



The Jason II

Journal of Student Scholarship
Volume I, Number 1 Spring 1984

1-52201

Dedicated to the Memory of
Katherine Ione Redmond '87
1965-1984

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A PARADISE LOST: France's Testing of Nuclear Weapons in French Polynesia Rebecca K. Cate	5
MUSIC ANALYSIS OF ROBERT SCHUMANN'S DICHTERLIEBE Susan Rutherford	15
FREEDOM AND ACTION: Tension in Enlightenment Thought Lee Schafer	18
CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN: An Intellectual of the Woman's Movement Carol McGowan	36
"INSTRUMENTS OF DARKNESS" AND THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS Katherine Redmond	43
THE NEW MASCULINE HERO IN THE FILM INDUSTRY Donal Welch	47
CIRCUMCISION: A History and Analysis Robert Johnson	54
CAN ART BE EDIBLE? Aimee Van Beek	71
SOCIAL CLASS IN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN: Perceptions of Social Stratification Craig McCarthy	74
GETTING SHIT ON YOUR HANDS Robin Craggs	93
THERE IS NO SOLUTION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO PROBLEM . . . John Schmor	96

PREFACE

For many years, the students of the College of Liberal Arts have successfully published the Jason, a literary magazine showcasing the creative writings of the Willamette Community. The Community of the University includes alumni as well as faculty and students; in general, it includes any people who are, or who have been closely connected with the life of Willamette. While the Jason has given an outlet and audience for the literary talents of our "community," the scholarly work done by the students has been largely confined to the classroom. The Jason II, a journal of student scholarship, is designed to provide a wider forum for some of the excellent papers students write during their four years at Willamette.

Sixty-four papers of superior quality were submitted to the editorial committee for consideration. The papers accepted for publication were chosen for their excellence and diversity. Special effort was made to include papers written by students who were at different points in their journey through a liberal arts education. Aimee Van Beek, Robin Craggs, and Katherine Redmond's papers, written during their first semester, show the beginnings of the thoughtful analysis and insightful examination which characterize papers written by seniors Rebecca Cate, John

Schmor, and Carol McGowan. Lee Schafer, Donal Welch, and Craig McCarthy's papers show the student's ability to cross the boundaries between disciplines in understanding and explaining social, cultural, and political phenomena. Robert Johnson and Susan Rutherford's papers, written during their sophomore year, are evidence of the diversity of intellectual interests found among the Willamette student body. Collectively they provide a sample of the student scholarship at the Willamette College of Liberal Arts.

Funding from A.S.W.U., the Student Affairs Fund, Mortar Board, Ralph Wright, and the departments of Physical Education, Economics, English, Political Science, Sociology, Religion, Philosophy, and Psychology, and the enthusiastic support of Dean Berberet, Rosemary Hart, and the faculty and students made it possible to realize the publication of the Jason II. We thank all those mentioned and others who wish to remain anonymous for their support.

Suresht R. Bald, Faculty Advisor
Lynne Beaton '85, Darin Dawson, Ed. '84,
Jana Fankhauser '86, Brad Middleton '85,
Lindsay Partridge '86, Katie Redmond '87,
Lee Schafer '87, and Ken Slosser '86.

**A PARADISE LOST:
FRANCE'S TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN FRENCH POLYNESIA**

Rebecca K. Cate, Class of 1984

French Polynesia is frequently alluded to as France's "Pacific Paradise," but more appropriately could be titled France's "Pacific Paradise Lost." For nearly two decades France had routinely conducted its nuclear tests in French Polynesia, turning the territory into a testing ground and nuclear waste site. By maintaining a convincing nuclear deterrent, France desires to preserve its status as an influential actor in the international arena, and continues to test despite alarming developments in French Polynesia such as increasing rates of radiation-related diseases and environmental damage.

Before France began testing in French Polynesia in 1966, it had already established itself as a nuclear nation with eight years of nuclear weapons development behind it. Unsatisfied with the NATO alliance and its conditions restricting nuclear weapons, France chose to act autonomously in the 1950's, creating its own nuclear strike force. France was determined at this time to remain independent from the Allies and to develop its own exclusive deterrence. General Charles DeGaulle, in an address made in 1959, declared that the defense of France must be a "French Defense." "The consequence is that clearly we must be able to provide ourselves . . . with a force capable

This paper was presented in Political Science 421, International Relations Seminar, in the Fall of 1983.

of acting on our account . . . It goes without saying that, as the basis of this force, there will be an atomic armament. . . " (Hartley, 1982:198). In reality, French nuclear armament had little to do with its military posture toward a political enemy, but a good deal to do with France's position regarding its principal allies.

The apparent politico-diplomatic advantages of nuclear weapons, the general inclination to return to the great power concert of former years, a determined desire to win as much maneuverability as possible vis a vis the Anglo Saxon powers, and the hope of gaining preeminence in Western Europe were the main considerations in the French decision to acquire nuclear weapons (Mohan, 1982:34).

France's acquisition, then, of nuclear weapons was preordained by the Gaullist vision of a greater and more independent France.

France's first nuclear device was detonated in February, 1960, at the Reggane Firing Ground in the Sahara. However, with Algerian independence in 1962, France was soon deprived of its Saharan testing site and another location had to be found. The French government's grounds for choosing French Polynesia were simple: "the area was uninhabited, situated outside of maritime and airline routes, capable of supporting scientific equipment and relatively distant from populated areas." (Tagupa, 1976: 202). The announcement of the new testing site from Paris aroused a "sudden furor of debate" in French Polynesia. In the early 1960's, when rumors that France would build a nuclear testing base in Polynesia first surfaced, elected leaders as well as the islands' traditional leaders vehemently opposed the plans. One elected official asked, "Since (according to the French government) there is really no danger at all, why does not the French government make these tests in the Marseilles harbor or in the center of Paris?" (Johnson, 1982:15).

A number of other relevant questions were raised following the official declaration in 1966: What would be the effects of atmospheric tests upon the human population and the environment in the area? Was it politically ethical that France decide to conduct tests without consulting public officials or conducting a public referendum? What would be the social and economic impact of an influx of civilian and military personnel and the migration of rural population into urban areas? Along with human and environmental concerns, apprehension was expressed over the immediate and far-reaching consequences of strontium 90, caesium 137 and carbon 14 (highly toxic and long-lived radioactive elements found in nuclear fallout) if they were to enter the islands' ecosystem. Besides affecting various life forms, the tests would pollute the ocean water, and subsequently the marine food chain including migratory fish such as tuna and bonito. Inevitably, the balance of life would be disrupted by radioactive fallout posing a decisive threat to inhabitants' lives, particularly to children and successive generations.

Since 1966, between five and seven nuclear devices a year have been detonated on the atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia, the most recent test taking place in June 1983. The total tests in the area have numbered over 100. The atoll of Moruroa has at least 90 detonations to its credit, 41 of which have been atmospheric. In 1975, bowing to international pressure several years after the majority of initiates of the international nuclear clientele had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (a multilateral agreement limiting the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons), France began testing underground. Robert Puissant, French Ambassador to Fiji and spokesperson for the French authorities concerning French Polynesia, insists that France's primary aim is to maintain its nuclear defense. "To be really persuasive, our nuclear arms must be kept up to date. An absolute nuclear weapon is useless: Thus we must continue our nuclear testing." (Robie, 1983:41). But as France

proceeds to test its nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, long-avoided and grave questions remain unaddressed: What have been the long-range consequences of twodecades of testing for the islands' inhabitants, and what does the future hold for these people as testing drags on?

Doctors and scientists have monitored regular occurrences of cancerous diseases associated with radioactivity among the Polynesians.¹ Some sources reveal that there has been an alarming increase in leukemia and thyroid tumors since the tests began in 1966. Bengt and Marie-Therese Danielsson, in their book on French testing, Moruroa Mon Amour, note a sharp rise in the incidence of cancer since the tests began. Subsequently, after 1975 there has been an increase in evacuated cancer patients (those with cancer serious enough to be treated in France, New Caledonia, New Zealand or the United States) from 22 in 1975 to 70 in 1982. Though this figure may not seem outstanding, it is important to remember that in this sparsely populated country--French Polynesia's population amounts to a mere 160,000--one could find little trace of cancer as few as two decades ago. The figures and the meaning of such statistics are uncertain nonetheless. Oddly, at the time the tests started, statistics on disease were no longer published by the French government. Scientists monitoring the rate of cancer among Pacific Islanders admit that they are unable to tell from gathered statistics whether there is a link between the cancer and France's nuclear testing. All the same, "the cancers found in the Polynesians have been monitored in other post-radiation-exposed populations, in particular the survivors of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and among Micronesians after American tests in the Central Pacific." (Robie, 1983:58). Such information has been verified by New Zealand doctors who have treated cancer patients from Tahiti since the early 1970's.

The menace of France's nuclear testing did not end after 1975 when France agreed to end above-ground

detonations. Alarming events such as leakages of radioactive waste into the Pacific Ocean have taken place lately on the Moruroa atoll because of underground detonations. After enduring an onslaught of over 90 explosions, reports claim that the atoll appears to be developing a fissure and slowly sinking. "According to recent internal reports circulated among engineers and technicians employed by the French Atomic Energy Commission, repeated tests on the atoll since 1966 have caused Moruroa to drop two centimeters after every explosion, with a total of 1.5 meters having disappeared underwater . . ." (Beaman, 1982:58). These events are not astonishing to the Danielssons: "As everybody knows, an atoll is a tall tower of porous coral, standing on a submerged mountain formed of brittle basalt . . . the most unsuitable place in the world for making underground tests" (Danielsson, 1983:4).

Unsettling events in connection with the testing have generated a wave of skepticism among the Polynesians regarding the safety precautions taken by the French authorities. For example, in 1979 two French workers died on Moruroa because of an explosion in an underground laboratory and in the same year the atoll partially collapsed. Its subsidance created a tidal wave after a faulty detonation caused a nuclear device to be triggered at a higher level than usual. 1981 brought an even more disastrous event when a storm swept radioactive wastes from testings stored on part of Moruroa into the lagoon of the atoll and into the Pacific Ocean. Despite these developments, the French government has announced its intention to expand the production of its nuclear arsenal by increasing research funding. All too clearly, there is no relief in sight for the Polynesians from the continual testing of atomic weapons on Moruroa.

During the first years of France's testing, the government's response to the Polynesians' anxieties were, for the most part, vague assurances like the following:

"absolute security of the population and all possibilities even the most improbable have been envisaged by responsible authorities." (Tagupa, 1976:202). All the while, other French authorities would claim just the opposite. The head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, for example, Professor Francis Perrin, conceded that the "contamination of the environment and eventually of fish does constitute a problem, considering the importance of seaproducts in the Polynesian diet... " (Danielsson, 1977:112). Undoubtedly, radioactive by-products from the detonation of nuclear weapons or the leakages of radioactive pollutants have found their way into the ocean and, subsequently, into the surrounding marine ecosystem and food chain. The Danielsson's remark in Moruroa Mon Amour is that the first link in the marine food chain, plankton, is rapidly contaminated by radioactive particles that manage their way into the ocean. The resulting process of larger fish eating smaller fish and so forth ultimately upsets the entire food chain, contaminating every consumer in its wake, including, inevitably, the islands' inhabitants.

At the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment, France's testing of nuclear weapons was openly condemned and labeled as ecocide, a human rights violation. The polluting of the ocean and the air with radioactive elements is an assault on the rights of the Polynesians and the rest of the world to a safe, healthy environment. Because the world ecosystems are interrelated, the issue of nuclear testing in French Polynesia is a problem that touches everyone, if not now, eventually. The moment radioactive elements are released into the environment they are out of control. As the air and ocean waters circulate, the radioactive materials are distributed throughout the world. In French Polynesia, the tuna and bonito that seasonally inhabit the waters of the islands help aid this process by sustaining some of the highest amounts of contamination and, in the natural course of their migratory habits, are able to carry the radioactivity to distant seas and shores. For instance, in 1968 scientists

at the University of Baja California, reported increasingly high degrees of radioactivity in fish caught along the Baja Peninsula (Mexico), and they blamed the French tests. Radioactive pollutants from nuclear testing or any other source travel freely regardless of territorial boundaries. As a result, the case of ecocide in French Polynesia becomes world ecocide and, likewise, the Polynesians' right to a pollution-free, livable environment becomes a global human right.

Aggravated by repeated tests, the problem of ecocide in French Polynesia fails to move towards a solution. As France consistently detonates more and more weapons, striving to preserve the viability of its nuclear deterrent, health and ecological damages in French Polynesia become more acute. One can predict that not only will exposure to abnormal amounts of radioactive material continue to cause high rates of cancer, but, in addition, the Polynesian gene pool will undergo a gradual loss of quality and, as a result, growing numbers of children will be born with gross mental and physical defects. According to Canadian biostatistician, Dr. Rosalie Bertell, "The most important target of radiation damage is genetic material . . . The mildly damaged child is of particular concern because he or she grows up less able to cope with the environment. This generation, in turn, produces a second generation also physically less able to cope with radioactive waste . . ." (Bertell, 1983:5). And on and on advances the cycle of generations gradually becoming more crippled by the unhealthy effects of nuclear testing. What kind of future is this for the Polynesians and other people who suffer contamination from nuclear waste and tests?

Ultimately, French Polynesia can be seen as a microcosm of the planet. The health and environmental problems emerging on a small scale in French Polynesia present the image of problems emerging on a larger scale in the global system. Consequently, France's expanding nuclear arms industry resembles mounting arms proliferation and the

ensuing proliferation of testing by First as well as Third World nations in the international arena. And as illustrated by the Polynesians, a proliferation of arms and testing carries with it a corresponding "proliferation" of human and ecological damage. Arms production perpetuated by France and other nations will eventually yield extensive cancer and irreparable destruction of the human gene pool and environmental habitat. Although the far-reaching effects of increasing rates of radioactive contamination do not appear as dramatic as the sudden annihilation of a nuclear war, the end results of both are the same: the extinction of the human race. We live in a world full of problems, yet in years to come, like French Polynesia, it will seem a "paradise lost" if the threats of worldwide nuclear testing become a reality.

NOTE

¹ A scientist and doctor researching the long-term effects of radioactive pollutants revealed the following list of irretractable human and environmental damages caused by radioactive nuclear fallout:

Latent chronic or long-term effects include a variety of cancers, impairment of growth and development, shortening of life-span and genetic disorders. (Howe, 1976:22).

(Included among the list of long range environmental consequences are) the degradation of the stratospheric ozone layer, long-term climatic changes, radioisotope contamination of the food chain, crop failures . . . (Chivian, 1982:10).

The environmental and physiological manifestations of fallout have become a major subject of investigation in recent years. Studies have been conducted in the United States examining the impact of 235 atmospheric tests at the Nevada test site between 1945 and 1962. Approximately 400,000 military and civilian personnel took part in the testing; subsequent studies have indicated a higher incidence of leukemia (a cancer associated with radioactivity) among these participants than in the overall U.S. population. In addition it has been found from research done at the University of Utah's College of Medicine that from 1959 to 1967 death from leukemia among children in Utah rose to 2.4 times that of the previous rate. These were the years following the period of highest exposure to nuclear fallout, 1951 to 1958. With such findings, the hypothetical damages in French Polynesia become only more credible.

WORKS CONSULTED

- Beaman, L.
1982 "A Nuclear Landscape." Oceans 15:58-59.
- Bertell, Rosalie.
1983 "Genetic Suicide." The Source 9:5.
- Chivian, Eric.
1982 Last Aid. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company.
- Danielsson, Bengt and Marie-Therese.
1983 "Moruroa the Dirtiest Pacific Island Will Be One Hundred Bombs Old in 1983."

1977 Moruroa Mon Amour. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd.
- Hartley, Anthony.
1982 Gaullism. New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey.
- Howe, Melvyn G.
1976 Health and the Environment. New York: Academic Press.
- Johnson, Giff.
1982 "Polynesia--France's Sugar-Coated Nuclear Fortress." Win 15.
- Robie, David.
1983 "In the Shadow of La Bombe". New Outlook 38-43.
- Tagupa, William E.
1976 Oceania and Beyond. London: Greenwood Press.

MUSIC ANALYSIS OF ROBERT SCHUMANN'S DICHTERLIEBE

Susan Alison Rutherford, Class of 1985

Dichterliebe, Poet's Love, is a series of songs composed by Robert Schumann in 1840. In these short vocal pieces, Schumann has put the poetry of Heinrich Heine to music. The first piece of the series describes a lover's ardent confession of his love in the springtime. The lyrics are set free by the melodic beauty and simplicity of the piece.

This piece derives its interest mainly from the melody. It is a smooth melody which is very repetitive. Although this is a vocal piece, there is a continual balance between the piano and the voice. The melody is often shared between the voice and piano. When not sharing the melody, the piano provides a compliment to the vocal part and contributes to the total melodic effect.

The piano begins with a four measure phrase before the voice enters with the theme in measure five. (See score). The voice has two measure phrases throughout the piece. The first theme is developed through the middle of measure eight, the end of the first section. Measure nine begins a four measure sequence which gives a feeling of moving the piece ahead. This corresponds well to the lyrics. In both stanzas the first two lines are describing the feeling of springtime and the last two lines describe the action of love bursting forth and then being confessed. The return of the original piano melody is seen in measure

This paper was presented in Music 131, Music Theory I, in the Fall of 1983.

