

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Angelo's Confession of Hypocrisy and Passion in Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*

by Ann C. Schmiesing

Measure for Measure, Act II, scene iv, lines 1-12

ANGELO:

When I would pray and think, I think and pray
To several subjects: heaven hath my empty words,
Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue,
Anchors on Isabel: heaven in my mouth,
As if I did but only chew his name,
And in my heart the strong and swelling evil
Of my conception. The state, whereon I studied,
Is like a good thing, being often read,
Grown sere and tedious; yea, my gravity,
Wherein, let no man hear me, I take pride,
Could I, with boot, change for an idle plume
Which beats the air for vain.

The title of the work *Measure for Measure* alludes to words spoken in the Sermon on the Mount, wherein Christ advocates a mitigation of the Mosaic law: "Judge not, that ye be not judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again" (Matthew 7:1-2). Also concerned with the progression from rigid law to justice tempered with mercy, the theme of Shakespeare's play is illustrated in the character of Angelo, who serves as the morally strict Deputy to the Duke. In order to adopt a more merciful theory of justice, Angelo must first come to an understanding of his own human passion and

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Written for Shakespeare: The Later Plays, in the Spring of 1987.

the hypocritical way in which he treats religion and the state. A significant part of this insight is gained in lines 1-12 of Act II, scene iv, wherein Shakespeare reveals much about Angelo's character and overall relationship to the theme of the play.

Occuring in the second act, this speech contributes to the rising action of the play, because it indicates that Angelo is experiencing an increase in conflicting emotions. He has already met once with Isabella, who comes in Act II, scene ii, to argue in favor of sparing Claudio's life. Her logical appeal complicates Angelo's decision to execute Claudio and questions his methods of governing. More interested in Isabella than in the fate of her brother, Angelo asks that she return to discuss the matter with him on the following day. It is preceding this second visit that Angelo's soliloquy occurs.

In choppy, highly punctuated sentences, Angelo admits to his own hypocrisy by pointing out the contrast between his words and his feelings. Realizing that his newfound desire for Isabella conflicts with his moral beliefs, he continues to pray, but in a manner more methodical than meaningful. Scheming has become more dominant than prayer, as is indicated by the plan Angelo presents to Isabella following his soliloquy, that of giving up her chastity to him in exchange for Claudio's life. This is also illustrated by the reversal of the words "think" and "pray" in lines 1-2: "When I would pray and think, I think and pray / To several subjects . . .",; it appears as if Angelo's thoughts of Isabella now come before his prayers, an order which is contrary to the dictates of his rigid morality.

In addition to the waning influence of his religious discipline, Angelo lacks a central focus of attention; he concentrates on not one but "several subjects" (line 2). Distinguishing between heaven and his fantasies, he implies that the latter are particularly sinful or emblematic of hell. To the former he gives "empty words" (line 2), again showing that his prayers have become methodical, while his imagination ignores what is said and "anchors on Isabel" (line 3). It is as if Angelo is a boat unable to sail, because an anchor, Angelo's "invention" (line 3), is firmly settled on Isabella. Restricting the motion of a ship, an anchor buries its hooklike arms into the bottom of a body of water; Angelo is, in effect, implying that he desires physical contact with Isabella, which is what he asks of her in the same scene. Such a thought indicates that Angelo's devotion to religion has clearly been overcome by his human passion.

Shakespeare is especially effective in showing this through imagery. Heaven is implanted within Angelo's mouth and juxtaposed with the sin in his heart. This is a reversal of the traditional placement of good and evil, which would put the influence of heaven in the heart and that of hell in the mouth, due to man's many blasphemous and impious remarks. Angelo's heart, however, has been touched by Isabella, while his mouth continues its habitual prayers. Angelo acknowledges that he speaks of heaven "as if I did but only chew his name" (line 5). Chewing is both a methodical process and one which involves breaking up pieces of food; robotically uttering his prayers, Angelo's piety is being broken up in a fashion similar to that of mastication. This is contrasted with the evil which is "strong and swelling" (line 6) in his heart. The imagery is effective in emphasizing Angelo's conception of his own hypocrisy; his outward attitude toward religion has remained constant, but his heart is brimming with a passion he considers quite sinful and destructive.

Angelo's thoughts are not only at odds with his personal religious beliefs, but also with his hypocritical actions in the governing of Vienna. Angelo compares his rigid form of statecraft to a book or other document which seems withered and monotonous after one too many readings. In the last lines of the passage, Angelo confesses his willingness to trade his dignified and solemn behavior, of which he says he is proud, for a lighter, more frivolous lifestyle. He uses the word "gravity" in line 9 to name his seriousness, while referring to that which he is tempted to adopt as "an idle plume" (line 11). It is idle because instead of being attached to a bird, it is floating for no purpose at all, just as Angelo tends to see his passion as something that is unattached, and indeed counterproductive, to his duties in Vienna. It is only profitable in a personal sense, since he could exchange his dignified air for a life of passion "with boot" (line 11). The main focus is on mass, because a feather seems so oblivious to gravity. Angelo supports this in the last line, speaking of the plume as that "which the air beats for vain." His desire for Isabella is an inner part of him, unaffected by the forces of the outside world, just as a floating feather appears to be untouched by the environment; though the air above seems to weigh down on top of it, the feather still falls at a leisurely rate.

The passage as a whole seems to suggest that Angelo is quite

uncomfortable with his hypocritical behavior. He realizes that he has been tempted by Isabella to the point that his thoughts are removed from the moral codes of both his government and his religion. This acknowledgment of his own shortcomings will eventually help him come to an understanding of the need for justice tempered with mercy, thus supporting the theme of the play.

Winslow Homer: His Relationship to the Mid-Century Genre Painters

by Colleen Broderick

From the moment that Winslow Homer picked up a brush and palette in the early 1860's, he has been regarded as one of the greatest American painters. Certainly he was a prolific artist. His works are generally divided into two groups: early works, spanning the period 1862-1881, and late works covering 1881-1909. It seems that what Winslow Homer's contemporary audience liked best about his work was that he depicted distinctly American scenes. It is perhaps because he chose to portray scenes of ordinary daily life that Winslow Homer is often characterized as one who continued the tradition of American genre painting.

While Homer's early work does have much in common with genre painting, he did not merely continue the tradition. What makes Homer's early work exciting and enduring is the fact that he expanded upon the genre tradition and, in so doing, led American art to a new frontier.

The style Homer achieved has been called "American Impressionism." This term implies that Homer's style bore some resemblance to that of his French Impressionist contemporaries. Yet he cannot be said to be an impressionist in the original sense of the word, because there remains in his work a tension between conceptual and perceptual vision. In order to see clearly what was achieved in the balancing of these two perspectives, it is helpful to compare Homer's work with that of the most respected of the mid-century genre painters, George Caleb Bingham and William Sidney Mount.

There are two major ways in which Winslow Homer's early work can be both compared and contrasted with the work of traditional genre painters. Both stylistically and in terms of emotional penetration, Homer's work can be said to convey a deeper realism than is found in

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the work of traditional genre painters. The most important similarity between the early work of Homer and that of the mid-century genre painters is subject matter. Unlike the traditional genre painter whose goal is to convey a specific idea concerning his subject, Homer utilized local subject matter largely in terms of vehicles for exploring problems of formal invention. Winslow Homer once said proudly, "When I have selected the thing carefully I paint it exactly as it appears" (Goodrich, 1972:47). This statement illuminates that Homer saw himself striving to achieve realism.

One wonders what Winslow Homer's style might have been like had his early training been different, for certainly the conceptual side of Homer's artistic sensibility can be said to be a result of this early training. Homer received almost no formal artistic training. Instead, like so many other great American artists before him, his first comprehensive experience with art came through his career. As a young man of nineteen, Homer was apprenticed in the Boston lithographic firm of John L. Buffurd (Ripley, 1963:8). Lithography is a craft which has draftmanship as its basis. The artist is required to be extremely linear and precise, to use geometric form and to basically planar organization. Thus, we can see that in his occupation, the basic tenets of conceptualism are stressed and become a permanent part of Winslow Homer's developing style.

Perhaps because it is ideographic in nature, traditional genre is characterized by extreme conceptualism. Of traditional genre painters, no one was more meticulously faithful to the tenets of conceptualism than the Missouri statesman George Caleb Bingham. Herman Warner Williams, a leading expert on genre painting, had this to say in regard to Bingham's drawings:

> He was not a subtle man, and his drawing shows it. It is sharp and accurate, leaving no doubt as to the shape or position of a leg or an arm. Each figure was studied in detail and each gesture, each crease and tear in the clothing was recorded. If he drew a face distorted by a hearty laugh, it was with the detachment of a plastic surgeon (Williams, 1973:89).

Because of the overwhelming commitment to linearity, there is no sense of movement in Bingham's paintings. His figures are curiously

wooden, almost puppet-like. Indeed, the dancer in Bingham's *The Jolly Flat-boatmen* of 1846 looks as though he is dangling in mid-air. The precise delineation of every fold and crease in the boatmen's clothes give them a sense of heaviness that is not at all life-like. While this painting is pleasing to the eye because of its geometric construction, it is not in any way naturalistically realistic. Instead of a group of people, what we see in Bingham's painting is a group of objects posed, as in a still life.

It is exactly this problem of a "constructed " look in painting that Homer sought to avoid in his work. His solution was to create a sense of atmosphere by painting the effect of light upon objects. This was always his major interest in terms of formal inventions.

William Sidney Mount was a traditional genre painter who was just as interested in the effects of light in nature as Winslow Homer. That Mount was a strong plein-airiste is proven by the fact the he was the inventor of the portable studio (Hoopes, 1974:63). It is also revealed in the statement, "My best pictures are those I paint out of doors . . . The longer an artist leaves nature the more feeble he gets . . . one true picture from nature is worth a dozen from the imagination" (Novak, 1969: 145).

Yet, Mount's painting reveals that his vision is just as conceptual as that of Bingham. Mount's basic style is classical. He is extremely aware of measure and planar organization, as is obvious in his notebooks, which are filled with geometric notes pertainting to perspective (Williams, 1973:78). It is generally acknowledged that Mount's greatest piece of work is *El Spearing at Setauket* of 1845. This work is luminist in style. Indeed luminism is perhaps the culmination of the purely conceptual vision.

Mount's painting is planar is organization. The taut line of the still water parallels the frame of the painting. The boat, locked in place by the linear vertical accents of the oars, becomes the second plane. Interestingly, Mount's figures are just as linearly precise as Bingham's boatmen, but they are not as artificial. This is because the light which emanates from the core of this painting seems to be imbuing these figures with energy. Because it is contained within the geometric confines of the structure, luminist light tends to be very intense (Novak, 1969:105). Luminist light depicts a moment of stillness; time is transfixed and magnified.

Insofar as it adds compositional depth to a traditional genre painting, luminist light can be said to foster realism. It is not, however, realism in the naturalistic sense in which Homer understood it. In transfixing the moment, luminist light becomes an almost tangible object. Therefore, it is revealed as another tool used by the traditional genre artist to convey the idea of what he saw.

Winslow Homer wanted to paint what he saw happening around him at the moment he saw it. His desire to catch the transient moment, the moment of action, is the basic tenet of perceptual vision. The most perceptual of painters were the French Impressionists. Surprisingly, Homer showed a basic affinity for this vision in that his style, from the outset of his career, was very painterly.

It is interesting to speculate as to how Homer acquired this perceptual side of his sensibility. Painterliness has been shown to be a distinctly European trait. No other American painters, save the expatriates, have ever been able to use it with any real degree of proficiency. Perhaps it was in his work as an illustrator that Homer first began to develop his painterly tendency. It is likely that, in order to capture the sense of action in a scene taking place in front of him, it would have been necessary for him to sketch with quick, bold strokes, such as characterize impressionistic painterliness.