14 and the second half of the piece follows the same pattern as the first thirteen measures.

The piece is to be performed slowly and broadly, it's rhythm is very simple. The piano provides an even framework of sixteenth notes. The entire structure of the piece is simple, giving emphasis to the theme. The key is minor, F-sharp minor, although this is not consistent throughout the piece. The words of the text are happy and speak of love in the springtime, yet the minor key gives a contrasting feeling. The music almost becomes joyful in measures 12 and 23 as the phrases end in transient cadences and seems to mutate from minor to major, but it returns to the minor key.

Schumann is a true musical Romantic. The piece feels very personal and emotional. It has a dreamy and reflective quality. Although emotion is subtle in his expressiveness, Schumann seems almost to veil the mood he wishes to express. The lyrics express the beauty of the month of May and the confession of a lover to his loved one. However, the music is not ecstatic, perhaps because the response of the loved one is not conveyed in this song. The concluding cadence is progressive and this further expresses a feeling of uncertainty about the response the lover will have to his outpouring of love. The conclusion is not shown in the lyrics or expressed in the music. Although subtle because of the simplicity of the music, the intensity of a lover's passion in springtime is felt through the music.

NOTES

Music Score From Dichterliebe, Edited by Arthur Komar and Published by W.W. Norton and Company

Im wunderschönen Monat Mai,
Als alle Knospen sprangen,
Da ist in meinem Herzen
Die Liebe aufgegangen.

Im wunderschönen Monat Mai,
Als alle Vogel sangen,
Da hab' ich ihr gestanden
Mein Sehnen und Verlangen.

In the lovely month of May,
when all the buds were bursting,
then within my heart
love broke forth.

In the lovely month of May,
when all the birds were singing,
then I confessed to her
my longing and desire.

FREEDOM AND ACTION: TENSION IN ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT

Man was born free; and everywhere he is in chains.
-Rousseau, The Social Contract

Lee Schafer, Class of 1985

Rousseau's seemingly paradoxical statement aptly describes the tone of the Enlightenment discourse. In their writings, Enlightenment thinkers share a common tension--given our human reality, how, then, shall we act? Indeed this tension ties their ideas together. Using various techniques of discourse, from philosophical treatises to satirical writings, the philosophes redefine the character of God, man, nature, and society in terms of a paradigm based on experiential, not rational knowledge. The paradigm allows for human autonomy--old notions of religion, society and philosophy do not fit into the parameters of the new paradigm. Yet human freedom is very tenuous. The philosophers realize man is "everywhere in chains," but they also realize that man must have new foundations which the old chains provided. The Enlightenment discourse, at times purely critical of old dogma and at times groping for new foundations on which man can act, conveys the Rousseauian tension of old world meeting new world. But it is not the nature of Enlightenment thinkers to digress from this tension. They attack, elucidate, and even construct, but, in all, they never truly despair. They leave a mark of hope and progress in dealing with the tension of their paradigm.

This paper was presented in History 345, European Intellectual History of the 17th and 18th Centuries, in the Fall of 1983.

MAN WAS BORN FREE . . .

Enlightenment thinkers inherited the empirical method—a method where individual experience rather than a priori rational thought determine human reality. John Locke articulated this method as the basis for human understanding. Locke insisted knowledge begins by perceiving. Locke stated that our mind is first void of all ideas and knowledge. Through experience, then, we gain knowledge about our world.

For Locke, though knowledge begins with experience, it is not limited to experience. From compiled experience we begin to reflect on ideas. We then start to demonstrate the agreement or disagreement among certain ideas. However, knowledge is more than a cumulation of experience. As Locke states:

For if we reflect on our ways of thinking, we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. (Locke, 1974:78)

The certainty of all knowledge depends on our intuitive knowledge. Although all knowledge begins with the senses, we cannot know the essences of this world without intuitive knowledge.

Locke's discussion of empirical knowledge plants the seed for further exploration into its possibilities and limits. David Hume searches for the limits and realities of Locke's empirical thinking. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume states the differences between empiricism and metaphysics. He sees his fellow empiricists, as well as rational thinkers, always searching for general principles. As he states, ". . . proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they [his contemporaries]

still push on their inquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. (Hume, 1974:308) Then not only are these principles abstract and obscure, but they bind humans to dogma. According to Hume, the empirical method does not lead to general truths. In his treatise Hume articulates the limits and true nature of empirical knowledge.

Like Locke, Hume believes human knowledge begins with experience. But, unlike Locke, Hume believes knowledge begins and ends with sensual experience. Hume states that we make associative relationships--resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect-- between our sense perceptions. Yet, because no knowledge is a priori--before experience; we cannot affirm our knowledge through demonstration or intuition. In summation, Locke confuses a priori knowledge of intuition with experience. As Hume states:

We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into the world, we could at first infer that one billiard ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse, and that we need not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree (Hume, 1974:325).

We cannot confuse custom with certain knowledge. As Hume states: "Motion in the second billiard ball is a quite distinct event from the motion in the first: nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other." (Hume, 1974:325) Our knowledge, then, is reduced solely to sense data. Though we might observe one billiard ball causing motion in the other, we cannot infer that this will be the case in every instance, nor can we demonstrate the cause.

Dogmatic truths in philosophy, then, are inconceivable. In this respect Hume's empiricism has tremendous consequences. Humans are no longer bound to general principles which determine their actions. In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume applies his skeptical philosophy to the traditional proofs of God's certain existence. In the dialogues, a Lockean empiricist, a skeptic, and a believer discuss the existence of God. Two traditional arguments are presented: the argument from design and the rationally based ontological argument. Each is presented, then each is destroyed.

Cleanthes, the empiricist, presents the argument from design. He states that from experience we observe natural laws; therefore, there must be a designer who causes the perfect laws of nature. Philo, the skeptic, thoroughly renounces the argument with several examples, the main assumption being one cannot infer cause from effect or the functioning of the whole from that of the part. The second argument, similiar in its use of cause and effect, assumes we have an a priori knowledge of ideas. The realization that "I think" necessarily leads to a cause of that thinking--God. Again, the argument is thoroughly refuted. Any premises assuming cause and effect relationships cannot be proven with certainty.

Religion, then, is only belief. Religious dogma based on gratuitous assumptions of certain truth have no justification in determining human actions. Hume's skepticism only gives justification to religious tolerance--humans may believe what they wish but are not justified in imposing their beliefs on others.

However, experiential knowledge does somewhat determine the human situation. Hume believes that human thought is historical and by looking to the past we can ascertain knowledge, highly probable knowledge, about natural laws and human nature. Yet, Hume suggests that to presuppose human nature is to presuppose unfounded

general principles. More importantly, human beings act out of will. The past gives us a high degree of probable knowledge, but humans also create the pasts of tomorrow. With experiential knowledge, uncertain knowledge, the human condition never remains static. Humans have the ability to change if they so desire.

Turning to Diderot, we see a French thinker articulating a view similar to Hume's. In his writings, however, Diderot is presenting a perspective rather than a philosophy. In D'Alembert's Dream, Diderot poses the question "what if?" What if we supposed a materially based world--what would it be like and what would be the consequences? In this work Diderot does not rigorously prove his assumptions but, rather, postulates the nature of a materially based world. The assumptions, however, convey an accurate sense of the climate of opinion in the Enlightenment period.

In the first part of the work, "Conversation Between D'Alembert and Diderot," D'Alembert speaks of the difficulties in substituting sensitivity for a Supreme Being as the foundation of human existence. Diderot, accepting the challenge, explains how a world of sense knowledge is valid. He describes how sensitivity inheres in all matter and is perceived by humans because they possess active rather than passive sensitivity. Diderot then continues to aptly explain the advantage of considering a materially based world. He states:

You will come to feel that by refuting a simple hypothesis that explains everything--sensitivity as a property common to all matter or as a result of the organization of matter--you are flying in the face of common sense and plunging into a chasm of mysteries, contradictions and absurdities. (Diderot, 1966:159)

As Hume, Diderot suggests we should be truthful about our world view. If it can be clearly explained materialistically, why trust the abstract and confusing conclusions of rational philosophies--conclusions which are "sheer metaphysico-theological balderdash!"

In the second and third parts of D'Alembert's Dream, Diderot expands on his materialistic paradigm. D'Alembert, agitated by Diderot's arguments, recalls his preceding discussion in a restless night of dreaming. His hostess, Mademoiselle de L'Epinasse, worried about his condition calls Dr. Bordeu, and, upon his arrival, the two, somewhat disregarding the disturbed patient, fall into a discussion of the world articulated by D'Alembert in his sleep. Using analogy and metaphor to explain scientific assumptions to the Mademoiselle, Dr. Bordeu explains that animal reproduction, and the structure of the body, are all materially based. For example, he likens the structure of the body to a spider and its web. The web, like the body's nervous system, receives stimuli which also perceived by the spider, the brain in the human case. Using this type of analogy, Diderot aptly describes technical material in laymen's terms and, therefore, further enhances the clarity of his assumptions.

The consequences of Diderot's world are extremely important. As Bordeu continues his discussion with Mademoiselle, the conversation turns to human sexuality. Individual sexual expression, a moral question in Diderot's time, is considered by Bordeu a natural desire void of any determining moral consequences. Bordeu thinks deprivation from a natural and even pleasurable sensation is both unhealthy and not supported by reason. As Bordeu states: "Exercise self-control, they tell me, and tire yourself out with physical exertion. I suppose this means go without one pleasure and put myself to a lot in inconvenience in order to keep another pleasure at bay! There's reasoning for you!" (Diderot, 1966:216)

The message is clear--the only true limits to individual expression are those set by nature. When one acts alone the necessities and desires of his material body should not be controlled by moral dogma.

Yet human freedom is limited by Diderot's materialistic determinism. D'Alembert, after awakening, asks Bordeu about the human will and freedom a person retains in a dream state. Bordeu states that it is the same as if awake: will is the impulse of desire and aversion whether determined at that very moment or from recollection of past experiences. In essence, there is no abstract concept of human will or freedom, yet there is some pretence for human action. As Bordeu states, ". . . there is only one thing I can say about human freedom of action: it is that the most recent of our acts is the necessary effect of one single cause--ourselves--a very complicated cause, but a single one." (Diderot, 1966:216). Although individuals are bound by their own experiences and desires, they are not bound by dogmatic rational concepts. Experience shapes, but experimental, unlike rational, knowledge, depends on individual perspective. While having conscious knowledge of our predicament, we have the freedom to cultivate and refine our experience in hopes of improving our lives.

Indeed, human freedom lies in the knowledge that a person can change his experience which dictates his actions. Such freedom gives man control over his fate as he is in control over his future. But, as we shall see, the philosophes are concerned with the nature of man's future. Given the nature of human autonomy, what are the criticisms and concerns about the fate of human beings?

. . . AND EVERYWHERE HE IS IN CHAINS.

"How should man act?" is a burning question in the Age of Enlightenment. George Berkeley has the answers, but given Hume's empiricism, they are unacceptable. This

is because Berkeley does not accept the nature of empiricism as it was being articulated by his contemporaries. Berkeley is concerned with skepticism--the doubting of God, person, and essences. Skepticism necessarily leads to atheism which Berkeley cannot accept. According to Berkeley, we need a purpose and a source of moral virtue that only God can provide.

However, in a sense Berkeley is a creature of his times. He is not a Cartesian rationalist but an empiricist. Locke's method is fine yet his materialism is dangerous and his dualism--sensation v. intuition--unacceptable. Berkeley's empiricism attempts to discredit materialism, solve the dualism, and establish moral virtue. In his Three Dialogues, Berkeley articulates a world of immaterial empiricism which he hopes will undermine the current climate of opinion and bring God back into the world.

As Berkeley's two characters, Hylas and Philonous, discuss how we know, we are taken into a world of skepticism. Philonous insists that ideas do not inhere in objects and that all empirical knowledge, is relative as qualities of matter are only ideas in our mind. However, entering dialogue two, Philonous states that our ideas are real because they exist in the mind. Yet we do not perceive ideas eternally--eventually we die. Ideas are real, then, because they exist in God's eternal mind. With Berkeley's empiricism, God becomes imminent. With this immaterial empiricism, Berkeley is not concerned with the extent of our knowledge; he is only concerned with overcoming skepticism and atheism and providing motivation for doing good.

Hume's empirical limits refute Berkeley's empiricism and are more acceptable to the secular climate of opinion. But Berkeley does have his finger on the pulse of Enlightenment thought. He feels the only way to ensure human virtue is to disallow the human autonomy of materialistic empiricism. Berkeley identifies the potential anguish of

Enlightenment thought--secular human freedom as opposed to morality. The tension increases as the Enlightenment becomes bolder in articulating a secular paradigm.

Besides Berkeley, both Locke and Hume were concerned with human morality. For Locke, humans experience pain or pleasure from sense gathered knowledge and pursue pleasure, avoiding pain. From experiential knowledge, the pleasure and pain principle is the basis for human morality. As Locke moves beyond experiential to certain knowledge, self-evident truths provide human moral foundations. Once man intuitively knows the good, he will pursue the good.

On the other hand, Hume, who denies self-evident truths, relies on our base sense of pain and pleasure combined with knowledge of human history to determine human morality. When we objectively observe human history, morality can be derived by doing that which is pleasurable and avoiding that which is painful. By looking to the past, man can establish laws to ensure secular morality. For Hume, then, experiential knowledge does lead to a notion of morality--not God given or intuited, but relying on human observation of history.

Though Locke and Hume are epistemologists, they cap their treatises with a derivation of morality. They, like Berkeley, have a genuine concern for the basis of human action. Yet Hume's notions differ from the other two. In articulating a materially based world, Hume allows for religious tolerance and human freedom to create law rather than religious dogma and determined laws. While establishing morality Hume does not enclose human thought in dogma. Experience can change and with it, our notions of human morality.

French Enlightenment thinkers, like Hume, feared philosophical systems and the dogma they entailed. Yet the French were more social critics than epistemologists. Even though there is a different emphasis, most French

thinkers, like Hume, accepted in part the materially based world of empiricism. Going beyond epistemology, the French exhibited a heightened concern about how man should act in a materially based world.

Pierre Bayle, who wrote at the end of the 17th Century, expresses the type of concerns characteristic of French Enlightenment thought. Bayle is critical of established religion. In the tradition of Montaigne, Bayle believes it is impossible to establish absolute truth from metaphysical concepts. Therefore religion, mainly Catholicism which relies on absolute truth, is self-contradictory. Established religions leads humans only to superstition which hinders their progress. Though Bayle is critical of the "church," he respects and exonerates religious ideals. Bayle suggests religious tolerance so that everyone might find for himself what is conformable to God's will. Religious tolerance is eventually better for society not only because it rids man of superstition, but also because it shifts the emphasis of religion to moral teachings. For Bayle, established religion asks too much, yet people should live by religious ideals.

Bayle, in his own writings, identifies the larger struggle of Enlightenment thought to come to terms with morality. Men should be free from erroneous superstition, yet religion is good because it teaches moral virtue. Bayle is afraid of limiting human potential yet he realizes the moral benefits of religious ideals.

Like Bayle, Diderot shunned certain truth as limiting human potential. In D'Alembert's Dream, the possibility of religion itself is undermined by a materially based world. Diderot, in articulating his notions of morality, must abstain from religious overtones. In Rameau's Nephew, Diderot expresses the tension between the world of empirical knowledge and the human ability to act virtuously in that world. The dialogue between "He" and "I," Rameau's nephew and the narrator, interestingly conveys Diderot's

concern with how humans should act and his hesitation to come to any conclusions.

"He," Rameau's nephew, is the dialogue's realist. From his experience in the world, "He" has come to the conclusion that happiness is purely self-interest--to survive and to seek pleasure. For "I," happiness comes from working toward virtue. His idea of virtue is elevated above the perceivable world of experience. From the start, Diderot depicts two contrasting points of view on how humans should act. It is not clear which position Diderot takes, but remembering D'Alembert's Dream, there is a distinct possibility Diderot agrees with "He." Yet "He" is portrayed as a scoundrel and a prostitute. While seeking survival and self-satisfaction, "He" must lie, cheat, and manipulate his fellow human beings. "I," on the other hand, is portrayed as a respectable and decent human rather comfortable in his position. Indeed, it seems Diderot does not wish to take any position in presenting these two contrary views.

However, "He" and "I" do compromise on a few points. "I" realize he is not above sensual pleasures. As "I" states:

I'm not above the pleasures of the senses myself. I have a palate too, and it is tickled by a delicate dish or a rare wine. I have a heart and a pair of eyes, and enjoy looking at pretty women. I like to feel her firm, round bosom, press her lips with mine, and drink pleasure from her eyes and die of it in her arms. (Diderot, 1966:66-67).

But Diderot is unwilling to converge his two views to the point of dogma. In Rameau's Nephew, Diderot seems uncomfortable with the materialism he articulated in D'Alembert's Dream. The life of "He" is far from acceptable even though he may be a victim of society. The transcendent ideals of "I," though not the only basis on

which humans can act, shows Diderot's restrained willingness to extend beyond materialism. Because he realizes dogma at any level might stifle human potential, Diderot leaves Rameau's Nephew open for review. In the spirit of the Encyclopedia, Diderot wants to enlighten men on their possibilities in hopes future generations may expand on his knowledge. In doing so, Diderot also captures the tension of Enlightenment thought--the tension between how man is and how he should act.