While this theory cannot be proven, it does not seem unlikely. Lloyd Goodrich, the foremost authority on Homer, states that there are some definite ways in which Homer's experience with illustration opened up some aspects of impressionism to him. Goodrich asserts that Homer's "bigness of vision," his ability to see his subjects in the simplest of forms, is partly a result of knowledge of patterns in illustration. Also, becuase he was an illustrator, Homer always had an eye toward fashion. Thus, he was not afraid to use daringly bright colors, such as the impressionists were famous for using (Goodrich, 1974:47).

Impressionism allowed Homer to paint with a sense of movement and freed him from the meticulous constructivism which he felt stifled him in conceptualism. Thus, it would seem his quest for realism should be ended. And yet this is not the case. Barbara Novak's analysis of Claude Monet's *Women in a Garden* helps to clarify the problem Winslow Homer found in the use of purely perceptual vision. Whereas Monet's primary interest is in the effect of light in nature, this formal

problem is but a secondary concern with Winslow Homer. Monet uses light to unite detail in the painting. His light causes the eye to flicker and dance about the picture. The preoccupation with light for its own sake causes the feeling that the work is essentially unrealistic. Monet is not concerned enough with the object to be considered a realist in Homer's sense of the word. Monet's figures do not have a plane on which to rest. They are swept up in the overall unity created by the light. As Novak says, "Monet's figures are no longer grounded in our world. They float lightly like bubbles on the surface . . ." (Novak, 1969:169). Just as Bingham in his extreme linearity distorted reality, so Monet in his extreme perceptualism distorted reality. He created a two-dimensional world of his own.

If it is not by following conceptualism and it is not by following perceptualism, how is it that Homer achieves realism? It is by a most amazing synthesis of these two sides of his artistic sensibility that Homer comes to his goal. Two paintings in which Homer's realism shines are *Long Branch, New Jersey* (1869) and *High Tide: The Bathers* (1870). We see in both these paintings that Homer juxtaposed elements of both sensibilities in order that they would play off one another.

In *Long Branch, New Jersey,* Homer's stroke is basically painterly, giving that sense of movement which he found lacking in traditional genre painting. Still, he maintains the unbroken identity of the object, that is also necessary in a realistic painting. Homer does this in a rather ingenious way. He seems to modify the luminist tendency of containment of light. The light in this painting is contained within the structural confines of the picture, and yet, it is active insofar as it spreads out within the painting, shining on and defining each figure. This could perhaps be called a naturalist's version of the precise delineation found in traditional genre.

It is also important to note that the organization of this work is planar. The use of the flat shadows upon the plane is very effective. It gives Homer's figures a sense of weight. These figures do not hover, as Monet's tend to do. Also contributing to the sense of weightedness is the diagonal of the dune. It subjects Homer's figures to gravitational pull, giving the viewer a sense that these figures belong in our three-dimensional world.

This painting is actually framed in geometric shapes. The most

obvious is the big square bath-house with its abruptly diagonal ramp. Behind it we see the taut line of the horizon. At the outer edge of the painting, at the bottom of the dune, is a row of box-like buildings. This contrast is very aesthetically pleasing. Perhaps this is because the geometric objects are painted in big, simple forms; they give the painting a feeling of vastness. It seems what we see here is Homer's perceptualist feel for patterns.

Homer's perceptual vision is also obvious in the decorative elements of this work. His color is fresh and bright, because it is bathed in sunlight. Color is one area in which Winslow Homer can be seen to be in direct contrast to traditional genre painters, whose colors tend to be opaque. It is also obvious that Homer simply revels in the elaborate fashions of the day. He paints all the flounces and ruffles and also uses bold, unmixed colors on the dresses. This decorating fashion may be easily misconstrued as unnaturalistic, that is, as having been added by Homer, but this proves not to be the case, as *The Nation* said in 1866, "These pictures ought to be taken care of in order that our ancestors may see how the incredible female dress actually did look when worn by active young women" (Goodrich, 1969:116). In this statement there is direct confirmation that Homer's fusion of his perceptual and conceptual tendencies resulted in his painting what he saw as realistically as possible.

It can be seen that Homer's synthesis of conceptual and perceptual vision made it possible for him to be realistic in terms of emotional content, as well as style. It was not the desire of the traditional genre painter to portray emotional realism. The genre painter wanted to portray his subject idealistically. The linearity of conceptualism, therefore, worked well for him as it is impossible to use it subtly.

In portraying emotions realistically, however, it was necessary for Homer to be able to communicate nuances of feeling. His painting *High Tide: The Bathers* is a paramount example of this emotional realism. Barbara Novak calls this painting unsettling. There are two ways in which it can be said to be so. There is a slight sense of agitation in this painting. Note the girl on the ground, tying her shoe. She glances up quickly, but we cannot tell from the expression on her face what she may be thinking. The little dog in the foreground seems strangely frightened. This representation of agitation, because it is such a subtle component of the overall mood, would not be possible

without Homer's painterly stroke.

At the same time, this painting has conceptual elements as well. It is planar and vast in space. The girls seem dominated by it. "Space becomes the carrier of wordless feeling" (Novak, 1969:175). The use of empty space echoes psychologically the physical estrangement of the three girls. Thus, it is shown that Homer's dual sensibility allows him to paint realistic emotion.

Because of the tension in his work between conceptual and perceptual vision, Winslow Homer has often been described to be more that a genre painter and less than an Impressionist. Such a judgement cannot truly be made. Winslow Homer's greatness was not in that his art was better than that of traditional genre artists. His greatness lies in the fact that he had the courage to follow his own unique vision.

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The European Frontier the displacement of nature as a result of the expansion of human settlement

by John Gabriel

Fredrick Jackson Turner's *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* provides a point of reference from which to begin a discussion of the European frontier. Turner believed that the North American Frontier was a unique phenomenon in world history (Turner, 1963:28). In 1893 he wrote:

> The existence of an area of land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development (Turner, 1963:27).

The movement of people into the frontier and the taming of nature resulted in a rugged individualism which characterized American democracy. Further, civilizing nature was evidence of man's progress and mankind's movement towards enlightenment (Simonson, 1926:11).

Although Turner believed the frontier to be a uniquely North American experience, it is clear that a similar frontier had existed in Europe during the Middle Ages (Glacken, 1967:298; Darby, 1956:195, 196; Thompson, 1928:517-19). The frontier was not a unique American experience but had been a recurring phenomenon in Europe. Since Roman times Europeans have periodically waged a battle against nature; at times nature has yielded to the expansion of human settlement, at others she has proven remarkably capable of reasserting her control over untended fields and lands.

Written as a senior thesis in History, in the Fall of 1987.

Defining the terms wilderness and frontier is a relatively difficult task. The word "wilderness" dates to the time of early Teutonic and Norse languages. It originated with the word "will-doer-ness," the place of wild beasts, the association being with an area which is outside of the control of man (Nash, 1967:2). In our modern technological society natural settings are no longer thought to be beyond the control of humans. Therefore, this definition is not as precise as it was in earlier periods. Perhaps the clearest way for us to define wilderness would be in terms of degree. If wilderness and civilization are thought of as antipodal we may arrive at a clearer understanding of both of these words. A particular area could easily be defined relative to the influence man has had on it. At one extreme, a wilderness could be defined as an area upon which the human foot has never trod. The extreme of civilization would then be an area where man exerted nearly total control over nature, such as a major cosmopolitan center. In the middle would lie pastoral or rural environments (Nash, 1967:6). Finally, between wilderness and pastoral or rural environments would be found areas which had been cultivated or settled and had seen a reemergence of a wild ecosystem. These areas would lack the diversity of the former virgin ecosystem but would be essentially wild in nature. Today, to insist on absolute purity from man's influence in defining wilderness would be to eliminate all areas.

When Europeans discovered America, they recognized that nature was not under the control and order which western civilization traditionally imposed upon it (Nash, 1967:7). For this reason they referred to the new land as a wilderness, though they knew it to be inhabited. This is perhaps the clearest definition of wilderness; an area in which humans exert little or no control over the environment. Roderick Nash writes,

> It was instinctively understood as something alien to man—an insecure and uncomfortable environment against which civilization had waged an unceasing struggle (1967:8).

If we accept this definition, then the definition of "frontier" is easy, a frontier being simply an outpost of civilization in the wilderness (Nash, 1967:7). Clearly the concept of frontier infers an attempt by humans to exert control over a region which is essentially wild by

nature. Thus a frontier could also include outposts of civilization in wild nature. Turner defined the frontier as a divide between the primitive and the civilized. He thought that at first the wilderness dominated the pioneer but that gradually the pioneer would come to dominate the wilderness and thus make it civilized (Simonson, 1926:9). However, rather than the frontier being a uniquely North American phenomenon, as Turner had believed, the frontier was a concept understood as early as Roman times.



Map 1. The Roman Empire and frontier prior to the fall of Rome (Hammond, 1981: plate 29).

Invading Forces and the Fall of Rome

The fall of Rome was preceded by a century of gradual retreat from the frontier. Map one shows the extent of Roman expansion prior to the fall of Rome. Of particular interest is the "Rhine-Danube frontier" (Pounds, 1973:98; Smith, 1978:70). It was at this frontier that the power of the Roman military and the German tribes were in equilibrium. The Rhine and Danube rivers provided natural boundaries which were more easily defended than the surrounding countryside (Smith, 1978:70). Rome made several abortive attempts to settle the land east of the Rhine and north of the Danube (Pounds, 1973:98). Due to the continual conflict over this region it remained largely an unsettled virgin forest. It is doubtful that the population densities exceeded five persons per kilometer for any period of time (Pounds, 1973:114).

During the third and fourth centuries AD, Slavic people moved west out of Asia and displaced the entire east German world (Bury, 1963:55). This displacement of the German tribes who lived east of the Elbe was a gradual process which peaked during the last two centuries of the Western Roman Empire. The movement of the nomadic Slavs west placed enormous pressure on the sedentary German tribes and forced them to move west and south into Roman lands. The German tribes were caught between two superior forces; the Romans were technologically and militarily superior, and the Slavs simply overwhelmed them in numbers.

In response to pressure from the Slavs, a Visigoth tribe requested and received permission from Rome to settle in Roman territory south of the Danube in 376 AD. The land into which the Visigoths moved was already supporting a Roman population. Roman officials had no experience with the relocation of large groups of people; when 80,000 Visigoths relocated in Roman territory, the repercussions were enormous. Within a short period of time competition between Romans and Visogoths for food and land resulted in a war which culminated in a Visogoth victory in 378 (Bury, 1963:58). This relocation and the resulting war are commonly referred to by historians as an indication of the weakness of the Roman empire in the fourth century (Bury, 1963:58). This event marks the beginning of the final episode which led to the collapse of Roman defenses on the frontier and the fall of the Western Roman empire.

In response to the pressure from Germanic tribes on the Danube frontier and the war with the Visogoths, who had only recently settled within Roman territory, Rome moved troops which had been permanently stationed on the Rhine frontier south (Bury, 1963:81). Rome's attempt to control internal unrest and defend the Danube frontier left the Rhine frontier unprotected. Germanic tribes invaded Gaul in 409 AD and Rome fell in 410 (Smith, 1978:123). As map two shows, by 419 the entire Roman Empire was under the control of barbarian German tribes.

Map 2. The invasion of the Roman Empire by Barbarians (Hammond, 1981: plate 30 B).

European Wilderness and Wild Nature

With the fall of Rome in 410, German tribes were free to roam at will throughout former Roman territory, and nomadic Slavic peoples dominated Germany (Map 2). In this period of unrest natural ecosystems reasserted themselves in western Europe and the limited area which had been cleared in Germany saw a reemergence of the woodland. For this reason we can divide Europe into two categories: wild nature being those areas which had been cultivated by Romans and had since seen a reemergence of natural ecosystems; and wilderness as the area east of the Rhine and north of the Danube.

The invasion of Roman territory was swift and the results profound. Medieval historians universally refer to the period following the fall of Rome as a period of extreme population disruption. Settlement and colonization of new lands came to a halt, most established cities contracted within their fortified walls, and many settlement sites disappeared completely (Pounds, 1973:196). Rural settlements disappeared as inhabitants fled before the destruction of the "barbarians." The collapse of the Roman Empire "nearly brought about the complete destruction of civilization"(Boissonade, 1964:1). Cities were destroyed and the population plummeted, reaching its lowest level since the early Roman period (Pounds, 1973:169):

> Buildings and monuments alike were delivered to the flames, and throughout both West and East numbers of still flourishing towns disappeared, never to rise again (Boissonade, 1964:26).

There is considerable debate regarding demographic trends from the fifth through the ninth centuries in Gaul (Smith, 1978:161; Pounds, 1973:182; Boissonade, 1964:29). Whether the population was declining or growing may never be determined. However, it is universally agreed that the population fell immediately after and during the early invasion of the barbarians. Population densities remained lower than those of the late Roman empire until the tenth or eleventh century (Smith, 1978:161; Pounds, 1973:182). Much of the land which had come under cultivation during the Roman period saw the reemergence of natural ecosystems. It is clear that during the period of insecurity and unrest, 409 through 850, natural ecosystems reasserted themselves and many untended fields and deserted villages reverted to waste and woodland (Pounds, 1973:276; Darby, 1956:190). Vast regions of Roman settlement disappeared (Pounds, 1973:196, 263, 276; Smith, 1978:161; Boissonade, 1964:25-26). This is particularly true of the Rhine and Danube river valleys where a Gothic writer describes a region where "not a labourer is to be seen" (Boissonade, 1964:25). The location of frontier settlements had been precarious in the best of times. During the barbarian invasions:

> . . . urban life, as the Romans understood it, had come to an end; the cities had fallen to ruin, and their sites, if inhabited, served only as villages. (Pounds, 1973:263).

Roman roads fell into disrepair as the economy of the early Middle Ages became increasingly localized and self sufficient (Pounds, 1973:300-01). As the woodlands reasserted their control over the land, villages became isolated population centers in a limitless forest. German tribes had little inclination to clear new lands, as they were unable even to maintain the former Roman cities and fields which they occupied (Pounds, 1973:198). As is typical of invading peoples, the Germans assimilated some of the technology of the Roman civilization. For our purposes agricultural techniques are the most important because they resulted in the development of a sedentary life style (Koebner, 1966:3, 45).

East of the Rhine river and north of the Danube river there existed a vast virgin old growth forest. Both German and Slavic tribes were pantheistic (Keobner, 1966:21). Since natural ecosystems were the homes of their Gods, both groups were resistant to clearing the woodland and had a marginal impact on the environment. They lived a life similar to that of the Native American Indians, each tribe being entirely self-sufficient (Boissonade, 1964:7). There existed little, if any, trade between tribes and few transportation routes. In fact after the fall of Rome, the few roads which had been built into the forest fell into disrepair (Pounds, 1973:300-01). Settlements were isolated within an immense virgin forest composed of birch, beech, maple and pine. These forests covered four-fifths of the vast region where they dwelt (Boissonade, 1964:7). As late as the eleventh century missionaries reported riding for five days on end in absolute solitude in these forests (Boissonade, 1964:224).

Throughout Europe the period from the fifth to the ninth century was characterized by population fluctuations, famine, epidemics, insecurity, invasions, constant anarchy, warfare, and primitive economy. This resulted in much of the cultivated land being deserted and the reemergence of wild environments:

> Agricultural labour became scarce, owing to the great slaughter of men, the slave raids, the famines and epidemics, which had become almost chronic. The growing insecurity discouraged all production, and everywhere in West and East alike stretched vast wastes, unpopulated and uncultivated (Boissonade, 1964:25).

In the year 900 AD it is estimated that half of France, two thirds of the low countries, and four fifths of England and Germany were uncultivated (Boissonade, 1964:226). "If the waves of the ocean had overflowed the fields of Gaul they would have done less damage" (Boissonade, 1964:24).

The Great Age of Clearing
900 - 1350

As the German tribes were forced to make do with the lands under their control they became increasingly sedentary. This increased stability is clearly evident in the rise in population densities during the tenth and eleventh centuries (Thrupp, 1964:18). During this period population pressures in villages in Gaul became extreme and humans began to expand their settlements into regions which had been settled during Roman times. These areas had remained unused for approximately four hundred years and were covered by dense forests and wastes (Smith, 1978:161). At first the process was concentrated primarily around villages and lands which had previously been settled by the Romans. By the early part of the High Middle Ages most of the land in Gaul had been reclaimed and settlement and colonization of the virgin forests of Germany was begun. It would be incorrect to claim that the expansion of settlement in Gaul and colonization in Germany took place at entirely different times or independent of each other. However, in the early Middle Ages very few groups had sufficient infrastructure or capital with which to organize large scale settlement. In the High Middle Ages the economy had expanded, yielding surplus capital which monasteries and feudal governments were able to use in organizing large scale settlement and colonization. From the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries the process of reclamation became increasingly ordered and controlled. By the

twelfth and thirteenth centuries the flood of peasants to the east was analogous to the movement of North American settlers to western North America. However, the European settlement took place over a much longer period of time (Glacken, 1967:289; Thompson 1928:523):

> Latent demographic pressure, which had only been held in check by the deficiencies of agricultural technique in the early Middle Ages, appears to have populated the empty or sparsely inhabited places as soon as it was released by improvements in equipment and the rise in productivity (Duby, 1968:121).

Settlement and colonization is most easily traced through the history of the clearing of the woodland (Thrupp, 1964:18). This clearing can be divided into three types: simple extension of the cultivated area; the founding of daughter villages; and finally, cooperative settlement and colonization (Smith, 1978:167; Duby, 1968:87). Extensions and foundings took place primarily during the ninth and tenth centuries, and cooperative clearing during the tenth through the fourteenth centuries. Extension of the cultivated area and founding of daughter villages took place primarily in Gaul. Cooperative settlement and colonization occurred almost exclusively in the virgin forest of Germany. It was directed by manorial lords, monasteries, and feudal governments and done by peasants. These three forms of settlement and clearing should be seen as a means of releasing demographic pressure and of expanding the economy (Duby, 1968:123).

During the early Middle Ages clearing was concentrated around areas which had been inhabited prior to the fall of Rome. Many of these areas were still inhabited after the fall of Rome. However, the population densities were much lower. From the ninth through the tenth centuries these areas saw a general rise in population densities. By the late tenth century, the areas were on the verge of famine. Current methods of farming were not able to produce enough food to meet the demands of the population (Smith, 1978:161). In response to demographic pressure, peasants gradually expanded their fields into the surrounding forest in piecemeal fashion (Duby, 1968:72). So slow was the process, it went largely unnoticed by the emerging power structure. We can easily imagine that such a process carried out over

several generations could significantly increase an individual's land holdings (Duby, 1968:74). When combined with similar clearing by other peasants the resulting cleared area could have amounted to an appreciable number of acres.

Another response to the demographic pressure was the "hiving off" of a group of peasants to form a new village in the forest (Pounds, 1973:253). For obvious reasons this form of settlement took place in areas of low population density such as on the frontier. These new settlements were rarely far from the parent settlement. Usually the parent village and the daughter village were separated by a woodland which grew smaller as both communities utilized it as a common resource base. As the farmers expanded their fields at the expense of the woodland it eventually disappeared entirely, and the villages were separated only by fields and pasture (Duby, 1968:75). The villages tended to be compact with houses clustered for security (Pounds, 1973:253).

The settlement type which had the most profound influence on the natural environment was the cooperative clearing. During the High Middle Ages settlement became much more controlled and planned. Historical geographies of Europe often claim that the clearing of the woodland was carried out under the direction of feudal governments, manorial lords, and Benedictine and Cistercian monks. Recent scholarship has shown that the Cistercians may not have been as active in settlement as had been previously thought (Berman, 1986:9). It is becoming apparent that the comparison of the Cistercians to the frontiersmen of North America is based upon propagandized accounts:

> It is becoming accepted that the early Cistercians, anxious to justify their privileges and to prevent criticism of the irregularities of the foundation at Citeaux, stridently insisted in their narrative and legislative documents on the poverty, isolation, and self-sufficiency . . . and the foundation of the abbey in otherwise unwanted lands (Berman, 1986:9).

By the time that the Cistercians were on the scene much of the clearing had already been done by a variety of groups, the most important of these being the Benedictine monks and feudal lords.

There is good evidence that, during the eleventh and twelfth

centuries, Benedictine monasteries and feudal government officials actively recruited peasants to form settlement communities in the forest. Generally, all parties involved benefited from these ventures. The monasteries and lords benefited in that their power, the number of subjects under their control, wealth, and influence all increased in these new population centers (Duby, 1968:80). It appears that by far the most appealing incentive to the peasants was the increased liberty which they were given in the new lands (Koebner, 1966:66). Typically the peasants would be granted greater freedom, and the tribute which they paid to the lords and churches was clearly less than it had been in their former homes.

In the later Middle Ages it became common for charters to be drawn up which specified limits to the Lord's power and the favorable treatment the peasants would enjoy (Duby, 1968:75). The old saying "One lives well under the cross," originated during this period. It had more than a spiritual meaning; it referred to the economic well being of the peasants in the new settlements (Glacken, 1967:349). Typically, peasants were able to exchange five to ten acre farms for 50 to 60 acres of virgin old growth forest (Smith, 1978:166). So great was the flood of peasants from their homes to these new lands, that the lords and churches in the established areas were forced to relax their exactions and increase liberties in an effort to entice the peasants to stay (Duby, 1968:114). A typical example of the recruiting which took place is seen in the messengers of count Adolf of Schauenburg. These men were sent out by the count in an effort to recruit peasants to settle the forest northeast of the Elbe. They went out proclaiming that:

> Whosoever were in straits for lack of fields should come with their families and receive a very good land—a spacious land, rich in crops, abounding in fish and flesh and exceedingly good in pasture (Pounds, 1973:248).

A large number of people answered his call in a movement to the east which was reminiscent of the flood of pioneers toward the American West (Darby, 1956:195; Glacken, 1967:298; Thompson, 1928:518).

This expansion of settlement is an indicator of the health of the economy. During the Middle Ages there were three primary uses for excess capital: the first, erection of larger and more elaborate buildings;

the second, land reclamation; the third, colonization and settlement of wilderness. All of these activities had a pronounced impact on the woodland (Pounds, 1973:242).

To set up a settlement in the virgin forest or reforested areas was extremely expensive. Problems associated with colonization were many. One of the most complex problems was the coordination of the entire affair. Willing peasants had to be found, organized and installed in suitable sites. Food, tools, seed pack and draft animals all had to be provided to the colonists until they were able to clear a large enough area of land to become self-sufficient (Smith, 1978:172). Settlers also had to deal with the indigenous inhabitants of a region. As the Germans advanced east the Slavic peoples were either forced out, slaughtered, or assimilated by the settlers (Pounds, 1973:248). Clearly, an individual or organization which wished to begin such an undertaking had to have firm financial standing.

The model used for forest clearing throughout Europe originated at the Benedictine Abbey of Lorsch, in the Odenwald of Germany. This abbey was located on the east side of the Rhine River and had accumulated vast tracts of land in the Odenwald, and on the flood plain of the Rhine, as gifts from King Charlemagne. The land was given to the monastery in order to strengthen its economic base and the money raised from use of the land was to be used, in part, to pay tribute to the King (Nitz, 1983:108).

The abbey used the revenue from farming done on the Rhine flood plain to colonize the Odenwald. The Waldhufendorfer or "forest village" model, which first evolved here during the tenth century, eventually spread throughout Europe (Nitz, 1983:105; Darby, 1956:193; Koebner, 1966:45). This village was usually located in a valley and was linear, with houses along the main street. The area directly behind each house, up to the crest of the hill, belonged to the home owner and was utilized at his discretion (Koebner, 1966:46). The entire settlement was linear, rather than circular, as were settlements in France. Each home owner received an oblong tract of land ranging in size from 20 to 60 acres and houses were built facing the street. Moving from the house to the crest of the hill one would pass through the garden, the orchard, the pasture, and finally the wood lot (Thompson, 1928:524).