In a sense, Voltaire's Candide brings the anguish of Enlightenment thought to its peak. The young Voltaire had a firm belief in the power of the empirical method and a hope for the human condition. The older Voltaire as represented by Candide is not so certain. On one level, Candide is a biting satire lambasting everything from the church and the society to rational philosophy. On another level, it is a story depicting the plight of the human condition. Yet Candide ends on an optimistic note. Though quite restrained, Voltaire's hope is the Enlightenment's hope for a better future.

The story is of Candide, the naive boy of Westphalia, who, ostracized from his home, begins a quest to regain his lost position. At Westphalia Candide was surrounded by a beautiful environment, his instructor Pangloss, and the lovely Cunegund. As Pangloss states, "this was the best of all possible worlds." Indeed it was, yet, as the story progresses, Voltaire alludes to how naive a world it really was. The world beyond Westphalia is not the best of all possible worlds. Candide is tortured by the Bulgars, lives through both an earthquake and an inquisition in Lisbon, and loses a treasure worth more than several kings' treasuries combined. The outside world is full of torture, deceit, and despair--in total contrast to Westphalia.

Candide's quest for paradise regained turns out to be a quest for nothing. The growth of Candide and his realization that his quest is futile is important to note.

As Candide travels literally around the world, he begins to become conscious of his position. In Lisbon he forgets about Westphalia, continuing his search only for the lovely Cunegund. Here he starts to look forward instead of backward to Westphalia. He also starts to question Pangloss' notion that this world is the best of all possible worlds. As he is whipped and Pangloss hanged at an inquisition, Candide reflects:

How is it possible that the lovely Candide and the sage Pangloss should be at Lisbon, the one to receive a hundred lashes and the other to be hanged by order of my Lord Inquisitor, of whom I am so great a favorite? Pangloss deceived me most cruelly in saying that everything is fittest and best. (Voltaire, 1962:27)

Candide's life becomes a series of tragedies. But, as the old woman whom he meets suggests, his life differs little from other humans. "I have a great deal of knowledge and experience of the world," she states, "therefore take my advice. Divert yourself and prevail upon each passenger to tell his story. And if there is one of them all that has not cursed his existence many times, and still said to himself over and over again that he was the most wretched of mortals, I give you leave to throw me head forward into the sea." (Voltaire, 1962:41). Yet, if life is so wretched, why continue? The old woman answers this herself saying that she has a ridiculous weakness--the will to live. Here Voltaire's message is clear. Experience tells us how wretched our existence is, yet we have a strong desire to live. If paradise cannot be regained, it seems humans are destined to live less than perfect but live none-the-less.

In the end, Candide becomes fully aware of his human condition. Cunegund, once regained, is old and ugly, but Candide accepts the situation. As Candide's group settles in the garden, they learn from an old Turk to work

together. Working together keeps humans free from boredom, vice, and want. They learn, as *Candide* states, "to cultivate our garden." The garden, however beautiful and productive for the moment, is a resignation from the outside world. Yet the garden has future hope. *Candide* has not only himself and his experience, but also a community of friends on which to build. There is hope that this small community can eventually become a larger community and even a world community. Although Voltaire feels the anguish of the human situation as is, he feels the hope of the human situation as it ought to be.

The irony in *Candide* is clear. The progress toward a secular paradise is not paradise at all. Given the human condition and the wisdom of experiential knowledge, the best that can be achieved is *Candide's* garden. The future has hope as the garden grows, yet, for the moment, human freedom and action are limited to *Candide's* small community of friends.

As in any productive garden, the laborers need tools--the plow, the hoe, the shovel--to effectively cultivate the garden. In a sense, Immanuel Kant develops the tools needed to effectively cultivate *Candide's* garden. Kant perceives the tension between human freedom and human action. In order to strengthen the paradigm and relieve the tension, Kant revises Enlightenment thought making moral knowledge certain knowledge. The gardeners in Kant's garden are free individuals with inherent moral knowledge, no empirical limits, and able to progress with not just hope but certainty.

As in *Candide's* garden, the basis of human action in most Enlightenment thought is experiential knowledge. Yet in Locke and even Diderot we see some reliance on higher principles distinct from Hume's empirical limits. The Enlightenment thinkers had fought the chains of religious and social dogma, yet they had struggles with the method that allowed them to do so. Through the empirical

method they had secularized the human condition and made man free, yet many still saw the validity metaphysical notions gave to morality.

Kant wanted to establish free human beings with their own notion of morality. To do this, Kant restored the possibility of metaphysics. Hume's skepticism dealt in relative probabilities which allowed neither certainty in science nor morality. Yet rational philosophy was for him, as for all Enlightenment thinkers, unacceptable. Kant's method was to examine how the mind operated, and, after examination, to come to conclusions about human reality.

In Kant's Prolegomena, the presence of an active mind is important to note. Unlike the empiricists white tablet, Kant's mind is active and brings its activity to experience. This is the first step in Kant's work. To prove the certainty of mathematics, Kant states that we cannot have notions of mathematics without the ideas of space and time. That is, the mind brings to experience the intuitive knowledge of space and time. They are not concepts empirically derived, but part of the active mind.

The "synthetic a priori" judgements our mind brings to the study of science makes our sense perceptions not probable but certain knowledge. Hume states that our mind makes certain associative relationships, but these relationships are established by experience and are only probable. Kant, on the other hand, states that these associative relationships are a priori judgements the mind brings to experience. In doing this, Kant establishes certain natural law. The cause and effect relationships we observe are no longer gratuitous assumptions. In making mathematics and natural science certain knowledge, Kant deviates from Hume's empiricism. By observing an active instead of a passive mind, Kant brings about what he calls a "Copernican revolution." Mind will no longer conform to the world but the world to mind.

Kant's active mind always strives to make further associative relationships, but it can only go so far. What our mind is striving for, according to Kant, is the realm of the noumenal--thing in themselves. Kant suggests we act in the realm of the phenomenal, the realm of mathematical and scientific knowledge, yet there exists a realm of the noumenal which our mind is always striving to obtain. We cannot know for certain whether this realm exists or not--we have no metaphysical or rational intuition. Yet we can observe that our mind, by its nature, is metaphysical. By asserting this, Kant makes metaphysics possible.

While making metaphysics possible, Kant does not make it certain. Yet, since our mind is part of the noumenal, we have an inkling about what the noumenal contains. What does the possibility of metaphysics have to do with freedom and morality? With certain knowledge of universal natural law, it would seem man was a determined being. But the human mind is part of the unconditioned, not the conditioned. For Kant, the conditioned world of experience does not run into contradiction with the unconditioned world of the noumenal. As Kant states:

Now I may say without contradiction that all the actions of rational beings, so far as they are appearances (encountered in some experience), are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason are free. (Kant, 1977:86).

That is, in appearance, all actions conform to the laws of nature. Yet if the actions are taken by a rational subject of pure reason, the human being, the rational subject is free since his reason is the cause of natural laws. By asserting freedom, in a sense Kant is asserting moral responsibility. Ethics are part of the noumenal.

Human beings, then, inherently know what is wrong or right. Indeed, human beings are free to do the good.

Kant's autonomy is responsible freedom and sums up much of Enlightenment thought. The philosophes wanted a world where human freedom did not lead to anarchy. With the fear of God gone, humans must have some foundation on which to act responsibly. Hume's morality gives humans hope yet no certainty. The world was not enlightened, as shown in Voltaire's Candide, and hope that humans might act responsibly together was the restrained hope of Candide's garden. Given Kant's metaphysics, hope is turned into certainty. He retains human autonomy while making humans their own moral agents.

Yet Kant brings back the dualism of corporeal and incorporeal realities. On the whole, most Enlightenment thinkers feared systems thinking and the dogma entailed. Though Kant refutes the traditional religious and social dogma, he establishes a system that could be rarefied as dogma itself. Yet the irony of the human condition might be too serious to continue without rules. Enlightenment thinking and the idea of hope culminates with Kant's response--the revival of metaphysics and certainty. Yet Kant's response was indicative of Enlightenment thought in that it was optimistic and true to the nature of Enlightenment reality--a man-centered reality.

WORKS CONSULTED

Diderot, Denis

1966

Rameau's Nephew and D'Alembert's Dream.
Trans. Leonard Tancock. New York: Penguin Books.

Hume, David

1974

The Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
New York: Anchor Press.

Kant, Immanuel

1977

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.
Rev. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company.

Locke, John

1974

The Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
Abrid. Richard Taylor. New York: Anchor
Press.

Voltaire

1962

Candide & Zadig. Ed. Lester G. Crocker,
New York: Simon & Schuster.

**CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN:
AN INTELLECTUAL OF THE WOMAN'S MOVEMENT**

Carol McGowan, Class of 1984

The women's movement is not new, for over one hundred years ago Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1890 - 1948) "the Marx and Veblen of the woman's movement" (Nies, 1977:127) acted as a strong critic of American society because of its institutionalized oppression of women. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked a time of tremendous growth in America due to the industrial revolution, immigration and of course, social reform. In that climate of change Gilman wrote books and speeches promoting the then radical idea of equality for women through economic independence. The story of Gilman's life and thought centers around "her insistence on her right to be treated as a human being, to choose work which defined her, to be a producer rather than a consumer." (Nies, 1977:127).

In Gilman's day women were expected to be wives, mothers, and homemakers, completely dependent upon their husbands for survival and suppressed in any desires for career or major activity outside of the home. As Gilman's father had deserted his family, leaving them without adequate money and resources (Nies, 1977:129), Gilman knew from personal experience that economic dependence of females upon males was highly detrimental. Gilman's response was to challenge the restrictive traditional female roles by advocating that women be educated and trained

This paper was presented in History 341, Foundations of American Thought, in the Spring of 1983.

to be equals with men in the American work force. Undaunted by the anti-feminist conventions in society and encouraged by the precedent set by her activist Beecher relatives, Gilman rejected being a wife and mother ² "to be a selfassertive reformer instead." (Hill, 1980:13).

In her most successful book, Women and Economics (1898), Gilman criticized the plight of women in a male dominated world--what she called sexuo-economic relation and felt to be the root of societal injustices to women. In Gilman's words,

Because of the economic dependence of the human female on her mate, she is modified to sex to an excessive degree. This excessive modification she transmits to her children; and so is steadily implanted in the human constitution the morbid tendency to excess in this relation, which has acted so universally upon us in all ages. It is not the normal sex tendency, produced and maintained by the abnormal economic relation which makes one sex get its living from the other by the exercise of sex-functions. (Gilman, 1966:38-39).

By being reduced to an object for the purposes of sexual relations and child bearing, women had become totally dependent upon men. This dependence forced women to focus their lives completely on marrying and having a family. In this system a female clearly could not develop into a contented and moreover a self-sufficient individual.

Gilman's solution to this injustice was economic independence for the female who should work according to her talents and interests rather than by conforming to social conventions. Most of Gilman's female contemporaries were allowed few, if any, educational opportunities, particularly for developing a marketable skill. However, Gilman firmly believed that women had the right to be

men, and from the hardship of being just a tool for regeneration.

Even though Gilman's thrust for reform seems to have been primarily for women, also integral to her ideal view so society was men laboring and profiting together with women. She stated:

the basic condition of human life is union; the organic social relation, the interchange of functional service, wherein the individual is most advantaged, not by his own exertions for his own goods, but by the exchange of his exertions with the exertions of others for goods produced by them together. (Gilman, 1966:100 - 101).

Gilman did not view women as a separate entity; she instead desired to accomplish a better integration of men and women in society. In the economic sphere, cooperation of the sexes would bring a more equitable distribution of resources and wealth, and most importantly, would encourage women and men to interact as equals.

Further, Gilman did not intend to destroy the home environment by encouraging women to have careers. On the contrary, Gilman felt that family life would be greatly improved by both parents working and at the same time sharing home responsibilities. One reads in Women and Economics:

What we need is not less home, but more; not a lessening of the love of human beings for a home, but its extension through new and more effective expressions. And, above all, we need the complete disentanglement in our thoughts of the varied and often radically opposed interests and industries so long supposed to be component parts of the home and family. (Gilman, 1966:123).

Gilman pointed out that mothers were not any better trained in how to socialize children than the rest of society. Thus, beginning in the home with father and mother nurturing their offspring, society as a whole should be responsible for training and improving its people. The main goal of Gilman's work, then, was to encourage relationships of equilibrium between males and females to benefit the health of all Americans. (Nies, 1977:140).

Gilman was heavily influenced in her thinking by two important nineteenth century intellectual trends: Marxism and Darwinism. Her ideal of social equality was the Marxist view of economic reform, based upon the equity of "from each according to his ability; to each according to his need." Ideally, then, in a communist system, both male and female are in the work force in a way best suited to their talents, their profit to be equally distributed within the whole society.

Socialism was a main theme in Gilman's lectures and clearly it was integral in her theory for economic independence. However, Gilman disclaimed full association with the Socialist Party; after reading a membership card, she wrote, "I utterly refused to sign it; sharply disagreeing with both theory and method as advanced by the followers of Marx." (Gilman, 1972:198).

Similarly, she was attracted by the views of Darwin as these were adapted by the American sociologist Lester Ward, who created a Darwinian theory of human progress. Ward first explained this theory in an 1888 Form article, "Our Better Halves". The main point is that in nature the female is primary and the male secondary, but freedom from competition allows males to become the dominant sex among the human species. Ward was critical of this "survival of the fittest" evolution because it negated equilibrium. Society should not be cruel and wasteful as in nature, assumed Ward, and thus, people should not live in competition but in cooperation.

Ward was to Gilman "the greatest single influence on her intellectual and professional development." (Nies, 1977:138). She adopted his theory on women as her own. Women could regain the power lost in competition by means of cooperation to reach an end of equality of the sexes. Evolution within society was essential for change but the progress should result from the effort to work as a unified whole. Gilman advocated this idea continually in her writings, doing more to promote the sociology of Lester Ward than his own work did.

Gilman came to call herself a sociologist and it is difficult to place her within any particular group of her day. As a radical feminist Gilman was set apart even from the suffragists, for she believed that women needed more than just the vote, since "the political equality demanded by the suffragists was not enough to give real freedom." (Gilman, 1972:235). On the other side, many of Gilman's contemporaries felt Gilman was asking for too much change. Because Gilman's ideas were rejected by editors who wanted her to ascribe to the norm, Gilman established her own paper, The Forerunner, which was a successful publication from 1909 to 1916. Despite opposition, then, Gilman strove to change what she saw as the worst evil in society, inequality of the sexes.

This advocacy for equality seems mild, in retrospect, yet in her own age, Gilman was considered a radical for her feminist views. And, indeed, Gilman herself admits in her autobiography, The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, that a suffrage leader once said to her,

After all I think you will do our cause more good than harm, because what you ask is so much worse than what we ask that they will grant our demands in order to escape yours. (198).

NOTES

¹ Gilman's books include In This Our World (1893), Women and Economics (1898), Concerning Children (1900), The Home (1904), The Man-Made World (1911), His Religion and Hers (1923), and her autobiography, The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1935).

² Gilman was a member of the New England Beecher clan as the great grand-niece of Harriet Beecher Stowe, famous author of Uncle Tom's Cabin. Gilman's first marriage was to Charles Stetson in 1884, and her first and only child was born one year later, but she divorced herself from both husband and child.

WORKS CONSULTED

- Gilman, Charlotte Perkins
1966 Women and Economics. New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers,
Torchbook edition.
- 1972 The Living of Charlotte Perkins
Gilman. New York: Arno Press.
- Hill, Mary A.
1980 Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The
Making of a Radical Feminist,
1860 - 1896. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
- Nies, Judith
1977 Seven Women Portraits from the
American Radical Tradition.
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books, Ltd.
- Porterfield, Amanda
1980 Feminine Spirituality in America.
Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.
- Smith, Page
1970 Daughters of the Promised Land.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.
- Wellington, A.
1930 Women Have Told: Studies in the
Feminist Tradition. Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co.

"INSTRUMENTS OF DARKNESS" AND THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS

Katherine Redmond, Class of 1987

In Loren Eiseley's essay, "Instruments of Darkness," the claim is made that, in the present day, science and the predictions it fosters can be detrimental. The predictions may cause us to assume a future which our actions then bring into being in a distorted form. Eiseley suggests that a pattern selected from past events, pointing to an inescapable future, may make the assumptions come true by sheer will put into action. The results of such action are seldom benign.

The essay is subdivided into four parts. In the first of these, an allusion to the Shakespearean play Macbeth is introduced. Macbeth, the major character of the play, is shown a future by the witches. However, Macbeth misinterprets the prophecy spoken by the witches, and plots to kill the king to carry out his destiny. In a modern interpretation of this scene, one notes the connection between nightmare and science. Like Macbeth, the public is told oracles of the future of our society. One is able to see the past, or the part of the past which can either be researched or remembered, the present can also be seen but, one can never know what the future holds. However, it is as if through glimpses of the past and present that one is able to "hazard a guess" at what the future may bring. This is as dangerous for the present society as it was for Macbeth. If by envisioning a future evil, one is able to instigate that evil, one is, in reality, capable of affecting the future.

This paper was presented in English 130, Craft of Writing II, in the Fall of 1983.

The second part of the essay discusses the idea that man is composed of chemicals, Eiseley states that "my body does not know me," and asks "where is the dweller" of the body. Here he brings in the illustration of the fossil embedded in the rock for centuries. He begins to ponder upon whether the fossil was ever really alive, which leads him to wonder if he himself is really a living, breathing organism, or simply a mass of chemicals. When Eiseley brings up the suspicion that the true nature of man may be obscured by his body, he is bringing up an important point that there is perhaps something else contained inside the body, such as a soul, which is inherently necessary to the nature of man. Thus, all the chemicals which make up the body (as well as the case the body is contained in), seem detrimental to man's soul as they obscure an important part of his nature.

The third part of the essay delves deeper into the question of the mysteriousness of man. Eiseley describes the relationship man has with himself as "dark," "void," and "empty." (Eiseley, 1971:52). It is posed since it is not the right of man to stop or arrest nature simply because he feels the future may cause harm. Even though the turns science takes may be evil, present-day man does not have the right to arrest science and allow no further development. Eiseley notes the fact that primates had the choice of stopping evolution where it was by choosing not to come down out of the trees. If this had been the case, modern man would never have progressed to the highly advanced technological stage he is presently in (on the other hand, it may be argued that the present technological stage is a liability to modern man). Another important point is brought out in the third section of the essay: fear of the future causes people to cling to the present and to be afraid of trying new ideas. Yet the natural human tendency to strive for improvement and the betterment of oneself fortunately will cause man to move on to develop new ideas. This is considered a basic reality.

Part four of Loren Eiseley's essay, "Instruments of Darkness" contains within it a type of conclusion: "man is not man." (Eiseley, 1971:54). The reiteration of the concept that the body is being classified as the "man," where it is really the soul that makes the man, underscores the importance Eiseley places upon this point. The central theme, the danger of jumping to conclusions regarding the future, is expressed in this final section of the essay in the profound statement that "Man's unhappiness comes of his greatness," as stated by Thomas Carlyle. The "Infinite-ness" of man is a product of his greatness. This is what makes it so difficult to appreciate fully the whole man composed of both chemicals and body parts, as well as this inner self. The basic problem man now has at the dawn of the scientific age, is "Man's conception of himself." (Eiseley, 1971:55). This ties in with Shakespeare's lines about foretelling the future; "That he which is was wished until he were." In other words, what one wishes to come true will come true because one will make it come true. This belief can be traced back to science and the supposed foreknowledge of future scientific results; for a group of people who share the common belief that some end will come about can make that end occur simply by acting as if it is the only plausible solution, and therefore negating the possibility of any other solution.

WORKS CONSULTED

Eiseley, Loren
1971 The Night Country New York: Scribner.

THE NEW MASCULINE HERO IN THE FILM INDUSTRY

Donal Welch, Jr., Class of 1984

In what may be an emerging genre in the movies--the "post feminist" romance--there appears a character who expresses in his personality and in his relations with the "heroine" a new ideal of masculinity. He might be described as the "emotionally competent hero." Alan Bates played him in An Unmarried Woman; John Voight played him in Coming Home. He is the man to whom women turn when they attempt to change their lives--someone who is strong yet affectionate, capable of intimacy, unthreatened by commitment, and above all, masculine without being dominating.

Compared to the archetypal, old-fashioned hero exemplified by John Wayne, Gary Cooper, or Cary Grant, the current figure of romantic imagination is less wooden, more emotionally articulate. Unlike the intensely emotional heroes that Marlon Brando or James Dean portrayed in the fifties, he is at ease with himself; he is more mature and less troubled. Nor is he the kind of "anti-hero" played by Dustin Hoffman or Jack Nicholson in movies of the late sixties or early seventies--small, estranged, and in Nicholson's case often cynical and debauched.

Of course, the emotionally competent hero is by no means a dominant figure in the movies, any more than he is in real life. In her book, Big Bad Wolves, a history of masculinity in the American cinema, Joan Mellen argued that the male of the 1970's--epitomized for her by actors

This paper was presented in Speech 230, Mass Media, in the Fall of 1982.

like Clint Eastwood and Charles Bronson--had become even more violent and brutal than he was before (Mellen, 1972:16). Perhaps there are more heroes in the Eastwood-Bronson mold than of the sort played by Bates or Voight. Yet, regardless of the numbers, the new, softer image of masculinity seems to represent what is distinctive and significant in films of the late seventies. The hero in the post-feminist romance, although not overpowering, is a firm and clear-headed fellow, possessed of a calm intensity of feeling and a capacity for non-neurotic expressiveness.

Kris Kristofferson, in Martin Scorsese's 1975 film Alice Doesn't Live Here Anymore, played what now seems to be the prototype for this role. Calm, peaceable, and warmly attentive, Kristofferson--as the rancher who gains Alice's affections--embodied the sort of "non-violent" sexuality and relaxed intimacy also communicated by Alan Bates as the artist Saul Kaplan, who wins the heroine's hand in An Unmarried Woman, and by John Voight as the wounded Vietnam veteran Luke Martin, who gains the devotion of the heroine in Coming Home.

Indeed, these three films share remarkable similarities. In each there is a first husband who is clean-cut, aggressive, tense, self-absorbed, handsome, but utterly unresponsive to his spouse. He departs early in each film. Alice's husband (Billy Greenbush) dies in a trucking accident; in An Unmarried Woman, Erica's husband (Michael Murphy) leaves her for another woman; in Coming Home, Sally's husband (Bruce Dern) is sent to Vietnam. Then Alice (Ellen Burstyn), Erica (Jill Clayburgh), and Sally (Jane Fonda), who have displayed signs of muted unhappiness, are forced to reconstruct their lives. In the course of doing so, they meet the "other man"--played by Kristofferson, Bates, or Voight--who in each case is less conventional in his lifestyle, more relaxed, more immediately "there" than the husband.

Alice and An Unmarried Woman were acclaimed as films about changes in the consciousness of women, and Coming Home is generally labeled an "anti-war" movie (Sherwood, 1978:13). Yet all three are about changing ideals of the male character, represented by the contrast between the first husband and the new man, and dramatized by the passage that the women in each film make between them. About ten years ago, at a time when the movies were dominated by "buddy" relationships of the Redford-Newman type, vigilante violence, the disaster cult, and a pervasive sense of moral decay, Pauline Kael wrote an essay entitled "On the Future of Movies." She concluded that "nobody understands what contemporary heroes and heroines should be, or how they would relate to each other" (Kael, 1974:4). This is no longer as true as it was then. For although these more recent films can be rather sanctimonious about their own implicit values, they do point toward a recovery from nihilism and an attempt to put relationships between men and women on some reasonably respectable foundation. Part of that effort is a rethinking, a remolding, of the stereo-typical male personality.

As if to highlight the differences between the old and the new images of manliness, the films show two contrasting scenes of the husband and the lover with the heroine. The first is a moment of coercion, the second a moment of tenderness. In the first, the husband, consumed by his own sexual appetite, virtually relieves himself on his wife, while she passively accepts what seems to amount to little better than rape. Later in the film, with the new man, she is passionate and responsive, and her body comes alive with energy. The contrast is particularly graphic in Coming Home, in which Luke, although paralyzed, is able to give Sally more satisfaction than her virile husband. Sally and her husband, on the eve of his departure for Vietnam, make no eye contact when they "make love;" he turns down the light and grapples above her in search of his own satisfactions, while her eyes

stare off somewhere else. On her first night with Luke, however, he insists that the lights be kept on. "I want to be able to see you," he tells Sally, and he lavishes attention over her in what is plainly a statement about "what it takes"--and what it does not take--to be a good lover.

The two men in each film also present a study in contrasting appearances. (It can hardly be an accident, either, that the husbands all have very American names--Don, Bob, and Marty--while the names of the new men have a Biblical origin--David, Luke, and Saul.) Kristofferson, Bates, and Voight all look a bit ragged and furry in these pictures; the beards give their faces a softer and rounder rather than angular appearance (the beard may also call attention to the more sensual, soft, and oral quality of their relationships with the women, as opposed to the husbands' sometimes violent and more narrowly genital preoccupations). Their more irregular appearance also highlights their even more irregular style of life. The husband in each case is an employee of some kind--a truck driver in Alice, a stockbroker in An Unmarried Woman, and an army captain in Coming Home. By contrast, none of the new men hold down regular nine-to-five jobs--Kristofferson plays a rancher, Bates an artist, and Voight a recuperating veteran. While the first husbands are preoccupied with the anxieties about work and competition, the new men are less harried, more easy going, more playful. They have a sense of humor. They like children.

The new man is not simply, as he might have been in a novel of a few decades ago, a lustier, more Dionysian lover, set against a weak and sexually repressed but socially respectable husband. That is an old opposition, out of D.H. Lawrence, belonging to an earlier period of revolt against ideals of Victorian gentility. The husband in these newer films is virile enough, even athletic. His problem is not impotence--he can respond physically, but he seems incapable of emotional expression. The new man is more readily reactive, gentler, and in some ways even more domestic.

Ideals of male identity seem to go through periods when they become more "masculine" or "feminine." (Here I use these terms to represent the various qualities conventionally associated with each one, such as physical strength and emotional self-control with masculinity, and nurturance and compassion with femininity.) Whereas earlier in this century we were in a masculinizing period--of which Lawrence and Hemingway were an expression--today we are in a period in which features of masculinity are being softened (Levine, 1975:71). Superficially, this was apparent in the long hair and uni-sex clothing of the 1960's, but it now goes deeper. Feminism and economic independence have encouraged women to make greater emotional demands on men not to tolerate the distant self-absorption of the competitive male primarily involved with his career (Levine, 1975:56). These characters on screen embody many of the qualities of responsiveness and intimacy now sought by women. They are the idealized response to a real change in social awareness.

Husbands in the films are representatives of the old order, and are treated accordingly. At their worst (which they often are), they are selfish pigs; at their best, they are merely pathetic or foolish. The wives are presented as victims, innocent of whatever has gone wrong in their marriages. The films examine the emotional struggles of the women, not the men, although it is clear in An Unmarried Woman and Coming Home that the husbands are in the throes of some desperate uneasiness. But they evoke little more than pity. Whatever they are suffering, they keep to themselves--indeed their inability to articulate their anxieties is in itself part of their character. Michael Murphy, who is more expressive than the other husbands, attempts to give some complexity to his part in An Unmarried Woman, and interestingly enough, he stated in a 1980 interview: "I'd love to have played the Bruce Dern part in Coming Home because if you can bring some sympathy to those characters and not make them just these obnoxious jerks, there's a nice kind of ambivalence about

it" (Calhoun, 1979:5). But the films are ultimately firm in their verdict on these characters. They are the bad-men of the tale and they meet a sad and just retribution.

The new man, to be sure, might not satisfy a radical feminist, either. In An Unmarried Woman, Saul Kaplan makes it clear to Erica that painting comes first in his life, and Luke tells Sally in Coming Home that nothing has been on his mind more than sex. Still, these new lovers are gentler and more sensitive than the husbands, and they are clearly meant to serve as counter-images of comparatively "unchauvinistic" men. If anything, they seem too good to be real--only John Voight, of the three actors, portrays a character with some inner tension. They are the stuff of romantic fantasy, only now the fantasies have been adjusted in light of the changing relations between men and women.

The more troubling issue it would seem to feminists, who would like to see women making it on their own, is why the new men show up at all. By having the heroines meet their fair princes, even though they are princes of a new masculinity, the films avoid some of the issues they initially promise to raise. But without the new men, the movies would not only lose the element of romantic fantasy that makes them more widely appealing, but would also fail to develop the positive side of their implicit critique of masculinity.

WORKS CONSULTED

- Calhoun, Coleen
1979 "Michael Murphy the Actor--An Interview." New York Times, September 9.
- Kael, Pauline
1974 On The Future of Movies. New York: Harper and Row.
- Levine, Bette
1975 The Feminist Movement Today. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Mellen, Joan
1972 Big Bad Wolves. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich.
- Sherwood, George L.
1978 "Coming Home--An Emphatic Perspective." New York Times, November 16.

CIRCUMCISION:

A History and Analysis

Robert Johnson, Class of 1984

Circumcision is the practice of completely removing the penile foreskin--a loose fold of skin attached to the base of the penis head concealing the glans or head of the penis. Age-old and of unknown origin, the practice is still widely observed throughout the world, especially in the United States, where ninety percent of all newborn babies are circumcised. Circumcision has been performed by a variety of techniques and for diverse reasons. The practice has not, however, been without opposition. Although the reasons for opposing circumcision have changed throughout the years, the bitterness of opposing it have not.

It is not known where circumcision was first performed, but the antiquity of the practice is suggested by its widespread ethnic distribution and by the early preference for performing it with a stone knife (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1979:945). The practice has been observed in nearly all parts of the world, only the Indo-Germanic, the Mongol, and the Finna-Ugrian speaking peoples have been found to be unacquainted with it (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1979:945).

Circumcision is often associated with Judaism. Though it is true that Jews have observed the practice for thousands of years, their observance was preceded by

This paper was presented in English 130, Craft of Writing II, in the Spring of 1981.

that of the ancient Egyptians, the primitive Arabs, and the Aztecs of Central America (Brown, 1971:92). Among those early peoples with whom circumcision was not religiously indicated, the practice generally carried a large degree of tribal and/or marital significance. As well as serving as a tribal mark of status, or formal admission to a certain intratribal group, it often served as a sacrifice for marriage, a sort of male dowry. For this type of marital sacrifice, pre- or puberty circumcisions were common, as marriage at those times often took place at or shortly after puberty (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1979: 945).

In the religious sphere, the Jewish have been the best known for circumcision. The practice began among the Jews when Abraham circumcised himself at age ninety-nine to form a covenant between God and the Jewish people. Genesis 17: 11-12:

Every male among you shall be circumcised. And ye shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a token of a covenant betwixt Me and you. And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you, every male throughout your generations.

It would appear that circumcision among the Jews has always been practiced in the neonatal period. It is suggested, however, that it started as a marital rite and as it gained a more lofty religious significance, was advanced to childhood and finally to infancy to bring the Jewish men under God's protection as soon as possible (Polan, 1967:878 and Brody, 1979:13). Indications that circumcision was connected to marriage or fertility rites are found in several places in the Bible. The reference in Exodus 4:25-26 to a "spouse of blood" and the reference made in the incident with the men of Sichem in Genesis 34:14-12 could indicate a connection between circumcision and marriage. Furthermore, other Biblical references made

to "uncircumcised" lips, heart, and ears as organs which do not fulfill their function until they are "circumcised" also tend to support the hypothesis that the practice was related to marriage (Polan, 1967:878). There is also semantic evidence in support of this thesis. The Hebrew term which translates as bridegroom is closely connected with the Aramic word for to circumcise, and the Hebrew word for uncircumcised means obstructed, as in the aforementioned obstructions of lips, heart, and eyes (Encyclopedia Judaica, 1971:568).

The importance of circumcision among the Jewish people is evidenced by the intricacy and formality of their circumcision ritual. The rite is strictly observed on the eighth day of a boy's life, preferably early in the morning, even if that day should be a Sabbath or a festival day. There are only four exceptions to the rule. Boys born with general diseases are circumcised seven days after the disease is cured. Those born with local disorders are circumcised immediately after they are well. If the eighth day is a Sabbath or a festival day and the child was born by Caesarean section, the operation is postponed until the next weekday. Permanently exempted from circumcision are those boys whose families have a history of bleeding problems; hence, although the practice is strictly observed in most cases, one need not be circumcised to be a Jew. Children born of Jewish mothers are Jewish, without regard to their circumcision status, unless they convert, and non-Jewish men may convert to the faith without being circumcised (Encyclopedia Judaica, 1971:570).

The traditional ritual of Jewish circumcision is rather involved and may take place in a synagogue, hospital, or a home. It is quite a festive occasion with many friends and relatives in attendance. Although it may be performed by any Jew, a loyal adherent to the faith is preferred. The operator is called the Mohel (pronounced like oil with an m). Brought into the "operating room" by the grandparents and the godparents, the child is handed to the

Mohel who takes the baby and places it on a pillow on the lap of the Sandak, or "holder." While the Sandak holds the infant's legs, the Mohel assesses where to make the cut, places a protective shield inside the foreskin and circumcises the foreskin with a sharp knife or scapel. This exposes a mucous membrane which is then torn down to the corona--tearing the membrane produces less bleeding than does cutting. Finally, the Mohel removes the blood by suction. In years past, this was done by directly sucking with the mouth. Today, in order to prevent infection, the Mohel sucks up the blood through a glass tube. After a sterile dressing is applied and the baby is refitted with a diaper, the Mohel gives him several drops of wine, recites ritual prayers, and names him (Encyclopedia Judcica, 1979:570).

Some Mohels do not follow exactly the traditional ceremony. Often, an upholstered board, with loose velcro leg straps replaces the Sandak. Some Mohels also use spray anesthetics and a special product called Skin-Freeze which is designed to slow the bleeding (Esquire, 1981:97).