Using this form of forest clearing the Abbey of Lorsch was able to

transform the vast virgin woodland and waste of the Odenwald into pasture and farmland in three and a half centuries (Nitz, 1983:106). The revenue generated from this forest products industry was used in part to pay tribute to King Charlemagne. Charlemagne decreed that,

> Whenever there are men competent for the task, let them be given forest to cut down in order to improve our possessions (Glacken, 1967:334).

Since the church craved revenue, its needs harmonized well with the craving for new land by peasants and freemen (Koebner, 1966:45). The success of this model was so great that the abbey reproduced it in each of its settlement areas in the Odenwald and it was adopted by other groups and used as far east as the Carpathians (Nitz, 1983:106).

Frontier Attitudes

The settlement of wild nature and wilderness throughout Europe was so successful that many wild animals, such as wolves, completely disappeared from vast regions (Boissonade, 1964:232). The attitudes which allowed Europeans to so fully exploit nature are fascinating. However, there has been little research done in this area. Medieval attitudes toward nature were complex and are not easily categorized. Yet, there seem to be two prevalent themes which appear time and again throughout medieval history. I have labeled these themes: Wilderness as a moral vacuum; and Wilderness as God's greatest work.

Using the definition of wilderness as an area where humans are not in control of the environment, and thus feel alienated, gives us some understanding of the idea of nature as a moral vacuum (Nash, 1967:3). A person who entered an area of wilderness during the Middle Ages would have found the rules which normally governed his existence and controlled his actions absent (Nash, 1967:4). Since these rules were absent, medieval thought often associated wilderness with chaos. Natural settings were often described as ugly, alien, mysterious and threatening (Nash, 1967:4). The battle against the woodland, which continually attempted to reclaim farmers' fields, was a concept which every farm worker understood. Since ninety percent of the populace worked in agriculture, the common perception was of

wilderness and wild nature standing between an individual and a more comfortable economic existence. Wilderness was a threatening force that lurked just on the edge of each farmer's field. Thus, among the illiterate peasants the criterion for judging the value of natural settings was exclusively utilitarian. Clearing the woodland around a peasant's field increased his income by freeing more land for planting.

It is a short step from this individual perception to the perception of wilderness by a village or better yet a culture. Virgin wilderness was an ever present reminder of exactly how far man had to go until he mastered Nature and increased civilization, civilization being the area where man was in control. It is significant that traditionally Paradise has been located on an island or in the clouds. "In this way the wild hinterland normally surrounding and threatening the first communities was eliminated" (Nash, 1967:9). Basically, the frontiersmen lived too close to the wilderness and battled with it too frequently to be able to appreciate it (Glacken, 1967:291; Nash, 1967:24). "Understandably, his attitude was hostile and his dominant criteria utilitarian" (Nash, 1967:24). The medieval economy was extremely dependent on the forest. It was the forest which: supplied materials to build monasteries, churches and all other human structures; powered the furnaces of blacksmiths and glassmakers; and supplied wood for cooking and heating of homes. The entire economy of medieval Europe was dependent on the woodland. As the economy became more sophisticated the demands which were made on the forest as a resource base grew until they peaked in the fourteenth century (Duby, 1968:143).

The traditional belief that frontiersmen were waging a battle against chaos has deep roots in Western history. By settling wild areas men were thought to be bringing the order of civilization to an unpredictable and frightening area. The clearing of the woodland was significant in that the Slavs believed that their Gods inhabited the deepest, darkest, and most isolated parts of the woodlands (Glacken, 1967:291). By clearing the forest, Christians hoped to prove the superiority of their God. The Benedictine monks wished to dispel pagan myths which kept the Germans from attacking the woodland (Keobner, 1966:45; Glacken, 1967:310). To clear vast expanses of forest and root out the pagan Gods of the Slavs was to be carrying on God's work.

Among the literate, wilderness was often viewed in an entirely

different light. Perhaps the most outspoken advocate for the preservation of Nature was Saint Francis (d. 1226) who believed that within the forest the study of Nature led to a clearer understanding of God (Armstrong, 1973:7). Saint Francis believed that God's will was revealed to humans through natural phenomena:

> St. Francis began to consider the lay of the place and the country round about. And lo, while he was thus pondering there came a great multitude of birds from divers parts that, with singing and fluttering of their wings, showed forth great joy and gladness, and surrounded St. Francis .... St. Francis rejoiced in spirit, and spake thus: "I do believe, dearest brothers, that it is pleasing to our Lord Jesus Christ that we abide on this solitary mountain, since our sisters and brothers, the birds, show forth such great joy at our coming" (Armstrong, 1973:42).

Stories similar to this were common in medieval hagiography (Glacken, 1967:290). Many Benedictine monks held that since God was perfect then his creation was perfect. They hoped to be partners with God and recreate the Garden of Eden. Medieval hagiography is filled with stories of the Benedictines and their peaceful relationship with "wild animals" (Glacken, 1967:309). While the vast majority of the populace was involved in destroying the natural environment it is surprising to read about the joy of Benedictines in meeting feral animals in the wilds (Glacken, 1967:209). Surely the monks had taken an active part in the settlement of the woodlands and wastes, but they also preserved a significant amount of woodland in which they worshiped their God (Glacken, 1967:313). Monasteries were in many cases the primary force protecting the woodland from the axe of the woodsman. In their forest the monks were said to have regained a dominance over nature which man had lost with the fall from grace (Glacken, 1967:310). The dominance which the monks achieved over nature was often much more harmonious and less destructive than that of their contemporaries. In this tradition the forest was thought of as a place of religious purity and many groups fled into the wilderness in search of religious freedom (Nash, 1967:18).

Conclusion

The attack upon nature during the Middle Ages was so intense that by the fifteenth century much of the woodland had been cleared, and Europeans were forced to come to terms with a finite resource. As early as the twelfth century Europeans in some areas such as western Germany had come to realize that if the forest disappeared, so too did the life blood of the economy (Glacken, 1967:336). From the twelfth century to the end of the Middle Ages forest protection became increasingly the rule, and eventually permission to clear land became a special exception (Glacken, 1967:338).

Even with the increased awareness of the destruction resulting from human use of the woodland, vast regions continued to be destroyed. The fourteenth century saw the results of a population exceeding the carrying capacity of the land. The black death and other epidemics, famines, and wars, caused the population of Europe to plummet at a rate not seen since the fall of Rome (Duby, 1968:301). This century saw the collapse of the economy and once again whole villages were abandoned and forests and wastes again covered arable lands (Duby, 1968:301). However, this reemergence of the wild nature was short lived. Europeans returned to clearing the land with renewed vigor in the early fifteenth century.

As we have seen, Europe has experienced three periods of settlement and colonization: the Roman period, the Medieval period, and a period beginning in the fifteenth century. It is clear that the frontier is not a unique North American experience. However, if we were to compare the North American frontier to Europe, or specifically the German frontier, we would find that they have more things uncommon than common. The German frontier "with a modest technology, was the work of centuries, the other, with the aid of machinery, the work of decades" (Glacken, 1967:290). I believe that it would be most correct to view the American frontier as an expansion of the European frontier. As Europeans neared the carrying capacity of the European continent in the late fifteenth century the Age of Discovery began. With the discovery of the wilderness of North America, Europeans simply transplanted the frontier to the new land and continued a process of settlement and clearing which originated in Roman times.

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"A Genteel Confrontation"

by Cerena Scantlebury

Professor Henry Higgins and Harriet Taylor are sitting across from each other at a table in the Bistro, sharing a plate of croissants and drinking tea. Higgins is flirting with the doe-eyed Taylor, who regards him somewhat stonily. Higgins makes a passing comment about an old student of his, Eliza Doolittle; Taylor, eyes alight, pounces on the subject like a terrier on a rat.

Taylor: You know Henry, though your education of Eliza may have benefited her in the long run, your attitude towards her did not help the idea of equal rights for women at all.

Higgins: (airily): What on earth do you mean? Equal rights had nothing to do with it. What does it matter *how* the results of Eliza's transformation took place, so long as they *did* take place? And a very good job those results were, too; look at her! She can pass as a foreign duchess—she is worthy of being consort to a king. I improved her mind as well as her appearance, introduced her to music, to Milton, to philosophy . . . though I don't think she'll need such things. So calm yourself, drink your tea, and say no more about it.

Taylor: (drawing herself up *very* straight): I most certainly will not calm myself! Henry, you are a man of considerable intelligence and some wit, but when it comes to social consciousness and human rights you are an absolute ass. I won't dispute the results; it's your attitudes that are so very deplorable. You seem to subscribe to the popular view that women should be excluded from so-called "unfeminine" activities, that the proper sphere for a woman is a private and domestic life. The truly proper sphere for any person is the best that he or she can attain. Only by this can all of humanity be improved, for

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Written for World Views Freshman Seminar, in the Fall of 1987.

women are a valuable human resource—as much as men are, if not more so. By encouraging Eliza to be servile to you, you contributed to your own moral degradation, for habits of submission make men as well as women servile-minded.

And why should Eliza settle for being a "Consort", as you so out-modishly put it? She has a brilliant mind, as you yourself once pointed out; it is actually better than yours. She is perfectly capable of maintaining her independence and of succeeding at her own business . . . she's also worth much more than a flower shop. That is, however, her choice, and if it makes her happy she has a perfect right to it.

No, it is not necessarily the end result of your experiment with which I find fault. When you raised Eliza from the gutter and persuaded her to discard her former image of a flower-girl, you opened up an entirely different world for her. You educated her, opened her mind to new possibilities, gave her a taste of what society would call "culture." You also gave her a considerable burden in the way of responsibilities and social expectations: she had to maintain her status, her accent, her grammar and her manners.

At the same time, you made Eliza dependent on you and Colonel Pickering, you made her play servile games to curry favor, allowed her to assume the role of a servant. You gave her no encouragement to be independent, so her self-confidence in her own abilities remained undeveloped, up until that last confrontation. At that time she was ready to claim her freedom from you, and she was ready to take her place in society as a free agent, independent of any man.

Give me one solid reason why freedom of movement should be granted to one person and not to another simply on the basis of sex. Don't answer that, Henry—let me finish. (Higgins subsides.)

Custom used to keep women tied to the traditional roles, but that is changing, especially here in America. No more must women be content to be housewives, to serve the men they live with . . . although you certainly undermined many years of social progress by allowing Eliza to set your appointments, keep your books, and fetch your slippers! Admittedly,

she did those favors for you partly because a small part of her wanted to "buy a claim" on you, to "seduce" you into needing her. Fortunately, you are too independent of women (except, of course, for your dear mother, to whom you are entirely too strongly attached) to allow yourself to be bewitched by these actions. Eliza should not be blamed, however, for making the attempt; she realized that you were a catch, and, feeling at first unfit for anything other than domestic life, she was simply trying to assure herself of a position in her new middle-class life.

Society can be blamed for this—always it has been assumed that men are physically and mentally stronger than women and are generally better equipped to support another person than women. You yourself contributed to this, for in the middle and upper class world to which you introduced Eliza, it was customary for women to be ornaments, to dress and sit nicely and to make polite small talk. They were not encouraged to work—it smacked of the lower class. To ban a woman from business or the professions simply because of her sex is ridiculous, and to discourage Eliza from claiming her independence is an outrage against humanity.