The importance of circumcision to early Jews is attested by the great suffering they endured near the end of the Old Testament period. Under the rule of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, many Jewish mothers who had their sons circumcised underwent cruel punishment often resulting in death (Encyclopedia Judcica, 1979:570). Circumcision became a great test of faith for many Jews.

One other faith which has adhered to the practice of circumcision is Islam--laws of the faith require circumcision before marriage. Among the early Islamic Tihama tribes of the Arabian Highlands, the rite occasionally became a test of personal courage and endurance for young men. In these cases, the ritual, or tests, would be carried out as far as exposing the entire groin region, scrotum, and inner legs. This required incising and peeling off a triangle of skin from the navel to the

thighs and across below the scrotum (Abarbanel and Ellis, 1973:547-48).

The practice of circumcision in Christianity was very short-lived--largely abandoned less than one hundred years after the inception of the religion (Boswell, 1980:106). The basis for the abandonment was that Christ the Savior had been circumcised, and thus Christians did not need to undergo the ritual; faith was the only necessary token of their covenant with God (Polzan, 1976:878).

This rather ambivalent attitude among early Christians, however, did not last long. By the middle 600's the practice was stridently condemned. Civil laws written in terms of Christian morality by the ruler of the Spanish Visigoths in 650 stipulated stoning or burning alive for the observance of circumcision (Boswell, 1980:174).

Circumcision operations not involving religious ritual are generally performed in the hospital one to seven days after the infant's birth. Two methods are primarily practiced. The first of these uses a funnel shaped plastic tube and a clamp device. After a longitudinal slit is made in the foreskin down to the corona, the funnel-tube is placed inside the foreskin, covering the entire glans. Over this tube and outside the foreskin a plate is placed with a hole slightly smaller than the bottom diameter of the funnel-tube. The plate fits over the funnel tube leaving exposed only the portion of the skin to be removed. A clamp on the plate is then attached to the tube to secure it further into the hole in the plate, thus holding it in place and constricting the blood vessels in the foreskin to reduce bleeding when the cut is made. Finally, the foreskin is circumcised with a sharp scalpel (Birch, 1975: 56).

A second less common procedure involves the use of a similar plastic tube and a loop of nylon thread. The tube, rather bell-shaped in this case, is placed between the

glans and the foreskin. The loop is tightened around the foreskin into a groove at the base of the bell, securing it in place and constricting the blood vessels in the foreskin. The surgeon then runs a scalpel once around the base of the bell and the operation is over. The bell is left for a day or two and the infant urinates through an opening in the top of the bell (Reubin, 1969:68).

As to the question of when the circumcision is best performed, studies indicate that delayed circumcision is preferable. Researcher Richard E. Marshall found that ninety percent of infants circumcised at two days showed significant behavior change for at least four hours compared to only ten percent of those circumcised at three weeks (Marshall, 1980:13). Hemostatically and dermatologically, the eighth day, the day chosen by the Jewish, is believed the best (Esquire, 1981:98).

There are primarily three grounds on which circumcision is favored or opposed. The first of these is religious belief. Arguments on these grounds, as they are a matter of individual beliefs, are not subject to logical considerations.

The second reason for siding for or against circumcision has to do with sexual gratification. The argument that the foreskin has a richer nerve supply than the glans, and thus is more sensitive than the glans, has been used both to support and oppose circumcision. Some say that removal of this extra sensitive part of the organ lessens a man's pleasure potential (DeMartino, 1979:210). Others say that the high sensitivity of the foreskin is largely responsible for premature ejaculation; thus, they feel the foreskin should be removed (Andelman, 1973:291). Although some studies have tended to support the hypothesis that the foreskin is extra sensitive (DeMartino, 1979:215), more objective and scientific research has led to a different conclusion. In a study of seventy men, thirty-five uncircumcised, sex researchers Master and

Joynson found no difference in either sexual pleasure or ejaculatory control, thus refuting arguments both for and against circumcision based on foreskin sensitivity (Otten, 1981:31). Furthermore, in all but a very small percentage of uncircumcised men, the foreskin is fully retracted during intercourse, leaving the glans exposed just like that of a circumcised man (Freedman, Kaplan, and Sadok, 1976: 86). And for those men whose foreskins do not fully retract, studies separate from those of Masters and Johnson have found no difference in sensitivity between retracting and non-retracting penises (McCary, 1978:311). Even without the benefit of Masters and Johnson's research, the arguments for or against circumcision on grounds of sexual gratification are invalid.

The final ground on which the need for circumcision is supported or refuted is medical or scientific reasoning. Although this area is cluttered with many conflicting studies, there does seem to be a prevailing opinion.

When medical considerations are taken into account, the greatest problem most parents have in deciding whether or to have their child circumcised is ignorance. Most parents are unaware that they can even make a decision, or that a decision one way or the other could have any significance. A survey by researcher Douglas Gairdner asked subjects to distinguish between a circumcised penis and an uncircumcised penis produced wrong answers by fifty percent of the women and thirty-four percent of the men questioned (Talan, 1981:100). It is quite evident that most mothers, who usually make the circumcision decision with little or no input from the fathers, (Grimes, 1980:108) have very little knowledge of the procedures and risks involved in the operation (Panter, 1981:82). Although some doctors explain the high rate of circumcision in the U.S. by high patient demand, this demand is not rationally based--a recent study found that seventy-two percent of the mothers surveyed had never discussed circumcision with their doctor (Panter, 1981:82). Most

hospitals simply give expectant mothers a "Circumcision Release Form" along with the insurance and other forms upon admittance to the hospital. Reasons commonly given by parents for choosing circumcision include prevention of bedwetting, masturbation, excessive crying, and many childhood disorders (Grimes, 1980:108). Others opt for the surgery because they think it is required for entrance into the military, or that circumcised penises are more aesthetic than uncircumcised penises. Still others are under the impression that they have no choice in the matter, that circumcision is mandatory hospital policy or state law (Grimes, 1980:108-109).

Of the more soundly based reasons for favoring circumcision, penile cancer is probably one of the most common. It is believed by many that this cancer often results from the accumulation of smegma, a thick, cheesy, greasy substance formed by a combination of secretions from the Tyson's glands, just below the corona, and dead cells shed from the corona and glans. Cross-cultural studies have shown the rate of circumcision to be inversely correlated with the rate of penile cancer among black urban men in South Africa, Hindus in India, Muslims, and Jews. Although these studies tend to indicate circumcision for the prevention of penile cancer, they must be taken in proper context. It is predicted that one in six hundred uncircumcised men will suffer penile cancer at some point in their lifetime (Kochen and McCurdy, 1980:53); one in five hundred circumcised infants will be placed in a life threatening situation as a result of the operation (Grimes, 1980:108). The American Academy of Pediatrics concluded in 1975 that good personal hygiene provides the same protection against penile cancer as does circumcision (Otten, 1981:31).

A second type of cancer often referred to in regard to the debate over circumcision is found in women. Cancer of the cervix is frequently blamed on an accumulation of smegma on the uncircumcised penises of the victim's

partner(s). Studies asserting this claim, however, have been invalidated by the finding that a large percentage of the cervical cancer patients surveyed answered incorrectly as to whether or not their husbands were circumcised (Time, 1981:57). Furthermore, a New York study of over one thousand women with cervical cancer found no correlation between their malady and whether or not their husbands had been circumcised (Brody, 1979:13). A study of the rates of circumcision and cervical cancer in the U.S. and Sweden found an inverse correlation between the two factors (Talan, 1981:101). Hence, it is the opinion of medical authorities today that noncircumcision is not significant in the development of cervical cancer. They say instead that the occurrence of the disease is related to the age at which sexual activity begins and to the number of sexual partners involved (Brody, 1979:13).

Among a number of other physical maladies attributed to the presence of the foreskin, phimosis is probably the best known. Phimosis, a condition in which the foreskin is too tight and adheres to the glans and hence cannot be retracted to be cleaned, can cause a number of problems. Occasionally the foreskin may be so tight that the urinary orifice is of insufficient size. This can cause ballooning of the foreskin and infection as well as difficulty in urinating. Indirectly, the phimotic foreskin can cause problems by providing an uncleanable breeding ground for bacteria. Such a condition can lead to swelling and inflammation of the glans and foreskin, ulcers, fissures, and occasionally gangrene (Andelman, 1973:291).

An opposite complication of phimosis, in which the foreskin becomes folded or rolled back behind the corona so tightly that it cannot be returned to its normal position, is called paraphimosis. This condition can result in edema, swelling and fissures, ulcers, and in rare cases, gangrene (Andelman, 1973:241).

Although the presence of any of these problems resulting from phimosis or paraphimosis indicates circumcision, routine circumcision of babies to prevent these disorders is not justifiable; as most neonatal adhesions heal naturally, and most phimotic foreskins present at birth render themselves retractable within three or four years, only about ten percent of uncircumcised males eventually require medically indicated circumcision (Talan, 1981: 101).

A final ill occasionally associated with the presence of the foreskin is venereal disease. However, despite the fact that circumcision is sometimes recommended for men with recurring herpes, studies have found no correlation between noncircumcision and venereal disease (Otten, 1981:31).

On the other side of the medical question are complications resulting either directly or indirectly from removing the foreskin, rather than from leaving it there. A great number of the maladies of this type are due to two factors. The first of these is the very nature of the operation. As the phallus is so tiny and the infant is generally squirming quite vigorously, accidents occur easily. The second factor is that the operation is often delegated to medical students and junior house staff--the least qualified of surgeons (Grimes, 1980:109). The result is not only a high mishap rate, but also the tendency for special problems which could have been discovered early by a pediatrician to go unnoticed until it is too late to correct them easily. An example of this is seen in a study which found that eight out of 5,500 circumcised infants surveyed should not have undergone routine circumcision because the foreskin was later needed for skin grafts in the correction of congenital abnormalities (Panter, 1981:82).

As previously mentioned, one in five hundred circumcisions results in a life-threatening situation. Of these, one in 500,000 results in death (Grimes, 1980:109).

Although this is a very low death rate, it is definitely significant considering the questionable necessity of the operation.

The most commonly occurring complication is bleeding; if the infant should turn out to be a hemophiliac, the hemorrhage will be severe and perilous. Following bleeding in order of occurrence is infection, which of course could lead to gangrene in serious cases. One other threatening complication is a serious reaction to anesthetics (Panter, 1981:82 and Rudoph, 1977:1335).

Along with these life threatening problems, there are a great number of less serious but nonetheless very important potential complications also due to basic procedural errors. A particularly significant case of this type was that of a four-month old child who had a slight hemorrhage upon circumcision. In order to stop the bleeding, the surgeon cauterized the wound. The cautery, apparently overdone, resulted in the sloughing off of most of the penis. After two years and several unsuccessful attempts at reconstruction, the patient was surgically changed to a female (Grimes, 1980:109).

Other procedural errors have produced such conditions as amputated glans, over, or under removal of foreskin, bivalved glans, grooved glans, denudated shaft, urethral fistulae, contractures, and lacerated scrotum (Grimes, 1980: 109 and Rudoph, 1977:4210).

Even when no error is made by the surgeon, problems can arise. The main affliction in this area is ulceration of the urethral opening, the meatus. This condition, known as meatitis, is the result of ammoniacal dermatitis and diaper rash. Occasionally it may lead to meatal stenosis.

Disregarding acceptance or rejection of all other medical reasoning against routine circumcision, there are several definite contra-indications to the practice. The

first of these, of course, is any family history of bleeding problems. Others include premature birth, neonatal illness, and birth defects. In all cases a full physical examination should be given before circumcision to verify the absence of these complications. Furthermore, circumcision should always be delayed until at least eighteen hours after birth in order to give the infant sufficient time to adjust to the new environment (Otten, 1980:31).

The final issue in scientific argument against circumcision, that of psychological damage, is definitely the least clear-cut. Many studies have found significant changes in postcircumcision neonatal behavior. Included are changes in sleep patterns, changes in responses to auditory stimuli, increased fussy crying and agitation not uncommonly including vomiting, and some state disorganization (Grimes, 1980:109 and Feldman, 1980:72). It has also been found that circumcised babies experience physiological changes which may have psychological effects. Significant stress indicating changes in the endocrine systems as well as changes in the concentration of serum cortisol secretions have been detected. And researcher M.P. Richards notes that the absence of evidence that these effects are long term is not sufficient reason to consider the effects short term, in light of the vulnerability of the infant brain to both exogenous and endogenous influences. He adds that even if the effects are short term, they could potentially foul parent-child relations for a short period of time, perhaps resulting in the hindrance of later development (Grimes, 1980:109).

Clouding the psychological issue, however, Yvonne Brackbill and Kerri Schrodn, in a review of thirty-eight studies, found no strong evidence that there were differences in neonatal behavior related to circumcision (Brackbill and Schrodn, 1980:612).

In view of the extensive list of possible complications due to circumcision, and in view of the relatively low

rate of medical indication of circumcision, most authorities today oppose routine observance of the practice. In those few cases where circumcision is necessary in childhood, it is recommended that it be done before the child enters school in order to lessen the psychological trauma (Brody, 1979:13). In all other cases it is recommended that any adhesions between the foreskin and glans be broken by the doctor at three to four weeks, and that the mother be taught to retract and clean the foreskin. The conclusion reached by the American Academy of Pediatrics in 1971 and again in 1975 states, "A program of education leading to continuing good personal hygiene would offer all the advantages of routine circumcision without the attendant surgical risks" (Grimes, 1980:109).

In view of this firm statement against routine circumcision made seven years ago, before much of the research demonstrating the psychological effects of circumcision was undertaken, it is compellingly obvious that the operation should not be performed routinely. However, until parents are educated enough to make an intelligent decision regarding the operation, or until there is enough firm evidence supporting assertions of psychological damage to convince doctors to abstain, this tradition will likely continue.

WORKS CONSULTED

- Andelman, Dr. Samuel L.
1973 "Circumcision." The New Home Medical Encyclopedia. New York: Quadrangle Books.
- Birch, William G., M.D.
1975 A Doctor Discusses Pregnancy. Chicago: Budlong Press.
- Boswell, John
1980 Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Brackbill, Yvonne
1975 "Continuous Stimulation and Arousal Level in Infancy." Child Development, 40.
- Brackbill, Yvonne, and Kerri Schrodn
1980 "Circumcision, Gender Differences, and neonatal Behavior: An Update." Developmental Psychobiology. 13(b).
- Brody, Jane
1979 "Circumcision." New York Times Sec. III.
- Brown, J.A.C.
1971 "Circumcision." The Stein and Day International Medical Encyclopedia. New York: Stein and Day.
- 1979 "Circumcision." Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropaedia.

1971 "Circumcision." Encyclopedia Judaica.

1981 "Circumcision, A Son's Rite." Time.

DeMartino, Manfred F.

1979 Human Autoerotic Practices; Studies on Masturbation. New York: Human Sciences Press.

Ellis, Dr. Albert, and Dr. Albert Abarbanel

1973 Sexual Behavior. New York: Jason Aronson.

Feldman, Judith F., et. al.

1980 "Sex Differences in Nonelicited Neonatal Behaviors." Merrill Palmer Quarterly 26(1).

1981 "First Rite of Man." Esquire.

Flaherty, Joseph A.

1980 "Circumcision and Schizophrenia." Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. 41(3).

Foley, R.L.

1967 "Circumcision of Our Lord." New Catholic Encyclopedia.

Goldstein, Bernard

1976 Introduction to Human Sexuality. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Grimes, D.A.

1980 "Routine Circumcision Reconsidered." American Journal of Nursing.

- Gunnar, Megan R., et. al.
1981 "The Effects of Circumcision on Serum
Cortisol and Behavior." Psychoneuroendo-
crinology 6(3).
- Haeberle, Erwin J., Ph.D., D.A.
1978 The Sex Atlas. New York: The Seabury
Press.
- Kaye, Valda, and Charles Isaacson
1980 "Genitourinary Pathology in Urban Male
Blacks of South Africa." Journal of Urol-
ogy 123(1).
- Kochen, Mosze, and Stephen McCurdy
1980 "Circumcision and the Risk of Cancer of
the Penis: A Life Table Analysis." Ameri-
can Journal of Diseases of Children 134(5).
- Marshall, Richard E., et al.
1980 "Circumcision: Effects Upon Newborn
Behavior." Infant Behavior and Develop-
ment 3(1).
- McCary, James Leslie
1978 McCary's Human Sexuality. 3rd ed. New
York: D. Van Nostrand.
- Otten, Carl, M.D.
1981 "Case Against Newborn Circumcision."
Saturday Evening Post.
- Polan, S.M.
1967 "Circumcision." New Catholic Encyclo-
pedia.

- Ruben, Dr. David R.
1969 Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex. New York: David McKay.
- Rudoph, Abraham M., ed.
1977 Pediatrics 16. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Sabiston, David C. Jr., M.D., ed.
1977 "Penis: Phimosis," and "Penile Infections: Balanoposthitis." The Textbook of Surgery. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders.
- Sadok, Benjamin J., M.D., Harold I. Kaplan, M.D., and Alfred M. Freedman, M.D., eds.
1976 The Sexual Experience. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- Seligmann, J.
1979 "To Circumcise or Not?" Newsweek.
- SerVaas, Cory, M.D.
1981 "Health Groups Conclude: 'Routine Circumcision Not Recommended.'" Saturday Evening Post.
- Talan, J.
1981 "Male Circumcision: Unnecessary Surgery?" Ms.

CAN ART BE EDIBLE?

Aimee Van Beek, Class of 1987

First the dish--crystal clean and starving for something to occupy its hollow interior. Second, the scooper. Its foggy silver head and bright red handle anticipate the icy journey. The scooper, as unedible as it is, is instrumental in the creation. It dives into the chocolate ice cream, lingers for a chilly moment, and emerges with a perfectly rounded (aside from a few straying, frosty crystals) ball which it ejects into the lonely dish. The chocolate ball, shocked at the warmth, paints impressions of itself on the sides. Strawberry and vanilla follow. Then the banana. Great care is taken to produce two perfectly symmetrical specimens which surround the three shivering balls of frosty flavor in a slightly curved fashion. Syrups of chocolate, strawberry, and pineapple drip down the sides of the snowy mountains desperately trying to reach the bottom of the glass dish. But the syrups are smothered as swirls of whipping cream, frothy and white, shower the ice castle in an attempt to be on top. The nuts, however, have no intention of allowing this. They scatter themselves (as if to occupy more space) like rocks on a once perfect ski slope. And, were it not for a final visitor, they would have won the highest position. But this position is taken by another. The cherry arrives to sit upon its throne! The masterpiece is finished. A work of art.

And a work of art it may be. But in all fairness, how can a creation (even one as delicious as a banana split)

This paper was presented in English 130, Craft of Writing II, in the Fall of 1983.

that takes at most fifteen minutes to make, be classified under the same heading as the Mona Lisa, Prokofiev's C# minor, or Homer's Odyssey? Art, in all its vastness, simply cannot be used to define everything worthy of looking at.

Instead, consider what art should mean. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the greatest thinker of all time, wrote, "Hence, not only must artistic operations imitate nature but even art products must imitate the things that exist in nature." (Aquinas, Spiazzi, 1951:247-334). Of course one could argue that the ice cream (if not MSG, guar gum, artificial flavoring, refined sugar, and powdered eggs) did use milk, which of course came from a cow, which coincidentally is natural. And the cherry (soaked in red dye, preservatives, corn syrup, and artificial color and flavor) is a direct product of nature. And to these arguments, I guess there is no opposition. The ingredients are natural.

But when I think of art, I think of the material evidence of a human effort to imitate, supplement, alter, or counteract the work of nature. Something consisting of a part of the artist. Something taking considerable time, effort and creativity. Something sense-provoking on a "deeper" level. Something lasting.

Granted, the sundae may last on the hips, but is the resulting roll something that inspires an adrenaline rush? Prokofiev certainly does. His music sends chills throughout the body. It reveals, on another level, one man's perception of nature. It is not an everyday creation, and therefore commands respect. No one could possibly have replicated his exact piece. And the Mona Lisa? Her face is undefinable. What is it that causes the effect it does? Her eyes? Her lips? Her cheeks? Her smile? She provokes thought as well as awe. The Odyssey is also art. It is a "fantasy" that dwells in many of us. It is the epic of an age.

And a banana split, though in many cases more sought after and pleasing than "art", really doesn't belong in this category of masterpieces. It involves skill, maybe, or possibly just a game, but not art. Art is so much more.

SOCIAL CLASS IN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN: PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Craig McCarthy, Class of 1985

Since the genesis of his existence, man has always lived by codes of social status. Whether that status is achieved through accomplishment, appointment, inheritance or warfare, the human race has always lived within the framework of some sort of diversified and specialized social system. It is here that social stratification is born. The many have always been ruled by the few, though the means by which the authority of the few is established varies tremendously. From this basic model of rulers and subordinates proliferates a complex web of social, political and economic interdependencies known as civilization. It is the study of the unequal distribution of social goods and services among civilization's status levels with which this paper is concerned.

The continent of Europe has been the stage of a vast array of political and economic ideologies through history. Two nations which currently stand responsible for much of the political-economic atmosphere of Europe are France and Britain. The impact of French and British politics both on European tradition and status quo gives credence to the world-wide emphasis put on understanding the two cultures. This paper examines the political culture which produces each nation's social stratification and then searches for the individual perceptions among the people concerning that stratification.

This paper was presented in Political Science 231, Western European Political Systems, in the Fall of 1983.

France and Britain are likely the two most stereotyped cultures in Europe. Each has a political and social aura about it which fact and fiction have entrenched in modern European culture. There is still a great deal of identification in Europe, as the rest of the globe, with things "typically French" and "typically British." Due to the past colonial natures of both countries, the cultural traditions of each, as well as the fossilized stereotypes, have permeated global civilization. It is this stereotyping that often hides the truth behind irrelevant generalizations.

France has traditionally been seen as a closed culture, with little tolerance for foreign interference and less interest in foreign life styles. French people take great pride in their historical past (some say as an escape from reality) and have a tendency to hero worship. Certainly, the most identifying label for French society has been "rebellion" or "revolutionary." This reputation, in light of French political and constitutional history, is generally deserved. French society is seen by outsiders as insular, cold and arrogant. In some ways this perception of France is due to ignorance of French philosophy and culture. As one French citizen once told me, "we are not mean people, we just hate superficiality." British society has been marked more for its rigid class stratification, along with its reputation for mild politics, social and political deference, deeply ingrained cultural traditions and so on. It is safe to assume, I would contend, that British society is in fact the most unique example of a modern political culture which maintains so many of the ideals and social structures of a feudal past.

Dealing specifically with social divisions and status levels, it is said by many that to have lost a great deal of its colonial class system. However, though these class distinctions have been said to be blurring (as J. Ardagh says in his article "France in the 1980's") as a result of a post-industrial society and its expanding middle class, the French may actually be more class divided than the

British, though less conscious of the fact. The barriers between classes are still there, infers Ardagh, but post-industrial affluence has merely blurred them by spreading availability of material status items such as cars and appliances. Social consciousness has never been as significant a part of French society as in the British, and the antique remnants of a divine nobility and feudal aristocracy were all but erased by the diminishing value of property and agriculture and the blade of the guillotine (Conradt, Jacobs, Peters, & Safran, 1983:86).

French society has changed a great deal in the last thirty years and many of the French ideals and attitudes so "typically French" were lost in the industrial transition of the 1950's. The old class system has been replaced by a modern economic, technical-flavored order of prestige. The emphasis placed on the French civil service and central government planning sets forth the arrangement of modern elite positions in government and industry. The French are not as insular as they once were though many still cling to such stereotypes. Their admiration for British Parliament and German industry is no secret. The permeating theme of egalitarianism still guides political and economic theory in France and this may account largely for the lesser perception of class identification that is said to exist there. The stereotypes about French society as a whole are still somewhat reflective of attitudes in France, but the extremity of most of those same stereotypes is overzealous.

English society is so imprinted with distinct reputations and expectations that it is often misunderstood. The view of the strict social divisions in which everyone knows their place and does not dare try to rise above it is somewhat mythical but not without truthful undertones. Along with the British "caste system," traditional views of pragmatic, mild politics interwoven into a strong central legislature with political party and bureaucracy activity complementing and improving government efficiency

simplify and even misrepresent modern British political and social realities. Britain has become a very troubled nation economically according to A. Bressand in his Daedalus article, "The New European Economies." Many of its traditional cornerstone institutions such as Parliament and political parties have come under question as to their viability in today's fragmented, technocratic culture. The social stratification, too, has undergone much change. The nobility has lost much of its political clout though one percent of British population still owns half of all property (Lewis and Maude, 1950:37). The House of Lords has become, like the monarch, a rubber stamp for the new sources of power in Britain (i.e. civil service, interest groups, labor unions). The elected rulers tend to be middle class, white collar products, rather than landed aristocrats. However, there is a radical difference between where political power is derived and where social status is derived. In Britain, the two no longer are synonymous. In Britain, despite all the changes, social class is still a very real concept which determines the fundamental social norms.

Before delving into an analysis of social class structures in France and Britain, I should define social class as it will be referred to in this essay. Simply, I mean a hierarchial of social class structure which generates its meaning only by contrast to other "social classes."

Says T.B. Bottomore in his book Classes in Modern Society, "It remains true, nonetheless, that the division of society into distinct social classes is one of the most striking manifestations of inequality in the modern world." (Bottomore, 1960:8). Precisely speaking, social classes are exactly that--measurements of social inequality. In modern industrial or post-industrial societies, social class has become more economically-oriented than the caste or feudal nature of the past (Bottomore, 1960:10). As seen in both French and British societies, large scale economic affluence has blurred the traditional class lines and social

mobility has been somewhat accelerated. There has, therefore, been a worldwide trend toward classlessness, partially instilled by Marxist philosophies, but paradoxically created by the material production of capitalist industry. However blurred and undefined social class distinctions may appear to be, they are still concrete divisions according to Bottomore. This should be kept in mind as one looks at a modern democratic society which often portrays a higher degree of equality than is actually accomplished (Bottomore, 1960:5).

To look at modern day France and modern day Britain one finds two very different democracies. Although both are parliamentary governments, Britain traditionally places a great deal of emphasis on political party influence, consensual party dealings and a centralized leadership. France, on the other hand, has come to view the civil service as the upper echelon of political and social prestige. Along with the sometimes dictatorial executive powers, authority in France derives its guiding force from an administrative emphasis giving much less power to party politics in the legislature.

More important than where governmental authority lies, however, is discovering the cultural beliefs and attitudes which are the origins of political norms. Here, we find a key difference in priorities between the "average" Parisian and the "average" Londoner. While the main goal of the French citizen or politician is in some way linked to equality, known in France as *egalite*, the British emphasize civil liberties which stem from a socialized mistrust towards State infringement on individual freedom (Ardagh, 1982). From such different goals as civil liberties and egalitarianism, it is easy to imagine how social principles and class systems would differ both in structure and citizen perception.

In focusing on French class division, a further analysis of French culture is in order concerning why equality is

so important an element. The French have developed psychological perceptions of man's relation to time and reality uniquely French and strikingly different from British thought (Condat, Jacobs, Peters, & Safran, 1983:86). The French have come to see two realities; an unseen one where utopian justice exists and a visible reality where injustices of man against man abound. Man, therefore is seen in a dual perspective; he is great as a race but hostile and greedy as an individual. To bring this philosophy into historical perspective, the French theory claims man has not always been greedy and vile but was once the object of a virtuous past. This logically explains the importance put on the French historical reflexion as a stabilizing force although it also tends to facilitate escapism and a somewhat false sense of past glory. From such ideas, the French individual sees equality as being the ultimate end given the role of man as a greedy, self-seeking entity. Yet the faith in mankind as a whole provides the hope that drives the nation towards improving on the present and stimulates the desire to bring back the virtue of yesterday. In synthesis, these factors combine to produce a set of attitudes that largely ignore class divisions. For to acknowledge a strict class stratification would be to sacrifice the practical aspects of the ideal of equality giving fuel to the undesirable picture of the greedy individual.

Today, French class structure is generally recognized to be a four-tiered arrangement of two bourgeoisie classes, a middle class and a working class (Bendix and Lipset, 1960:98). The upper bourgeoisie is called *haute bourgeoisie* and comprises high ranking civil servants and big business executives. The *grande bourgeoisie* is the next highest class division which includes upper level educators and the free professions. Here we see the importance placed on education being equated with the status of a doctor or lawyer, a prestige not enjoyed by education in many western democracies. Next, we find the largest group by far, the middle classes. Here are found the

remaining educators and lower civil servants in addition to the new white collar worker, specialist and technocrat in post-industrial France. The lower classes are known as classes populaires including small farmers, industrial workers and small-time artisans. According to several polls taken in the past decade, social class does indeed have a substantial effect on political ideology, expectations of government functions, domestic lifestyle and political partisanship (Lewis and Maude, 1950:54).

Despite the French insistence on egalitarian goals, it is ironic that France has the greatest gap between rich and poor in all Europe. In excess of one-third of total income is earned by ten percent of the population compared to one-fourth of Britain's total income being earned by one tenth of the population. (Ardagh, 1982). Obviously, both cultures boast a very concentrated wealth amongst a small elite. Another thing to be remembered is that while the Welfare State is emphasized more than in Britain, the economic system of France (especially since the industrial surge of the 1950's) has been engineered to function best in the hands of an able elite. Subject to the relationships between bureaucracy and industry, the French economy has been taken out of the hands of the elected officials and put under the care of the specialized elites not responsible to an electorate. The French tradition of State planning again adds strength to the control of the State and industrial elites who guide the economy, thereby reinforcing upper class prestige. Elite control has also been sustained by the conception of authority that appears to be "typically French." The French insist on strictly formed relations between superiors and subordinates because informality in business or contractual relations necessitates social trust--a bond not easily established in this society. This underlying mistrust and business formality lends itself only to an attitude of "I'll do it myself" as opposed to the British conception of delegating authority. As J. Ardagh says in his essay "Towards a More Trustful Society," French culture facilitates too much

reliance on too "few pioneers." (Ardagh, 1982). Again we see a society claiming to be egalitarian in direction, yet built on a modern stratified system of communication and organization.

Education is one of the highly respected priorities in French culture, a trend of the past few decades (paralleling the late industrial boom of the 1950's). Today, an attempt is being made to alter the old arrangement of elite and non-elite schools, both at the grammar school level and especially at the intermediate and collegiate levels (i.e. universities versus the Grande Ecoles). An attempt is being made to channel students toward technical and vocational schools but the social inferiority of a vocational degree is still an inhibiting deterrent. Despite the influence of limited reform, educational inequality, personified in the rift between the Grande Ecoles and the overcrowded, generic universities of the French collegiate system still fortify social stratification. Education, therefore, is a constant concern for the French State and reform has moved very slowly--too slowly to effectively alter the fact that the existing system is a tool of social divisions which provides educational prestige to the socially prestigious, and educational mediocrity to the socially mediocre. Even the general populace supports the inequality of education by placing such high value on elite education and such low value on practical, pragmatic education such as technical schools (which are much more complementary to a post-industrial technocracy).

As in all other western, industrial societies, the advent of modernization and post-industrial information explosions have created a middle class that has grown to a magnitude unknown before in industrial society. This broad middle class has blurred class distinctions at either end of the class spectrum (haute--bourgeoisie) and decreased the number of exploited proletariats. The middle class, according to Ardagh, are slowly becoming elitist by virtue of their self-acquired social mobility (Lewis and

Maude, 1950:54). The most evident trend in French society today is the middle class switch from stringent frugality to an emphasis on leisure and external pleasures. As mentioned before, class divisions, especially amongst transitional upper and lower-middle class sections, are not as easily seen as felt. This "felt" class barrier is something which is perceived at times when it cannot be observed.

The tradition of severe class division in Great Britain is one of the many surviving characteristics of a feudal society. Through industrialization the post - industrial service sector has blurred even the British social stratification to an extent; but in this modern age, Britain maintains the most recognized class structure in Europe. Ray Lewis and Angus Maude paint a somewhat humorous but not totally unrealistic picture of a British perception of the ideal British class culture and its harmonious operation:

We have shown the example of a nation in which every class of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which providence has assigned it, while at the same time each individual of each class is constantly trying to raise himself in the social scale--not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality--but by preserving good conduct and by steady and energetic exertion of the moral and intellectual qualities which his Creator has endowed him with. (Lewis and Maude, 1950:69).

The comparable difference between British and French attitudes toward class stratification reveals some deeply ingrained cultural dissimilarities. While the French goals of equality directly oppose the characteristics of social stratification, British social and political structures make class division a visible part of their traditional operations. Since medieval times, property has been the basis for legitimacy and power in this country. From this landed aristocracy came the political leaders who were established through an elitist Parliament and these leaders

formed the precedents of British politics and society. British government was developed by elites for elitest ends (the same can be claimed of the United States) and the rest of society was socialized to believe such a social class system was right. Deference is a term so often associated with British society, especially in depicting the masses as generally following the decisions of aristocratic (or elitist) "wisdom." Political deference has recently been a regressing trend as public awareness and dissatisfaction with current politics has increased. However, the long term effect of deference to the upper class and to the elite rulers is still very visible. Britain is a society that is traditionally receptive to elite control of society's laws and norms but at the same time there is a strong mistrust of personal invasion by intrusive government. This indicates a rather easy-going attitude which implies "you leave me alone and I don't care what you do." A very significant point to be made is that the aristocracy of the old days and the elites of today are in no way the same social class. As Lewis and Maude conclude in their analysis of British society, "England has now no aristocracy, no upper class to take the lead . . .", they insist that the driving force in British socio-political culture is the middle classes (Bottomore, 1960:37). Indeed, the landed aristocracy no longer dominates British culture and the "elite" is usually a middle class cabinet member. Money no longer buys political power as it once did in the parliamentary system (though still more so than in France) but in social class politics there is still at least the flavor of the old aristocracy, and the new upper-middle classes are attempting to fit the shoes. But in social realms money alone does not buy one's way into a new social class, and one often gets the feeling he does not fit in when attempting to use a high salary as a ticket to the upper social levels

The middle class, like in France, has grown exponentially, and its upper ranks are becoming part of Britain's upper class (the larger part). Also like France, social

mobility has accompanied the new middle class and this mobility has simultaneously undermined the solidarity of both the upper class and the working class. The white collar British citizen has more potential for social ascension than any other class member due to the importance of specialization in post-industrial economies. The working class has been decreased as the political-economic attitudes move towards the white collar service sector from industrial production. However, working class standards of living have increased, but probably due more to enlargement of the economic "pie" than to a bigger piece for the laborer. There is visible difference in the working class situation of today as compared to the universally poverty-stricken proletariat of a century ago. Today the majority of the working class is enjoying relative comfort, but the impoverished groups are now concentrated victims of modernized alienation due to technological displacement of human labor.