Higgins: But my dear, don't you see, I agree that Eliza is capable of setting up and managing her own affairs, though not as neatly or as well as I. Why do you think I read her out and told her she could come back or go to the devil, or that I could adopt her, or that she could marry Pickering? She has a brilliant mind, though somewhat emotional, and a finely flaring temper and a fierce pride—I wanted to provoke her, to show her the strength she had inside. Worked out quite well, I must admit; her relationship was extraordinarily impressive. Her choice of men, however, is not nearly as impressive—Freddy will be more of a drain on her than he is worth. If she wishes to attempt her own business, let her—that was not the specific purpose for which I educated her, but I can't very well stand in her way.

Taylor: Why then did you educate her?

Higgins: As a lark. That's what it started out as, in any case. I wanted to see if it was possible to take a low-class, dirty little flower girl and transform her into a duchess. But as the experiment wore on and I discovered that she had an exceptionally good ear and a quick mind, it became more an experiment for its own sake than for the sake of winning a bet.

Taylor: So you admit that you didn't do it for *Eliza's* sake?

Higgins: No, I didn't. I'm not as preoccupied with individual human or feminine rights as you are, you see. I see people as a grand parade—amusing and interesting subjects to study. I am an eccentric, and as such I am entitled to have a different view of humanity; I don't need people; I don't become attached.

Taylor (smiling slightly): Oh? Are you quite sure of that last statement?

Higgins: I may become accustomed to some of them, from time to time . . .

Taylor: Well! At last you admit it! Now if we can alter a few of your high-handed bullying attitudes, we might make you an advocate of equal rights for women after all.

Higgins: Highly unlikely my dear. Another croissant?

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1914 (Original production)

Taylor, Harriet *"The Enfranchisement of Women."*
1851 (first publication)

Fragmentation in Ashbery and Murray

by Per Olson

"It's all bits and pieces, spangles, patches, really; nothing/ Stands alone . . . " laments a character in Ashbery's "Daffy Duck in Hollywood." Yet, if she were to seek comfort from the fragmented universe in which she lives, she would not find a consoling handkerchief in the pockets of her creator, nor within the paint-crusted jeans of Elizabeth Murray. Rather, both artists seem to celebrate the disjointed whole that they portray in their works. The element of fragmentation takes many forms with Murray and, especially, Ashbery, and provides an excellent point of juncture for them. A close examination of how fragmentation works in their art reveals that it is a positive force of message and technique.

Ashbery takes on fragmentation as a stylistic means of giving his poems a feeling of disconnectedness, an occasional chaotic quality, or a hard-edged jagged movement. We could locate at least four strategies of Ashbery that suggest fragmentation. One technique that is especially prevalent in "Daffy Duck" is the breaking of a sentence or a unit of thought in a poem by inserting, with grammatical conventions, a digressive unit of thought within the main sentence. For example, the second sentence of "Daffy Duck" contains a long digression set off by the hyphens that break up the main idea of the sentence. By the time we come to the end of the digression, we have been led astray by envisioning the odd selection of listed items so that we forget the original train of thought. Later in the poem, Ashbery uses the same technique of fragmentation, only he sets off the digression with parentheses:

> . . . This wide, tepidly meandering,
> Civilized Lethe (one can barely make out the maypoles
> And chalets de necessite on its sedgy shore) leads to Tophet . . .

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We return and read the sentence again, but the effect of fragmentation has been achieved; the line does not move with one easy flow of thought.

Nor do the lines of thought easily flow with the more literal breaking up of the line, and this leads to Ashbery's second technique of fragmentation. In "Collective Dawns," for example, the first two stanzas end with the first part of a fragmented line. In this poem, the technique is appropriate in regard to form corresponding to content ("They say the town is coming apart"). Yet, Ashbery will use this tool again, most obviously in "The Thief of Poetry" whose lack of punctuation suggests continuous flow, but whose equal partitioning by stanzas suggest the fragmentation of a slide show. Similarly, Ashbery will break up a train of thought by ending a line after one word. For example, in "Daffy Duck:"

> . . . I scarce dare approach my mug's attenuated
> Reflection in yon hubcap, so jaundiced, so deconfit
> Are its lineaments—fun, no doubt, for some quack
> phrenologist's
> Fern-clogged waiting room, . . .

If we pause at the end of every line in reading an Ashbery piece, our feeling of the complete unit of thought or sentence will be that it has been broken up, fragmented simply by the way it is presented.

Similar to Ashbery's effect of fragmentation by grammatically inserting diversions is his technique of bombarding the reader with a barage of images taken from random warehouses of society and culture. The relentless bombarding effect of "Daffy Duck" forces us to refer to all of the unconnected levels of social existence in order to bring the fragments of the poem together, to find a sense of wholeness within the poem. The sentence that begins "That geranium glow/ Over Anaheim's had the riot act read to it . . . " is grammatically correct; but it is absurd and forces us to run a gauntlet between the images shooting at us from all directions. Words don't stand alone here, as Aglavaine laments; they are loaded references to bigger structures of thought, different for every reader, culled up through the process of image-producing, and seldom related to other images. Reading this sentence, I see stadiums, police with helmets, fireworks, a locker room, a golf course next to a garden, two people urinating, and

plenty of blank visions corresponding to references that I don't understand. The effect is chaos and fragmentation. Of course, the whole poem does not read this way. Certain lines seem to counter the jumbled, image-bloated sentences and suggest some sort of coherent idea that Ashbery is trying to relay. Yet, in this poem especially, the feeling of fragmentation is at the fore, and we need to consider the fragmented parts in order to see the whole. We cannot peel off the parts to get to the meaning of the poem, because Ashbery's whole point in using fragmentation as a technique is not to puzzle us or to challenge us to find hidden meaning but to show that fragmentation is the fundamental nature of the world around him.

To the major techniques of fragmentation in Ashbery's poetry outlined above, we may add a fourth, again found particularly in "Daffy Duck," and that is the use of bloated and hard-sounding words. The average reader is not familiar with this language that has a way of cutting into the flow of a line, like a jagged-edge blade through leather. Words like "algolagnic," "borborygmic," "stygian," as well as foreign phrases and proper nouns, bear down on the reader like fat men in an airplane aisle-way. We need to stop and take each word syllable by syllable before we can get our mouths around it, let alone understand it. Once we've mastered it, though, the line still lies fragmented, divided by the brazen and hard-edged word. The softness of flow is interrupted by the awkward language.

The fragmented nature of Murray's art is more obvious, since her mode of presenting the whole is through an arrangement of separate canvases. Yet, closer inspection of how Murray arranges the subjects on the canvases, how the subjects are shaped and juxtaposed and how the canvases sit in relation to one another opens the door for a full understanding of fragmentation for Murray as well as for some parallels we can draw between Ashbery and Murray. Just as I discussed the fragmentation that broken structural schemes, random images, and mouthy words introduce to "line of thought" within an Ashbery poem, I will discuss Murray's subjects or images and how they function on her canvases, all in light of the idea of fragmentation.

First, considering how the image is positioned on a canvas, we notice that in several of Murray's paintings, the image does not always remain on a single canvas but carries over to an underlying canvas. In "Like a Leaf," for example, the leaf in the center of the work has a

fragment on each of the canvases. The organ-like form and rectangular object on the table in "More Than You Know," too, are placed on two canvases, one overlapping the other. Murray suggests that we cannot look to the individual canvases to hold the image; rather, the canvases act to break up the image. At any moment, we feel that the top of the canvas of "Like a Leaf" might fall away, like a leaf, leaving only the edges of the image. Murray is even quasi-illusionistic in this regard in "More Than You Know," in that the square canvas in the center seems to be the equivalent of the table top image. Yet, the canvas on top of the table contains, in part, a portion of the table as well as the chair next to it, so that the table top which we thought was flat and defined by a single canvas is actually fragmented. A section has been broken off and raised.

Analogous to this fragmentation of the subject is Ashbery's literal breaking up of a line from one stanza to the next and his fragmenting the sound of a line of thought by using one-word lines. The subject exists on different levels of structure. To be fair, we could see these parallel techniques of Ashbery and Murray as suggesting continuity rather than fragmentation. The leaf that has a corner on each of the canvases making up the whole could be regarded as an uniting force, an element all canvases have in common. The divided subject in an Ashbery poem could be read as a bridging of the gap between stanzas. Indeed, both Ashbery and Murray find a sense of wholeness in their art; paradoxically, though, only through a rigorous consideration of the fragmentation, the disjointed effect, is the mood of continuity viable.

The disjointed or broken effect in Murray is achieved most poignantly in "Art Part" and "Painter's Progress," and with these pieces we enter into a discussion of how Murray's canvases sit in relation to one another and suggest fragmentation. Obviously, the work appears like a puzzle that has been pulled apart—a fragmented picture. Yet, we notice that this puzzle will never be a whole. The pieces do not interlock. Not only are they fragmented, but unlike the overlapping paintings previously discussed, they have no potential for continuity except in the mind of the viewer who understands that a whole hand and a whole paintbrush are being represented. Yet, even with these images in mind, we see that sections of the hand and brush are missing. Also, we wonder if part of the hand is not in fact grafted

from another hand. The top of the middle finger is much too thin in relation to the base of that finger. We feel the sense of discontinuity, of bits taken from somewhere else and grafted onto the whole. Similarly in Ashbery, a series of images comes at us from all directions, especially in the case of "Daffy Duck." The images or lines of thought do not interlock, correlate, or flow logically.

Of course, here I am drawing an analogy between Murray's structural positioning of canvases and Ashbery's seemingly random selection of trains of thought to show how they both suggest fragmentation. We would have a more difficult time in trying to find a sense of fragmentation in Murray's choice of images which unquestionably represent an actual object, since her combination of images does not seem particularly disturbing or absurd as do Ashbery's choices of images. If, however, we consider the shape of the abstract images, the biomorphic blobs and jagged forms, and how they relate to one another, we feel a similar sense of awkwardness and breaking-up that we found in those mouthy words and phrases of "Daffy Duck." In "Sentimental Education," the jagged, hard-edged figure on the left makes contact or potential contact with the two soft and rounded biomorphic figures. It means to break up the sense of wholeness of these forms. Also, the lightning-like line running through the black figure suggest a crack that might potentially fragment the black figure. Just as we winced at those obnoxious words in "Daffy Duck," we wince at the assaulting nature of the jagged form.

The article "Elizabeth Murray Shapes Up," by Paul Gardner, notes Murray's threefold development as an artist. In the first stage, she painted, on single canvases, bloated shapes that suggested a possible bursting of the canvas. The ball in "Moody Ball" and the figures in "New York Dawn" pushed at the canvas sides. "Join," the figure of a broken heart, was the prelude to her second stage in which the forms literally seemed to explode—the painter's hand and the palette in "Art Part." The pieces were disconnected with no possibility of reconciliation. In her most recent phase, Murray has brought the pieces back together but not in the form of one canvas. The canvases overlap and join together to hold the various subjects. The last two movements correspond to events in Murray's life—the shattering divorce from her husband and the subsequent rediscovery of unity

with remarriage. Without psychologizing Murray unnecessarily, my point is that Murray does not consider her life's fragmentation a negative force which she feels a necessary burden to represent. Rather, that she has found contentment in her life and yet has refused to return exclusively to the unity of a single canvas seems to say that she has found fragmentation a positive element perhaps in the world around her, and definitely as a means of presenting her art.

Ashbery, too, accepts fragmentation as a positive force in both the reading and writing of poetry as well as the "reading" of the world around us. Ashbery deals with fragmentation thematically as well as stylistically, therefore we can gain a closer approximation of how he accepts and celebrates the fragmented world and how poetry works. The last page of "Daffy Duck" is ripe with phrases that describe Ashbery's view of the world. "... since all/ By definition is completeness... why not/ Accept it as it pleases to reveal itself?" Though the world seems fragmented, we need not despair, but accept it and enjoy it in its infinite possibilities of combination. He goes on to say that if a meaning or a "sense" lies amongst the pattern of images, it is hidden by the "pagination," that is, how the images order themselves. He continues:

> Not what we see but how we see it matters; all's
> Alike, the same, and we greet him who announces
> The change as we would greet the change itself.

The world remains static, but we celebrate the evolving ways of looking at the world. If the world were not fragmented but unified, logical, and known, we could look at it in only one way. Instead, we need to be open to many odd forms in which it presents itself.

The evolving, protean nature of how we regard the world allows Ashbery ample room to create. The freedom of the poet is realized in the infinite possibility of combination of forms, the power to create a quasi-order out of the swirling fragments of discourse. Furthermore, Ashbery turns fragmentation into a positive factor in the reading of his poetry, both for the reader and for himself. "Collective Dawns" reads as a personal thank-you note to his audience for giving him not only identity but eternal life. At the beginning of this poem, he laments the force of fragmentation in the world.

They say the town is coming apart.
And people go around with a fragment of a smile
Missing from their faces. Life is getting cheaper
In some senses . . .

In some senses, perhaps it is cheaper. Yet, in the possibility of multiple appropriations of a poem, we need not be content with just some senses. We can "twist" a sense to ourselves, give a poem "a sense beyond that meaning that was dropped there/ And left to rot . . ." Ashbery finds joy in this twisting, as well, because his poem becomes a living item. The poem takes another step towards eternal life every time it is read and appropriated by a new reader. Clearly, Ashbery associates his identity with his poems, as in the last stanza where he thanks his readers for saving him from the "mill pond" of stagnancy, of death. In the last few lines, he seems to say that the poet is viable only as his poems live on. "For the man," that is, the poet, "to find himself . . . ," the poem, in and of itself, needs to lie dormant or passive, obscured from the light of the gasworks that may illuminate only one meaning, so that the reader may bring it to life, activate it as it relates to him or her.

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The Women Question: A Marxist Perspective

by Caitlin Wright

Before one can adequately address the very real problems of economic and political oppression that have manifested themselves under the current socio-political climate, one must first deal with the most fundamental type of oppression which exists in the world today—the oppression of women by men. With the growing desire on the part of many political thinkers to change the unit of political analysis to the individual human being, it is now both possible and necessary to examine the problem of male domination of the female sex. Since it is impossible to address the idea of racial and social equality when one-half of the human race remains under the oppression of the current patriarchal society, it is the responsibility of those who wish to produce real change not to ignore this fundamental issue of human rights. Only by actively working to alleviate the burdens placed upon women due to the sex roles determined by society can any real steps be taken towards the achievement of equality for all.

The question of freeing women from the oppression of men is not a new one. Two of the earliest proponents of women's right to equality were Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Their formula for achieving equality for women has long been popular with many feminists who are attracted by the proposed egalitarianism of a Marxist society. It is for this reason that this paper will examine the Marxist approach for dealing with the "woman question" in order to test the viability of such an approach for ending the oppression of women worldwide. Although there has long been an attraction to the Marxist solution for the problems of achieving female equality, it is my contention that there are certain inherent problems within the structure of Marxist analysis of this issue that preclude it from holding any real hope for the end of male domination. This is best shown by an examination of the

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state of women within a Marxist society. By looking at the role that women play within the Soviet Union, it is possible to see that Marxism does not necessarily on its own hold the key to the liberation of the female sex.

The basis for all Marxist writings is set in Marx's theory of the historical dialectic. Very simply, this concept envisions history as a series of stages. The original stage is refered to as the thesis. Over time, there develop inherent contradictions within the system which give rise to a counter movement, the antithesis. The product of the clash between these two competing forces produces the synthesis. Because this too is fraught with inherent contradictions, it becomes the new thesis which will eventually be challenged by a new antithesis.

In writing on the historical place of women in their relations with men, Marx and Engels refer to a period of primitive matriarchy, the original thesis. During this period women played the principle role in the prevailing mode of production, primitive agriculture, while men hunted for game. At this point, there was no private ownership; everything belonged to the gens or tribe. With the beginning of cattle-raising, though, the antithesis to primitive matriarchy was created. New instruments of production came into use, such as the bow and arrow and the spear. As these tools were used by men rather than women, the control of production was passed to men, and the order of patriarchy was created. (The Woman Question, 1951:9) There were two main results of this change in the mode of production. The first was an increase in the amount produced. The second was the shift to private ownership of both the means of production and the output. This ownership of surplus output allowed for even greater control by the man. "All the surplus which the acquisition of the necessities of life now yielded fell to the man; the woman shared in its enjoyment, but had no part in its ownership." (Engels, 1942:147) Under the synthesis created by the clash between these two historical stages women maintained their place in the household as they had under primitive matriarchy, but now the work they provided was considered to be completely unimportant when compared to the work of men. Engels believed that the beginning of patriarchy was responsible for the subjugation of the female sex because it eliminated the value of women's labour.

> The overthrow of mother-right was the world historical defeat of the female sex. The man took command in the home also; the woman was degraded and reduced to servitude, she became the slave of his lust and a mere instrument for the production of his children. This degraded position of the woman, especially conspicuous among the Greeks of the heroic and still more of the classical age, has gradually been palliated and glozed over, and sometimes clothed in a milder form; in no sense has it been abolished. (Engels, 1942:50)

Because women were considered to have no worth under this system, it was only to be expected that the state of women would deteriorate within it. The outcome of this was that the wife's only value was to be found in the satisfaction of her husband's desires and in the production of his heirs.

With this newfound surplus value came the desire to protect this wealth by creating a system of inheritance based upon the male line of descent. Under primitive matriarchy the custom of inheritance was reckoned according to the female line, with all property passing to the nearest blood relative on the mother's side. This was due to the fact that the children belonged to their mother's gens, not their father's. (The Woman Question, 1952:15-16) With the power of man increased due to growing wealth, there came the desire to overthrow the traditional customs of inheritance in favour of his own children. Once having achieved this, the next step was to ensure that only legitimate children would be able to inherit.

In order to guarantee that only legitimate children were produced, the patriarchate established the monogamous marriage. The historical purpose of this institution, according to Marx and Engels, was solely to maintain the fidelity of the wife. Because the monogamous marriage was a male creation for the single purpose of having legitimate heirs, it can hold no restrictions on the actions of the male. By making the act of adultery by the wife illegal, and by giving the power of divorce to the male alone, the patriarchy gained effective domination over women. Wives had no rights to any recourse whatsoever in the event of their husbands' infidelity. "The legitimate wife was expected to put up with

all this, but herself to remain strictly chaste and faithful." (The Woman Question, 1951:18) This disparity between the rights of men and the rights of women shows the monogamous marriage to be the tool of the patriarchate.

Another source of power that patriarchy was able to utilize in the subjugation of women was found in the economic control gained through the ownership of the means of production. Because 'woman's work' was in the home and unpaid, a wife was tied to her husband as he was her only source of the means of survival. Since she could not earn money in her own right, she had to rely on her husband's income for food, clothing and other necessities for both herself and her children.

> In a great majority of cases today, at least in the possessing classes, the husband is obliged to earn a living and support his family, and that in itself gives him a position of supremacy without any need for special legal titles and privileges.
>
> (Engels, 1942:65-66)

The fact that he does the 'important' income producing work in and of itself gives the male superiority over the woman in a patriarchal system.

It has been this tradition, which was created in beginnings of the patriarchate, that has continued to hold fast and strengthen in the capitalist world. As the struggle among men for the production of profits at the expense of the surplus labour of the proletariat continued, women became more and more viewed as mere objects that were not only to be owned (this idea has been carried over from the early stages of the patriarchate), but also to be exploited.

> The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to women.
>
> (Tucker, 1978:488)

It is this mindset of the capitalist that causes women to be in the same situation as the proletariat. The same inequality that exists between factory owner and factory worker also exists between husband and

wife. "Within the family he is bourgeois and the wife represents the proletariat." (Engels, 1942:66) Women have been forced into this position because their repression by men did not allow them to influence the dialectical cycle. Only by recognizing the kinship of woman and proletariat can either group hope to create a suitable antithesis to capitalist patriarchy.

Marx and Engels believed that the only way in which it would be possible for women to free themselves from the oppression of the patriarchate would be to become involved in social production. "...it will be plain that the first condition for the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole female sex back into public industry, and that this in turn demands the abolition of the monogamous family as the economic unit of society." (Engels, 1942:66) By gaining economic independence from her husband the wife would be able to become a more equal partner within the marriage. It was felt that this was best seen in proletarian marriages where the necessity for two incomes to support the family had required that women reenter the marketplace. This removed all bases for male supremecy within the household except for the brutality towards women that had been somewhat prevalent since the beginnings of monogamy. (Engels, 1942:64)

This opportunity (and often necessity) for work was not without its problems, and Marx and Engels recognized this. The structure of society itself made it impossible for women to be truly able to emancipate themselves.

> Not until the coming of modern largescale industry was the road to social production opened to her again—and then only to the proletarian wife. But it was opened in such a manner that, if she carries out her duties in the private service of her family, she remains excluded from public production and unable to earn; and if she wants to take part in public production and earn independently, she cannot carry out family duties. ...The modern individual family is founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife, and modern society is a mass composed of these individual families as its molecules. (Engels, 1942:65)

The only way this contradiction can be resolved is through the end of the capitalist system itself. It is the system, not the male sex, which is the fundamental oppressor of women, just as it is the oppressor of the proletariat. The end of capitalism is the end of that motivation which is the cause of female (and proletarian) subjugation.

For this reason, the women of the world must unite with the proletariat for the pursuit of their emancipation from the capitalist patriarchy. Because of this relationship with the proletariat, women must turn to communism, not feminism.

> The thesis must clearly point out that real freedom for women is possible only through communism. The inseparable connection between the social and human position of the woman, and private property in the means of production must be strongly brought out. That will draw a clear and ineradicable line of distinction between our policy and feminism.
>
> (The Woman Question, 1951:89)

Marxism considers feminism without the consideration of the relationship of women to capitalism to be bourgeois. By ignoring the fact that there is a difference in the power held by men of different classes, feminism is incorrectly assessing the needs of oppressed women.

> As we shall see, Marxists certainly believe that, with a few exceptions, women should be equal with men, but they think that liberal and radical feminism are forms of false consciousness, generated by the experience of women who do not belong to the working class. Traditional Marxists argue that, rather than focusing their attention on the apparent privileges of all men, women should instead ally with working-class men in struggling for their common, long-term interest in the defeat of capitalism. Feminists must be brought to see that women and the working class are natural allies because the liberation of both requires the end of capitalism.
>
> (Jaggar, 1983:66-67)

This rejection of feminism is a strong point within Marxist thinking. The women who are truly interested in ending male domination and who completely understand the role between capitalism and the patriarchate are the women of the working class. They are not fooled by the promises of feminism and realize it for what it is: a tool of the ruling class for the clouding of social divisions.

> In the Marxist view, therefore, bourgeois women are much more likely to be feminists than working-class women. The Marxist interpretation of this phenomenon is that the class position of working-class women enables them to see that most versions of feminism are versions of ruling class ideology. Traditional Marxists argue that most prevailing feminist ideas are ideological because they postulate that women of all classes share a common interest in abolishing male privilege; by obscuring class divisions, they serve the interests of the ruling class.
>
> (Jaggar, 1983:66)

Working-class women, because they are wage earners, have gained a measure of equality with their husbands. Unlike the women of the bourgeois they do not perceive any great privilege accorded to the men around them and are therefore not deceived into believing that it is men and not capitalist patriarchy which has been oppressing them. The so-called privileges of working-class men "are ultimately illusory, an ideological appearance concealing the social reality and allowing the capitalist class to divide and rule." (Jaggar, 1983:66)

The conclusions that Marxism draws concerning the problems of women are quite correct. By pointing out the very real fact that society requires the domestic slavery of women in order to run properly, this theory brings up some extremely important points which must be dealt with in any consideration of a paradigm change. Unfortunately, one of the major problems within Marxist thought is that there is no adequate solution offered to remedy this situation. The proposed solution to women's inequality was merely to bring the female sex back into socially productive labour without any real thought given to the consequences of this act both for society, and for the women themselves. Without providing an answer to the problems of house-

hold labour and care of children, there can be no real emancipation of women. In the words of one Socialist joke,

> Under capitalism, women are not liberated because they have no opportunity to work. They have to stay at home, go shopping, do the cooking, keep house and take care of the children. But under socialism, women are liberated. They have the opportunity to work all day, and then go home, do the shopping, do the cooking, keep house and take care of the children. (Smith, 1976:182)

By not addressing the problem of the double-day, where a woman is supposed to work a full shift in her place of employment and then go home and do all of the tasks that she once did when relegated only to household labour, Marxism not only does not help to liberate the woman, but it instead increases her burden two-fold.