As is the case in France, the British educational system has been a tool of social stratification and inequality. Education has been a dominant status symbol for centuries in Great Britain and has been the "industry" which produced the "accented gentlemen" which perpetuated the aristocratic ideals of social division. Bottomore sees this English class system as a unique "blend of a crude plutocratic reality with the sentimental aroma of an aristocratic legend." This set of circumstances create "the gentlemen ideal" and the "public" schools (privately funded schools) he sees as the agencies which most consolidate and transmit this ideal (Bottomore, 1960:73). Probably the most important point to be made is that hierarchies of ability are not accurately measured by social position since in any culture (especially one based on traditional hereditary position) intellectual ability is by no means always rewarded with high income or social status (Tumin, 1967:43). Ergo, the "best" have not necessarily ruled Britain, but the populace was led to believe such was the case.

Educational reform has also been a visible force in recent times. Since the Education Act of 1944, the State has attempted to smooth out the inequalities of the educational opportunities, both in making it more accessible and decreasing the qualitative rift between the "public" schools and the local schools. However, the British "public" schools are still highly preferred by today's middle classes. This persisting insistence on traditional schooling trends indicates an aversion to modern realities of the technocratic society in favor of the "well-rounded" scholar versed in the classics. Whether or not this is a healthy attitude or a utopian escape remains to be seen. What it does tell us is what an Oxford professor emphasized recently, that in the context of the British culture, the gentleman of the "public" schools still excels above the average. Today's gentleman is a different breed from the nobility-bred product of fifty years ago, but the elite status of the "public" school system facilitates social advantages as it always has.

British society of 1983 is a curious blend of the old and the new. Deference to authorities is a retreating trend but change in Britain is so slow that such a shift may not be evident in a single lifetime. Parliament is still a "behind closed doors" elite oligarchy, though representative and of different composition than times past. Gone are the truly powerful dukes and earls, now replaced by upper middle class bureaucrats and politicians. The working class is better off than it once was but is shrinking in size and importance. Middle class expansion is bringing on a crisis of leadership to a nation which has always trusted its "superiors."

The strength of socialist politics and leftist ideals in a traditionally right-wing, conservative country indicate new tensions and re-evaluations of British political culture itself, of which social class is an integral part. Political partisanship is still related strongly to social division in Britain though not as faithfully as it once was.

In comparison to France, where party unity runs opposite to the French tradition of social mistrust, British voting patterns still display ingrained loyalties to traditional ideals such as family political history and class-related economic expectations. Voting frequency is also higher among upper and middle class indicating that those in a higher social class believe that they do influence political policy. In France there is also remarkable stability in voting patterns, but it occurs more across ideological lines and according to locational or occupational distinctions rather than social class. British voting patterns, on the other hand, consistently show direct ties to lifestyles, organizational affiliation, religious preference and residential trends all usually representative of particular social classes.

At this stage, I believe it significant to point out that I am not attempting to offer moral judgment on social stratification structures or on the benefits and inequalities which seem to be produced. In addition, I believe it unnecessary to try to list all the eventual causes and effects linked in some way to social class structure. However, I do feel that a sufficient understanding of the general differences and similarities between any two political cultures' social class system should be grasped. Additionally, an explanation of the cultural traditions and beliefs which mold both the class structure itself and the perceptions of the people concerning that class structure is equally important. I have attempted to contrast and trace the structure and cultural tradition of French and British social stratification and now I will examine the psychological effect it has on the people and draw some concluding comparisons.

According to Melvin Tumin, one's social status is probably the most important aspect of a person's life (including political power and material wealth). The social prestige gives what Tumin calls psychic gratification to a person. This gratification determines how one looks at

his life and his future. A lack of psychic gratification will make a person bitter and nonconfident (Lewis and Maude, 1950:54). He would look at the world as antagonistic and see himself as an exploited means to another's ends. This parallels very concisely the Marxian view of the exploited proletariat which would revolt and eliminate the capitalist elites. Tumin says that a positive dose of psychic gratification gives a person the optimism and drive necessary to achieve goals he feels he has the ability and freedom to pursue. Marx felt that this could only be the attitude of the elite owner of the means of the production, but I have found that the lack of or proliferation of psychic gratification is largely a result of socialized beliefs. Therefore, it is quite common to find working class and middle class people with as much hope as an upper classperson for future successes. It is a given, of course, that a totally impoverished lower classperson on the verge of starvation would lack any amount of prestigious self-perception but in British society a high degree of at least accepting attitudes exists in most social positions. In France, the level of acceptance of social class is lower than in Britain but the hope for rising to a higher level in society is higher than in British social system. This can be explained at least in part by the deferential tradition among British citizens in relation to elitist superiority while in France, inequality is a key enemy and class perception is much less concrete (maybe by subconscious evasion of the issue).

One's personal evaluation of his status in society is established by three major perceptions according to Tumin. The first is the need to be well thought of by society in general (superiors, peers, subordinates). The second is the desire to be as "good" as the next guy. The term "good" represents any area in which social status is important. Third, there is the desire to be thought of as "better" than the next guy in a competitive situation. In dealing with the third category, while the desire to be better may exist in the heat of the moment of conflict, generally,

such conceptions of antagonism and strife are suppressed by the consensual social culture in Britain; one is not to be pitted against another be he superior or subordinate. Trust is the dominant theme that pervades the class structure--trust and acceptance. In the French society, the concern with the perception of others about one's self seems much less important. Whereas trust is a basic thread in Great Britain's culture, mistrust and individualism tend to dominate the Frenchman. Therefore, if these desires are fundamental in all people's self-evaluation, then French culture has squelched its viability from its people's minds. The one perception that does seem to have some importance to the French system is the second of Tumin's desires--to be as "good" as the other guy. Here the French insistence on equality applies.

The perceptions of the French and the British about the situation they believe themselves to be in is quite different. In France, there is a class consciousness though class order is seldom the focus of French activity. Stratified social inequality is a dirty sock hidden under the bed; there is acceptance to a point concerning social position but it is a resentful acceptance in most cases. Although outward inter-class violence has been diminished, the root of the hatred of class systems has only been institutionalized to channel emotional responses towards effective solutions. Yet the French are still much more bent toward violent outbursts (i.e. the 1968 student revolt) which stems from deeply buried opposition to social subordination. The Britisher has the superior ability to achieve collective aims directed toward class division elimination but seldom opts to do so. One formidable factor for this decrease in French revolt and British acceptance of class structure is the recent (the last fifty years) expansion of the middle class which accompanied high production and broad increases in affluence. Middle class growth has lessened the tensions of class conflict by spreading material success at least superficially. The most characteristic theme of the new middle class has been independence

(identity) and psychological security (Davis, 1948:158). In reflection, both French and British societies have the largest section of their class system enjoying the affluence and economic security produced by the industrial society. Class distinctions have been blurred, but blurring is a phenomenon that occurs only at the very surface of something. I believe that middle class security, and therefore, temporary class tolerance is based on frightfully fragile, if not finite economic "necessities"--those of continued industrial production and progress. As I said earlier, I am not making a moral judgement on class structure; I am however outlining the circumstances I see as inevitably volatile, regardless of the virute or evil of social stratifications.

Today it is still true that social calss is the strongest single influence on private social-political attitudes. In France, there lies a deep-seated refusal to allow social inequalities conflicting with the reality there are social inequalities; in Britain, there exists a still ingrained acceptance of stratified social culture but the key is how fast deferential attitudes will continue to erode. Both societies are in transition: Britain toward a more pluralistic, reactionary culture, and France toward a more stable, centralized political culture. Within this transition, we see the Englishman who sees himself as a definite part of a certain social class, and though he aspires to a future of social ascension, is well acquainted with social division and considers himself a vital member of this social level; at the same time we have the Frenchman who seldom looks at his life in terms of his social class, partly because such emphasis is not part of French cultural consciousness, but also because he cannot look at the social inequality he disapproves of so. Both cultures have the key institutions which foster social inequality; the contrast lies in how the two cultures are thought to deal with this fact.

Power will most likely lie in the hands of some sort of an elite group in both Great Britain and France fifty

years from now. I use history as my only premise for such a prediction. Perhaps the trend that Bottomore suggests will prevail, that being the democratizing effect of elitist discretion and responsiveness. Time will tell. The question remains--will the ruling elite pursue policies that homogenize or perpetuate social stratification?

WORKS CONSULTED

- Ardagh, J.,
1982 France in the 1980's. New York: Penguin Books.
- Bendix, Reinhard and
Seymour Martin Lipset
1953 Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers.
- Bottomore, T.B.
1960 Classes in Modern Society. New York: Random House, Inc.
- Bressand, A
1979 "The New European Economics" Daedalus. Journal of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences Vol. 108 No. 1.
- Butterworth, George and Light,
Paul
1982 Social Cognition: Studies in the Development of Understanding. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Conradt, David P.; Jacobs,
Dan N.; Peters, Guy B.; Safran,
William
1983 Comparative Politics. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
- Davis, Allison,
1948 Social-Class Influence Upon Learning. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Deutsch, Martin, Katz, Irwin;
Jensen, Arthur R.
1968 Social Class, Race, and Psychological
Development. New York: Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston.
- Lewis, Roy, and Maude, Angus,
1950 The English Middle Classes. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
- Miller, Richard L., and Suls,
Jerry M.
1972 Social Comparison Processes: Theoretical
and Empirical Perspectives. Washington,
D.C. Hemisphere Publishing, Inc.
- Miller, Seymour Michael
1968 Social Class and Social Policy. New York:
Basic Books.
- Tumin, Melvin
1967 Social Stratification. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs.

GETTING SHIT ON YOUR HANDS

Robin Craggs, Class of 1987

My family are ranchers, mink ranchers. So, every summer since my brother and I were big enough to hold tools, we have worked in the mink yard. Mink ranching involves fulfilling every need of the animals. The rancher digs ditches, builds sheds, mixes and grinds foods, then feeds the mink and removes the piles and piles of manure. Summer after summer of removing manure taught my brother and me that there is value in "getting shit on your hands"--for want of a more elegant phrase. I'm sure young Americans would argue that there is no advantage to being in contact with contamination, germs, waste. Most youth, however, don't understand what it means to "get shit on your hands" in any sense other than literal. The definition is threefold. First there is the actual act; the shit hits the hand. Second, the phrase means work, which in itself has two distinctions: the experience of work and the value of work.

As mentioned above, the first meaning of "getting shit on your hands" involves the actual act. In my personal environment the term, though certainly not pleasant or eloquent, is commonplace for in order to maintain the family business, the mink ranch, the act of "getting shit on your hands" is a necessity. Since we have two thousand to ten thousand mink at a time, depending upon the season, the mink manure accumulates rapidly. Picking up piles of manure with pitchforks, the workers drive a manure spreader, a wagon-like machine with rotating paddles to

This paper was presented in English 130, Craft of Writing II, in the Fall of 1983.

disperse the manure, down the aisles. As the spreader fills, the workers must lift their pitchforks higher and higher and the higher they lift, the more manure slides down the handle. In spring, when there are kits not yet box trained, we, the workers, must clean each nesting-box with a metal scraper. The manure itself, about forty percent fish by-products, is one of the most malodorous animal feces, and unlike deer or rabbit manure that is solid and tidy, mink manure is a runny greenish-black mess. "Getting shit on your hands" is a common, unpleasant experience in my life, very different from changing diapers or taking out the litter box. Those two domestic examples, however, though not considered labor which will be discussed later, do involve the actual physical process defined as "getting shit on your hands" and, therefore, are valid examples of the first point.

Unlike the first meaning of "getting shit on your hands" which is literal, the second and third meanings are somewhat figurative. "Getting shit on your hands" means work. It means getting in, getting dirty, and doing something because it has to be done. It means work in the sense of physical labor: my being at the end of a pitchfork. It means work in the sense of necessity: my being at the end of the pitchfork not that ever-important, golden paycheck. It means work in the sense of responsibility: my being at the end of a pitchfork or the black gooey piles of manure become a jeopardy to the health of the mink and the environment.

Perhaps even more figuratively, the work involved with "getting shit on your hands" means developing an idea of the value of work. So many young Americans don't understand that value, and understanding that can only be developed through work experience. And as a result, so many young Americans are inept workers. Someone who has never "gotten shit on their hands," figuratively, thinks it's work to get out of bed in the morning.

There may be little value in literally "getting shit on your hands" beyond realization of bodily functions from which we are disconnected by modern sewage systems. However, I argue that there is much value in "getting shit on your hands" figuratively, concerning work. In light of the apathy of "young people" on the job or in the classroom, perhaps an experience of "getting shit on their hands" would improve their performances.

THERE IS NO SOLUTION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO PROBLEM . . .

John Schmor, Class of 1984

It is difficult to present Marcel Duchamp historically because he does not affect modern art in the linear way which art historians typically enjoy. It is difficult to present Marcel Duchamp aesthetically because he creates to disrupt aesthetics, to avoid theory or criticism. It is not effective to present Marcel Duchamp visually because it is the idea that dominates his art. It is the idea that finally becomes his canvas, his model, his block of marble, and in a curious way his audience. But if a college student could get away with pointing out the difficulties, never pretending to conclusions at least, then college would be no problem and education would be no solution.

Duchamp himself enjoyed saying yes to everyone. If we were to suspect him of insanity, he would smile and say, "yes." If we were to ask him "What is Art?" He would smile and say, "yes." He is the tailor who spins the invisible clothes for our emperor Art. Not only does Art become a problem, but Duchamp becomes the focus. Anyone as intelligent as Marcel Duchamp would know the results of his labor, and because of that element of self-consciousness would necessarily be suspect as a prankster. Questioning Duchamp and his motives, becomes as convoluted as the notes he leaves behind regarding his narratives for The Large Glass. If he is a prankster, it does not exclude the significance of the prank. Because of Marcel Duchamp's work, we are now in the midst of a break-neck

This paper was presented in Art 357, Twentieth Century Art History, in the Fall of 1983.

succession of original artists scrambling to re-define Art with every stroke. It is possible to assert that no art produced today is not in some way, to some degree, under the influence of Marcel Duchamp.

I begin this paper with such statements, not because I am at a loss in the swirl of theory and criticism, but because Marcel Duchamp implies cerebral struggle. It is crucial to his art that no answer be found. His great masterpieces are even greater questions. It would be folly to try and "solve" Duchamp, because his art is strategically produced to ponder. He is the master chessman, moving twentieth century art into perpetual check.

THE PAINTER.

In 1902, when Marcel Duchamp was only fifteen, he completed his first painting. Landscape at Blainville was not in the traditional Salon style; it was not a painting for which Duchamp's Parisian bourgeois parents could have too much enthusiasm. For his first painting, Duchamp chose an Impressionist style, a style which was only beginning to gain acceptance or popularity. As soon as he had mastered the technical elements of the Impressionist look, he moved rapidly on to his own brand of Fauvism. Marcel Duchamp revealed in his painting the single characteristic to his work that survives through all the transitions, advances, and delay: that is, he creates to reject.

Duchamp's implicit rejection of Salon formalism by painting in the Impressionist mode, though probably due to his youth as much as anything, played heavily in his Fauvist inquiries. When he learned a technique, he rapidly moved on to the next. He was never satisfied with the formal questions that modern painting had become preoccupied with. His later vivid desire for detachment must have been a part of his impulsive explorations as a young painter. As he matured in his painting, his mind took him further from the technique, and finally painting altogether.

Marcel Duchamp was always primarily interested in that eternal nemesis for the modern artist: content.

In 1909, Marcel and his brothers Duchamp, Villon and Villon, joined a group of artists named for their Sunday meeting place. The "Puteauz Group" included the first essayists on Cubism, Albert Gleizes and Jean Metzinger, and the two painters Fernand Leger and Francis Picabia. Theories for the "New Art" were argued; some remained Fauvist, others looked towards Cubism. This was where Marcel Duchamp began his intellectual affair with Art. They came to discuss their own art, lamenting the powers of the great Salons, all secretly hoping to someday break through and become part of one. Leger became the first to succeed, and by 1911 the group was entirely disbanded. Duchamp wrote:

The varied group which used to spend the Sunday afternoons in Puteaux, was far from being homogeneous except as far as friendship was concerned . . . Picabia and I already opposed the very idea of a valid theory, well aware of how far one's gray matter is from one's lips (Schwarz quoting Duchamp, 1970:5).

Duchamp's dismissal of "a valid theory" is a telling sign of things to come. He became more and more disturbed by the verbal scaffolding that had begun to support the modern art of his time. In 1911 he painted Portrait of Chess Players. It was Duchamp's personal account of the Cubist vocabulary. Unlike the frozen, mathematical works by Picasso or Braque, "Portrait" is filled with rhythmic motion. A critic wrote, "Duchamp deliberately attempts to re-introduce elements of subject: action, mood, personality, into Cubist painting." (Schwarz, 1970:23).