The reason for this is due to the fact that Marxism only addressed half of the problem when looking at the subjugation of women.

> Because Marxists are concerned primarily with the critique and overthrow of capitalist society, their interest in women focuses particularly on women's situation under capitalism, in which productive activity is organized around the division between the working class and the capitalist class.
>
> (Jaggar, 1983:63)

Since the concern of Marxism was to end the oppression of women under the capitalist patriarchate, Marx and Engels did not even consider that many of the repressive factors of this system would be carried over into any new society. Within the structure of the theory there is no mechanism to deal with the chauvinism that was ultimately inherent in the attitudes of the majority of men towards women. This is why there can be little or no change in the role of women in society through the implementation of Marxist ideals. As long as the male sex continues to subscribe to the roles for men and women as delineated in the patriarchate, there can be no real emancipation of women.

This has been the case, for the most part, within the Soviet Union. Despite the legal rights accorded to a woman under Soviet law, she is

still very much oppressed by both chauvinism and the double-day. These problems have existed from the beginnings of the Revolution itself and have remained a part of Russian women's life even until today. "In spite of the declared Marxist-Leninist commitment to feminine equality, the strong tradition of male chauvinism in Russian life has been only mildly moderated by the Soviets." (Smith, 1976:170) Even though the revolution which was to have given Russian women freedom from male domination has taken place, there is as of yet no real overall improvement in their situation vis-a-vis men. The reasons for this lie in the fact that there are inherent problems in the Marxist solution to the "woman question" which preclude it from being able to provide the emancipation of women which it promises.

In the early days of the Revolution it was these promises of emancipation which brought many women into the struggle on the side of the Communists. These women were extremely excited by the hope of equality of men and women and by the end of what they saw, in Marxist terms, as being domination by the capitalist patriarchy. Because of this excitement they worked very hard in recruiting for the Party, especially in recruiting other women. Women Bolsheviks

> eagerly sought to enlist working women into their ranks, claiming that women workers had the same interests as the wives of capitalists and landowners. "All women are equally oppressed," they said, "all of them have common interests. Men cannot champion our interests, for they do not understand us."
>
> (Bochkaryova, 1969:34)

Women intellectuals such as Nadezhda Krupskaia (Lenin's wife), Aleksandra Kollontai, and Klara Zhetkin all were very much a part of this effort, and, because of their desire and determination, they became powerful voices in the early days of the Revolution. On the whole it is considered in the Soviet Union that these women, and other female intellectuals who took part in the revolutionary struggle, did so on a more equal footing with men than women had been able to do at any other time. (Bochkaryova, 1969:19) These revolutionaries firmly believed in Marxism as the only way to achieve total emancipation, and that such a movement must necessarily be supported by women revolutionaries.

> Women workers, Krupskaya wrote, will be delivered from exploitation, win freedom and complete equality and find their cares in the upbringing of children lessened only when the working class emerges triumphant in the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy and capitalism.
>
> But this victory cannot be achieved without women workers taking a most active part in the revolutionary movement. (Bochkaryova, 1969:16)

This call for support was heeded and many women joined the struggle for Communism and for the expected betterment of the female sex. Yelena Stastova, the Secretary of the illegal Northern Bureau of the Party Central committee who both witnessed and participated in the events on the eve of the Revolution, wrote in her reminiscences:

> And the most remarkable thing was that women joined in the revolutionary struggle. In those grim and anxious days many of them became members of the Bolshevik Party. They consciously participated in the economic and political strikes and in the rallies and revolutionary demonstrations not singly but in the thousands. Many engaged in the dangerous but vital work of distributing and hiding illegal literature. (Bochkaryova, 1969:23)

Since one of the major goals of the Party was to gain the support of the peasantry, these women also did important work by trying to increase the number of women supporters from this class. "Communist women perceived themselves largely as agitators and organizers committed to bring the communist work to masses of backward Russian working-class and peasant women." (Berkin, 1980:146) Women Party supporters were a part of every major area of the revolutionary struggle, including the war itself. The one area where women were conspicuously absent, though, (with the notable exception of Aleksandra Kollontai), was that of theoretical analysis. Whether they sensed that they would not be welcome in this almost exclusively male domain or not, women tended to engage in the practical tasks of the Revolution rather than in the intellectual ones. (Berkin, 1980:146)

Once the Revolution was complete the power again reverted back

totally to the men of the Party, with the women relegated to the confines of the Zhenotdel, the women's section of the Party. Despite their isolation, though, the women involved were able to bring about, within the Party programme, some important platforms which attempted to begin the move towards equality. They began with the regulation of women's labour (the length of the working day, the kinds of work that women should not have to do, maternity and childcare considerations, etc.). While this legislation was important for women to have at the time, it soon came to work against them. This was because the favourable treatment accorded to women (these same rights were not sought for men) was seen as another sign of women's fundamental inequality in the eyes of those who still held on to the notion of the female sex being weaker than the male, and consequently unequal.

> By seeking (and achieving) special privileges for working mothers in order to ease the burden of their presumed dual roles, rather than proposing to extend these benefits to working fathers as well, the Zhenotdel may in fact have hurt the cause of female equality. Evidence suggests the extension of special protective arrangements for women has tended simply to reinforce occupational and professional segregation and to inhibit rather than to promote the cause of female equality.
>
> (Berkin, 1980:157)

It is quite likely that the Zhenotdel chose this course of action, without considering the ramifications, because this was what had been suggested as necessary by Marxism. In his writings, Engels refers to the need for the "standardization of the working day," "the restriction of female labour," and "the exclusion of female labour from branches of industry that are especially unhealthy for the female body or are objectionable morally for the female sex." (Padover, 1975:131) Even though Marx and Engels probably firmly believed in the necessity of women's equality, they too were under the influence of the patriarchy. By professing the existence of some types of work that are not to be done by women, they were falling into the trap of classifying the human race on purely sexual grounds, the root of patriarchical subjugation. If instead they had written that there was a need for a

standardized working day for all labourers, (not just women), and that there was a need for the end of certain types of labour that are unhealthy to all workers, (not just women), then they would have better helped the cause of female equality, and also the proletarian movement as well. By ignoring the need to change the thinking of the male sex, Marxism ultimately made it completely impossible for the women of the Revolution and the Zhenotdel to succeed.

There is no doubt, though, that the Revolution sincerely desired to help the state of women within a Marxist framework. Along with working to improve the situation of women in their place of work, the Party also moved to help them create communal facilities to help ease the burden of housework. These facilities, such as public dining rooms, creches and kindergartens for example, were expected to provide the means by which women would no longer be seen as domestic objects, and therefore no longer have an inferior status to men. Lenin called upon women to build up these institutions because it was in their best interests that these programmes be implemented. In many ways, though, it seems as though this programme could not possibly do anything more than take women out of the domestic kitchen and put them into the communal one. The division of labour between men and women remained the same. The only difference now was that women were expected to continue to do the same tasks as before, not only for their families, but for the rest of society as well. For the most part, the majority of the communal facilities did not survive for very long, due to lack of use. Only the nurseries and kindergartens have remained a part of Soviet life to this day.

One of the most useful things that the Party did at this time to help the state of women was the creation of divorce laws which allowed women to have an equal legal right in the ending of marriage. Up until this time the privilege of such recourse was held by the husband alone. This implementation of one of the main ideas of Marx allowed the women of Russia to gain a lot more real freedom than did the other measures of the Communists. Along with this came the right to abortion. This move, although disliked by Lenin, was of fundamental importance because it gave back to women some degree of control over their own bodies. In the absence of other constitutional rights, (during this time, the constitution was still being formulated), these laws were of utmost importance.

It was not until the Stalin era that any of the legal rights promised to women came about. In Article 122 of the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the exact nature of women's rights in the Soviet Union are presented.

> Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.
>
> The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, rest and leisure, social insurance, and education, by state protection of the interests of mother and child, by state aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, pre-maternity and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries, and kindergartens.

While this legally promised (and still does promise) many rights to women, it still constituted a paper answer to the difficulties of the female sex. Without the tacit support of their husbands on the issues of housekeeping and childcare, the legal right to equal rest and leisure with men was meaningless in light of the double day. And as with most countries in the world today, the right to equal pay is also meaningless when women, because of their sex, are kept out of high paying positions due to male bias.

Many of the continuing difficulties faced by women are the result of the historical situation that existed during this time. Stalin was attempting to create a strong foundation of heavy industry, and had to deal with the problems of a severely depleted workforce due to the war. There were two ways in which he worked to alleviate this shortage of labourers. The first was the most obvious, and involved bringing women into the workforce on an enormous scale. The second was more implicit, and involved the encouragement of these women to produce more children. This created terrible difficulties for women. Often the work assignments were of the heaviest and most distasteful kind; work that men would not take. Examples of this type of work which Soviet women still hold the monopoly on today are street-cleaning and road-building. (Thayer, 1960:52) In the country, peasant

women provided the bulk of the labour on the collective farms, as they still do now. The literature of the period showed the ideal Soviet woman to be "muscular, hard working and enthusiastically toiling." Not only could she do heavy labour as well as any man, but she also realized her role in fulfilling the state's need for children. She would therefore dutifully find a man with whom she shared a "mutual interest and a common dedication to building socialism," and produce children. (Rohrlich-Leavitt, 1980:438-439)

In the Soviet Union today, there has been little real change. The inherent chauvinism within society still remains and affects the woman daily both at work and at home. At her place of employment she is expected by the state to work hard all day. At home she is expected by her husband to do the shopping, the cooking, the laundry, and to take care of the children. In gaining emancipation under a Marxist system the Soviet woman has merely added the second burden of socially productive labour to all of the tasks originally assigned to her under patriarchy.

The reasons for many of the problems that women still face in their attempt to gain true equality in the Soviet Union stem from the fact that Marxism did nothing to change the chauvinistic attitudes of men. Tatyana Mamonova, a contemporary Soviet feminist, once wrote:

> I saw what an arbitrary distinction the usual division of labor was, and that women were perfectly capable of assuming the responsibilities of men. But I soon learned that this crossover of duties didn't work both ways: women might perform male tasks but men did not perform female tasks. I noted, for example, that while I could be sent out to chop wood with my brother, he would not be sent to wash dishes with me. The Revolution had not managed to eradicate patriarchy. (Morgan, 1984:683)

Because Marxism did nothing to change the way men viewed both women and the work they traditionally did, there was no change in men's attitudes. Women were allowed to work in a "man's world," but they still had to take care of their "feminine responsibilities." Because the man's world carried, and still does carry, status while the women's did not, there was no end of women who wished to become

a part of that world and consequently add to their family's status. On the other side, though, due to the lack of status given to women's roles, there was no incentive for men to venture into the woman's world. Today, consequently, the wife is given very little help by her husband with the household work. As one Soviet woman put it: "Papa comes home from work and reads the paper. Mama comes home from work and goes shopping, makes supper, does the laundry and ironing and helps the children with their homework. Sometimes Papa helps out after supper by turning on the television set." (Kaiser, 1976:60) As a result of this, the average working woman spends approximately 80 hours a week on paid employment and housework combined, while the man only spends 50 hours per week. (Jaggar, 1983:70)

Part of the reason for the remaining chauvinistic attitudes of men towards women involves the traditional relationship between the two sexes. The principles of the Sixteenth Century *Domostroi*, a book which stated the responsibilities of women, are still accepted. In this book, whose title can be roughly translated as "Household Structure," are given the duties of women towards men. These include the idea that a woman should not let her husband help with the housework. (Kaiser, 1976:60) These same traditional values of the dominant male culture are still held today. A good example of this idea of male superiority can be seen by looking at a popular stage play that ran in Moscow during the Seventies. In this production:

> . . . four husky women sit at home, playing cards, getting roaring drunk, while a henpecked husband caters to their whims. As the women grow more boisterous and uncontrolled, the timid man, wearing a ridiculous little apron, bounces obediently from one thankless chore to another. He tries vainly to end the drinking bout by substituting tea and sandwiches for the vodka bottle, but the four women snap at him about the food, bitch at him about the dirty table and clutch at the vodka. . . . With the others gone, he begins helping his own wife to bed by pulling off her shoes, but she pinches him on the butt. "Don't touch me!" he squeaks, and they launch

into a spat over whose paycheck was frittered away
on the vodka. (Smith, 1976:170-171)

This situation is complete role reversal and for this reason the Soviets love it.