That objection became more valid in the next year when Duchamp painted King and Queen Traversed by Swift Nudes, and his two studies of a Nude Descending a Staircase.

Both paintings obviously use the cinematic innovations that Duchamp had followed with great interest. Movement is translated into fragments, of illustrated with dotted lines; the precious monumentality that Duchamp found so pretentious in Picasso and Braque is washed with lyrical narrative.

Two months after Duchamp painted the second version of Nude Descending a Staircase, he entered it in the Salon des Independants, a Cubist showing that included works by Braque. The Cubists were shocked, and insisted that Duchamp withdraw his painting. Their objections were curiously specific. Most importantly, Duchamp had chosen a subject that did not have any precedent in academic museum painting. His nude was descending, not reclining, and was therefore not Cubist and not appropriate. The kinetic preoccupations of the painting conflicted with the Cubist commitment to a static image.

Duchamp's brothers were elected to make the Salon's request. When they came to him, he was disgusted but not surprised. Even before he had finished "Nude", he had repeatedly complained that the Cubists' "pure painting" seemed self-indulgent and exclusive. Their criticism of his interest in movement seemed petty to him. He insisted that their commitment to simplification was his also. He wrote:

The reduction of a head in movement to a bare line seemed to me defensible. A form passing through space would traverse a line; and as the form moved, the line it traversed would be replaced by another line, and another and another. Therefore, I felt justified in reducing a figure in movement to a line rather than a skeleton. Reduce, reduce was my thought . . . but at the same time my aim was turning inward, rather than toward externals. And later, following this view, I came to feel an

artist might use anything, a dot, a line, the most conventional or unconventional symbol, to say what he wanted to say (Schwarz quoting Duchamp, 1970: 19-20).

With these ruminations, Duchamp left France for Munich in 1912. He saw in a store window a chocolate grinder, and was so fascinated that he came home to Paris in 1913 with a blueprint painting of the machine. His interest in motion led him to the machine, a subject that up to that time had not been addressed seriously in painting. Immediately the Cubists breathed a sigh of relief simultaneously condemning Duchamp's name to Dada. Duchamp, of course, rejected that category as he did every category. He was looking for art that could never be categorized, a style of painting that would never be a tradition. His great escape was from what he called the retinal:

The last hundred years have been retinal; even the Cubists were. The Surrealists tried to free themselves, and earlier so had the Dadaists, but unfortunately these latter were nihilists and didn't produce enough to prove their point . . . which, by the way, they didn't have to prove according to their theory . . . (Schwarz quoting Duchamp, 1970:17).

The idea of a chocolate grinder, the ordinary object painted and framed, was Duchamp's most crucial rejection. Subjective qualities were completely avoided as Duchamp sought ultimate content, which would soon lift him forever out of painted art.

After a long interlude concerned with other works (that I will clumsily ignore for the moment), Duchamp painted his last painting in 1918. Tu'm, his final farewell to painting is a salute to deliberate chance. Tu'm is a dictionary of Duchamp's art up to that time. It includes

the penciled shadows of a bicycle wheel, a hat rack, and a corkscrew. Actual safety pins hold the illusion of a torn canvas together. Painted sign symbols executed by a professional sign painter accompany a range of arbitrary color samples springing from the background, to mock the painter's "purpose." Tu'm is one of the great abstract paintings in the tradition of pop art, a work far ahead of its time. It is a delayed reaction to that all-important transition that Duchamp made from painting to his own art.

I don't mean to describe Duchamp the painter as a negative man, eager to reject for the sake of his own ego. It is fair to imagine that Duchamp delighted in the questions posed by each technique, only to become quickly disappointed when he found that questions in painting are inevitably answered. Always remember Marcel Duchamp is allergic to answers. It is with The Chocolate Grinder that he began to head his way towards what he called "the beauty of indifference."

EPIPHANIES FROM A CHOCOLATE GRINDER.

In 1913 Duchamp the chess player outwitted the Cubists by overthrowing representation without resorting to pure abstraction. He saw a chocolate grinder in Munich and instantly decided that the next step would be to bring the subject itself to the gallery, without an intermediary. When he returned to Paris, he "found" a bicycle wheel, nailed it upside down onto a conventional stool, set it in a gallery and it was called (no one knows by whom) "foundobject" or "ready-made". This object lacks all artistic interference in form, the parts are mass-produced. The "found object" is governed by chance and communicates indifference, a perfect modern metaphor for Art.

Essentially the found object challenges our ideas of value. Joseph Mascheck describes the challenge by suggesting that "the wit was in making a common object as remarkable as an art object, making a work of art as real

as an ordinary thing all at the same time" (Mascheck, 1975:10). Indeed, Duchamp proposed using Rembrandt's Night Watch as an ironing board, and he painted a goatee and mustache on a copy of the Mona Lisa.

In 1914 he produced Bottle Dryer, cynically hailed in retrospect, by a New York critic, as the most attractive sculpture of the year. Duchamp bought a commercial landscape painting in the same year, and adding a red dot and green dot, called it Pharmacy. Both works were not at all received by the European art community which spurned Duchamp for not joining the war effort. The tension was sufficient enough for Duchamp to leave for New York, not knowing any English, prepared to live there for the rest of his life. He was amused to find our American press waiting for him.

The Americans had already been exposed to his painting, particularly The Nude Descending a Staircase (#2), in the famous Armory Show of 1913. Even Teddy Roosevelt saw it and hated it. The immediate delight that the American public and critics took in ridiculing Duchamp's art had a peculiar impact on his decision to move to America, and was a force in his invention of the "ready-made." Clement Greenburg describes Duchamp's attention to public opinion:

The first bewildered reaction to innovation art was to be the sole and appropriate one; the avant-gardist work, or act, or gesture, was to hold nothing latent, but deliver itself immediately. (Masheck quoting Greenburg, 1975:124).

It is this "first reaction" that Duchamp felt completed the work, and in the case of the "found object", was the important content to the work. He wrote:

All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by

deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the creative act. (Lebel quoting Duchamp, 1967: 78).

In America, he produced a particularly witty found object, simply a shovel, calling it In Advance of the Broken Arm. The title refers to a suggestion that Duchamp might be twisting the spectator's arm. It is in this first year that Duchamp became deeply interested in developing a new alphabet and language, relating words to prime numbers. Out of the complex inventions came his mysterious formula for puns. From that point on, titles became increasingly important. Duchamp used the pun to explode the categories he was disturbed to find still haunted him.

For the next five years, he produced found objects to wash away the patronage that he found debilitating. When Gertrude Stein asked for a Duchamp ready-made, he went to the nearest hardware store and signed another snow shovel, brusquely repeating his In Advance of the Broken Arm. She was delighted. The precise "execution" of a found object became increasingly difficult with each new discovery. Duchamp spent months trying to locate the next found object that would revive his originality. He produced Comb in 1916, which had painted on its side, "New York Feb 17, 1916, 11 A.M. Three or four drops of loftiness have nothing to do with savagery." In the same year he "finds" the Traveler's Folding Item, which is simply a portable typewriter cover and stand. And in 1917 he sent his infamous Fountain to an exhibition by the Independent Artist's Association which he had helped to establish. The urinal signed by "R.F. Mutt" was refused. Though one member felt it had a lovely resemblance to a Buddha, it was the Association's verdict that Marcel Duchamp was trying to piss on them. Duchamp subsequently withdrew from the only formal club he'd ever been part of. Soon after, he produced Trap, a coat rack designed for the wall but nailed to the floor.

By 1919 it was clear that the found object was no end in itself. Duchamp's ironic humor was no longer interested in "the classic" found object that his idea had become. During the years after 1918 he created a myriad of clever pieces that owed their irony to the found object. His bearded Mona Lisa titled L.H.O.O.Q. (which when pronounced in French means "She had a hot piece of tail."), became a popular joke among the artists and later the public. Duchamp had managed to bring an act of defamation to high art. In the same year he bottled some Parisian air and sent it to South America. In 1921 he filled a birdcage with what looks like sugar cubes, and a thermometer. On picking it up, one discovers that the sugar cubes are of marble, and that the object is enormously heavy. It is titled "Why not sneeze Rose Selavy?".

In 1920 Duchamp began to use the pseudonym Rose Selavy, and also the title of engineer rather than artist. The changes were to reject the esoteric popularity he had gained in America. He was not happy to be fashionable, and made several oblique attacks against his "patrons." He was photographed in a woman's "high fashion" attire by the Surrealist Man Ray, and the photograph became a label for a false perfume named "Rose Selavy." Soon a critique was published about the bottle, and each edition was snatched up for an exorbitant price. Duchamp was in danger of always tripping in his own trap, but because of his illusory detachment, he was able to remain free, or perhaps only seemed to remain free. For Duchamp, there was probably no difference.

The found object is a brilliant nullification of art theory. It has the very effect that the Dadaists were never able to achieve. Octavio Paz, a poet-admirer of Duchamp's, writes:

The ready-mades are not anti-art, like so many of the creations of Expressionism; they are an-artistic. The wealth of commentaries on their

meaning, (some of them would no doubt have made Duchamp laugh) reveals that their interest is not plastic but critical or philosophical. The ready-made doesn't postulate a new set of values. It is active criticism: a contemptuous dismissal of the work of art seated on its pedestal of adjectives (Masheck quoting Octavio Paz, 1975:84).

Duchamp's "beauty of indifference" is a leisurely balancing act on the meta-physical line between indecision and suicide. He is able to suggest complete escape from the confines of art theory, without becoming anti-artistic.

The found object's legacy is threefold. It is the source of the almost conventional attention to re-defining art with each new work from an artist. It irrevocably illuminates the primary role of the artist as selector, the act of choice. And finally, it leaves the spectator with a difficult responsibility to the artistic experience, requiring active dialogue with our assumptions about art, the artist and the gallery. The found object is Marcel Duchamp's witty challenge to cerebral art, a return to the myth of content.

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS.

From the 1912 visit to Munich up to 1923, Marcel Duchamp focuses his most important innovations and wit towards a large glass fresco just under nine feet tall, that he titles The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors Even. His fascinations for motion, machine, and irony are brought together in what Breton describes as a great modern legend. And indeed it is in the tradition of Joyce's Finnegan's Wake or Eliot's "The Wasteland", with its epic scale and intricate allusions to modern confusion.

Duchamp left copious notes behind, describing the specific functions of this machine whose sole function is

to make love. Several volumes carry the complete notes for "Bride", or The Large Glass. It seems ironic to me that technique or method is the final deciphering tool we have to understand The Large Glass, given Duchamp's consistent efforts to escape method. But inherent in Duchamp's tightrope act is inconsistency. It is probably necessary to know the machine's general themes, just as it is necessary to read Eliot's "Wasteland" or Joyce's Finnegan's Wake in annotated editions. But annotations should not justify the work, even if the work is as baffling as Duchamp's The Large Glass.

The most general picture I can describe of The Large Glass is that it is a biomorphic machine that functions as invited rape, which in turn implies a sort of paradoxical masturbation. The bottom half of the glass is inhabited by nine malic molds that represent nine male roles in modern society. These are only molds however, not the actual product. It is probably significant that these nine male-ish forms are capable of being mass produced. They are fed a love juice that fills their forms with gas, and through an elaborate set of sieves, funnels and water-wheels, sends up electric splashes to excite the bride, thereby stripping her bare. The love juice that starts the whole thing is generated by the bride herself, funneled to the malic molds through her "quite feeble cylinders."

The central machine part is The Chocolate Grinder, which was as you should remember, originally drawn up in 1912 and 1913. Works from the past were planned advances on this great final work. The lines that extend from the nine malic molds are from a study that Duchamp made in 1914 called Standard Stoppages or "canned chance." Duchamp notes, "If a straight horizontal thread one meter long, falls from a height of one meter onto a horizontal plane twisting as it pleases, it creates a new image of that unit of length" (Schwarz quoting Duchamp, 1970: 444). Duchamp spent months designing this

introduction to what he later called "playful physics", his attempt to inject humor into science by introducing chance.

His playful physics allows the gas to turn the glider or sleight which holds the water-wheel which endlessly emits a litany: "Slow life. Viscious circle. Onanism. Horizontal. Round trip for the buffer. Junk of life. Cheap construction. Tin, cords, iron wire. Eccentric wooden pulleys. Monotonous flywheel. Beef Professor" (Tomkins quoting Duchamp, 1966:23). All these terms express a single one: "Echecs", which is the French word used for check, failure, and chess (Tomkins, 1966:123).

The large, cloud-like shape with the three squareish holes was designed in 1914 from a chance sequence of photographs catching the positions of three gauze pieces as they were shaped by the wind. The main machine of the bride is very similar to Duchamp's late Cubist painting The Bride of 1912. His fascination for the humor in a machine equivalent to the human body comes to its climax (so to speak) in The Large Glass when the most physical experience next to defecation is automatized (an indirect pun on the Surrealist method that Duchamp found silly because the element of chance was not deliberate).

Every idea that Marcel Duchamp translated into art appears in The Large Glass, carefully planned and delicately executed. In 1926, three years after Duchamp announced that The Large Glass was "uncompleted," both plates were broken in the shipping from a museum to Duchamp's studio. They were broken by the same shock, and so appear to have identical fractures in reverse directions. It was not until 1936 that Duchamp repaired the work, with characteristic delay. It took him two years of meticulous labor to put all the pieces back in place, but when he was finished, he remarked that he felt the work was finally complete.

All of Marcel Duchamp's imaginative inventions with odd gases and living machines might be reminiscent of a mediaeval alchemist. Duchamp's secret languages, systems of number, and symbolism of forms revive that particularly bachelor art (to say nothing of the bachelor of arts) of conjuring. When asked if he were a modern-day alchemist, Duchamp replied, "If I have practiced alchemy, it was in the only way it can be done now, that is to say without knowing it." (Lebel quoting Duchamp 1967:67). Though it is as inconclusive as any of his responses to our need for rational description, his suggestion that mysticism in the twentieth century can only exist in ignorance of its own existence is significant. Duchamp's career has been, if anything, entirely self-conscious.

While you look at The Large Glass, there appears through the glass the image of the room you and the work stand in. And on the surface of the mirror design lives the image of your own body. Unlike the painting with dust on its backside, The Large Glass is exposed and yet illusive. For so many motifs, mechanisms and overtones to be brought together into a single entity involves an incredibly complex iconographical program. Yes, or one of incredible mock-complexity. The Large Glass is Marcel Duchamp's last will and testament, bequeathing an epic mythology rich in the comic spirit, fascinating as cerebral-puzzle, finally becoming its own metaphor, its own definition.

CONCLUSIONS OR CONTRADICTIONS.

Marcel Duchamp died in 1968 with a smile on his face. He left the world a changed place by his "beauty of indifference," forever re-defining art and what it is to be human. But he leaves no artistic tradition. I think Hess is right in remarking that "his followers should have known that only Duchamp can be his own work of art. When Duchamp did it first, he did it last. That is his lesson. Those who have understood him make the same

point: In the beginning is originality." (Masheck quoting Hess, 1975:126).

Duchamp's legacy is a shadow, the tracings of an atom's movement. His originality came from creating works that would negate or reject the act of creation. He admits, "I have forced myself to contradict myself in order to avoid conforming to my own taste." (Hess, 1975:31). It is this constant oscillation that provides the fuel for his great originality. Breton paraphrasing Edgar Allen Poe wrote that ". . . originality, except in minds of the most unusual vigor, is in no way, as many believe, a matter of instinct and intuition; to find it, one must generally seek it laboriously and, though a positive merit of the highest order, it is achieved rather by the spirit of negation rather than by the inventive spirit." (Lebel quoting Breton, 1967: 89)

It is for this quality in Duchamp's originality, the tension between negation and invention, that I believe time will prove his greatest contribution to be the single-handed rejuvenation of active dialogue in art. The great philosophical movements of our century are all inherently acting in Duchamp's work, but instead of statements, they live as questions that require response. Perhaps the ready-made is the perfect visual aid for discussion of the modern dispensation.

Certainly there is room to point at the Emperor's new clothes, but never his clothier. Conclusions become comically ineffective in Duchamp's world, because he is so good at keeping his side of the chessboard free for escape. In his apartment in New York, a natural wood door in the studio leading to his bedroom shuts the entrance to the bathroom when it is opened to enter the bedroom, and when it is opened to enter the bathroom it closes the entrance to the studio. Duchamp had managed to construct a door that was at the same time both open and closed.

WORKS CONSULTED

- Hauser, Arnold
1960 The Social History of Art. New York:
Vintage Books, Alfred K. Knopf.
- Lebel, Robert
1967 Marcel Duchamp. New York: Paragraphic
Books - Grossman Publishers
- Masheck, Joseph
1975 Marcel Duchamp - In Perspective. Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall
Inc., H.W. Janson-general editor
- Paz, Octavio
1970 Marcel Duchamp or the Castle of Purity.
New York: Cape Goliard Press London, in
association with Grossman Publishers.
- Rubin, William
1968 Dada, Surrealism, and Their Heritage. New
York, The Museum of Modern Art.
- Schwarz, Arturo
1970 The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp.
New York, Harry N. Abrams Inc.
- Tomkins, Calvin
1966 The World of Marcel Duchamp. New York:
Time-Life Books.