The chauvinism that women are subjected to is not restricted to the home. In working, Soviet women have been relegated to the lowest paying type of work. Even though over half of the industrial workforce is female, there are seven times more male than female foremen. (Reston, 1975:70) The majority of doctors and teachers (two traditionally low-paying and unprestigious fields), are women, but even so, the high-paying administrative positions still fall to men. Although women have a right to equal pay, they do not have the opportunity of getting most of the high paying jobs.

One of the primary reasons given by men to account for the lack of women in jobs which have high responsibility and correspondingly high pay is that the responsibilities of the home do not allow women to take a serious attitude towards their work. (Smith, 1976:180) When seen in this light, the double day is the cause of a vicious circle. Because women are expected to work both within and outside of the home, they are unable to give the necessary energy to either one. They are frustrated because they cannot do what is expected of them at home and they are frustrated because they cannot get ahead at work. In this way they become like squirrels in a cage, and are unable to find any sort of fulfillment.

It is this problem which affects almost every woman both inside and outside of the Soviet Union. While Marxism has done much for women, it has not provided the fundamental solution to the problem of women's oppression. This is due to the fact that Marx and Engels only examined one half of the issue in question. They identified many of the problems that women face, but they also left out many others, due to their fundamental concern with the problems of the proletariat.

Although Marx was correct in his view of the capitalist patriarchy as being a major source of the motivation for the oppression of women, he was incorrect in downplaying the role of the male in this system as oppressor. If one takes the original ideas of Marx, one can see that since it is the male who runs the system which oppresses women, it is the male who has the most to gain by maintaining women in this position. The call for women to work outside of the home in socially

productive labour was not enough to liberate fully the individual woman and, in fact, helped to oppress her further. The fact that the woman works outside of the home does not end her domestic slavery within it. By not stressing the need for men to change their attitudes toward women and the home, and by assuming that emancipation would just automatically happen with the move to pure communism, Marx allowed for the continuation of patriarchical values even under a Marxist state. Unfortunately, Marx's answer to the 'woman question' constituted a paper solution to the women's problems. Clearly paper solutions are not enough; real changes must be encouraged within the thinking of men.

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The Anima In Keats' "Lamia"

by Wendy Johnson

The archetype, anima, according to Carl Jung, is the feminine element in every man. Maria L. von Franz, one of Jung's scholars and a well-known Jungian analyst and writer, fleshes out this idea in "The Process of Individualization."

> The anima is a personification of all feminine psychological tendencies in a man's psyche, such as vague feelings and moods, prophetic hunches, receptiveness to the irrational, capacity for personal love, feeling for nature, and - last but not least - his relation to the unconscious. (1964:186)

The anima can be a man's spiritual guide; she can carry him past the rational and into the realm of the imagination or, as Blake puts it, Poetic Genius. These qualities of the feminine are highly valued throughout the Romantic period, and particularly in the works of John Keats. Keats' poem, "Lamia," (1977:414-433) is an exploration of the anima (as embodied by Lamia) and a declaration of its importance in human life.

The reader can interpret Lamia as a projection of Lycius' anima. As Maria von Franz puts it:

> All the aspects of the anima . . . can be projected so that they appear to the man to be the qualities of some particular woman. It is the presence of the anima that causes a man to fall suddenly in love when he sees a woman for the first time and knows at once that this is "she." In this situation, the man feels as if he has known this woman intimately for all time; he falls for her so helplessly that it looks to outsiders like complete madness.

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> Women who are of "fairy-like" character especially attract such anima projections, because men can attribute almost anything to a creature who is so fascinatingly vague, and can thus proceed to weave fantasies around her. (1964:191)

This description of the projection of the anima can be applied to Lycius' first meeting of Lamia. When he first hears her words to him: "It seemed he had loved them a whole summer long." (Part I, 1 250). It is love at first sight, yet he has that feeling of knowing and loving her for a long time. He falls for her completely and hopelessly. At this point, he declares he would die without her:

> For pity do not this sad heart belie-
> Even as thou vanished so shall I die.(I, 259-260)

Lamia is a likely target for Lycius' projections because she is so "fascinatingly vague" and "fairy-like". She appears to him as a goddess at first, and she lets him believe this for quite awhile. He calls her a "Naiad" (I, 261) and a "descended Pleiad" (I, 265). Lamia refers to herself as a "finer spirit" (I, 280). Later, however, she reveals that she is a woman, or rather, plays the "woman's part" (I, 337), yet she "made, by a spell, the triple league decrease/ To a few paces; not at all surmised/ by blinded Lycius " (I, 345-347). There is no certainty of what she is. Whether she be a real woman or a descended goddess with magical powers, Lycius is blind to any distinctions. He doesn't really care, nor does it matter what she is in reality. Through projection, he can make her into anything he wants. Hence, she becomes a suitable target for his projected anima.

Carl Jung says that there are four levels in the development of anima. The first level involves purely instinctual and biological functions. Lamia as a serpent represents this level. She exists in a feminine, but less than human, form. She longs for "a sweet body fit for life, and love,/ And pleasure " (I, 39-40). She soon transcends to this realm of human pleasure and into the second level of anima. This level contains romantic and aesthetic values, characterized by sexual relations. Hermes transforms her into "A full-born beauty new and exquisite" (I, 172). "She was a maid/ More beautiful than ever a twisted braid " (I, 185-186).

This section of the poem, after Lamia's transformation into woman and throughout her meeting with Lycius, concentrates on her magnificent beauty. It also characterizes her sexually:

> A virgin purest lipped, yet in the lore
> Of love deep learned to the red heart's core;
> Not one hour old yet of sciential brain
> To unperplex bliss from its neighbor pain (I, 189-192)

She is a wonderfully tempting paradox of a woman. Innocent, yet skilled in the arts of lovemaking, she is possibly every man's dream lover. Later, when Lamia becomes Lycius' real lover, she transcends to the third level of anima. In this, the anima figure raises love to the heights of spiritual devotion. When they are alone together in the palace, their love takes on this worshipful character. While they sleep, they must see each other:

> . . . with eyelids closed
> Saving a tithe which love still open kept,
> That they might see each other while they almost
> slept (II, 23-25)

The fourth and most rarely developed level of the anima involves wisdom transcending the most holy and most pure. At this point, the anima can become a treasured guide in spiritual matters to a man. Lamia, however, never gets the chance to reach this point. Instead of listening to her wisdom, Lycius decides to display her publicly as his wife. Instead of letting her grow in her own directions, he has a "stronger fancy to reclaim/ Her wild and timid nature to his aim" (II, 70-71). Any archetype, such as the anima, is an unconscious force. A decision to co-opt it into the conscious ego is folly. When one is "using" his anima best, he is listening to it and letting it tell him in which direction to go. This doesn't mean giving oneself totally up to the unconscious, but instead, one should be in cooperation with it. As Maria von Franz says of the anima:

> Only the painful (but essentially simple) decision to take one's fantasies and feelings seriously can . . . prevent a complete stagnation of the inner process of individuation.

By forcing Lamia into the public show of marriage, he alienates her, preventing her from developing fully. Instead, she remains a jealous, possessive anima. She is insecure when he gives his thoughts to the outside world:

> She began to moan and sigh/ Because he mused beyond her, and knowing well/ That but a moment's thought is passion's passing-bell. (II, 37-39)

Because she is being alienated and not allowed to develop, Lamia knows she cannot face that other archetype, the Sage or Sophist. Apolonius embodies this archetype, and he represents masculine reasoning powers. The struggle between feminine imagination and masculine reason is an underlying theme throughout the entire poem. When Lamia and Lycius first pass Apollonius on the street, Lycius says:

> 'Tis Apollonius sage, my trusty guide
> And good instructor; but tonight he seems
> The ghost of folly haunting my sweet dreams.
> (I, 375-377)

It seems as though Lucius' "trusty guide," reason, threatens imagination or "sweet dreams." The line, "a moment's thought is passion's passing-bell" (II, 39), also indicates that intellectualizing can destroy passion, or the creative imagination. Later, Keats asks, "Do not all charms fly/ At the mere touch of cold philosophy?" (II, 229-230), and declares:

> Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,
> Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
> Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine-
> Unweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made
> The tender-personed Lamia melt into a shade. (II, 234-238)

Keats seems to be saying that reason, by applying orderly thought, can solve the world's mysteries. It undeifies the universe and replaces nature's mysteries with scientific solutions. At the same time, philosophy, or reason, is described as cold. Although it may provide

answers, it denies joy in human existence; it lacks warmth, creativity, and passion. Ultimately, it destroys human hope by clipping angels' wings and keeping us all earthbound by our sensibilities.

This is essentially Blake's argument in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.* (1953:122-135) To Blake, reason, or the five senses, is a necessary tool for expressing (or attempting to express) Poetic Genius. Poetic Genius can be thought of as imagination or passion which both characterize the feminine principle of the anima. A central passage in *The Marriage* is thus:

> . . . one portion of being, is the Prolific, the other, the Devouring: to the devourer it seems as if the producer was in his chains, but it is not so, he only takes portions of existence and fancies that the whole. But the Prolific would cease to be Prolific unless the Devourer as a sea received the excess of his delights.

The Prolific, or producer, in this passage is clearly a feminine image, which links to Blake's ideas of Poetic Genius and imagination. He refers to the Devourer in the masculine, and it can be thought of as reason, or the five senses. The Devourer, reason, thinks he has the feminine Prolific in his control, as does Apollonius appear to have Lamia powerless in his gaze. Like the Devourer, Apollonius takes reason and imagines it the whole of existence. He sees his role as protecting Lycius from this serpent-woman who could destroy his reason. Indeed, he calls Lycius a "Fool! Fool!" (II, 295) and declares, "From every ill/ Of life have I preserved thee to this day/ And shall I see thee made a serpent's prey?" (Keats, 1977:433). He is grievously wrong, however, in supposing the supremacy of his philosophic thought. Instead of protecting Lycius from a loss of reason, Lycius dies because he is deprived of the Prolific—the warmth, imagination and passion of human existence. In short, he is deprived of his anima.

Blake says, in the above passage, that the Devourer is necessary for the Prolific to be what it is. The two must operate together. The feminine needs the masculine to avoid chaos, and the masculine needs the feminine to give and sustain life. Keats says this also. Lycius needs both Apollonius and Lamia in his life to be a balanced person.

Without Apollonius, Lycius would forever remain in his "purple-lined palace of sweet sin." (425. II, 31). He would never see the outside world; rather, he would live forever in a dream state. This may not seem unpleasant, but ultimately, without reason he could not translate such an experience into reality. Without Lamia, or a developed anima, "Lycius' arms were empty of delight/ As were his limbs of life." (433. II, 307-308). Keats implies that man cannot live on "cold philosophy" alone. It is necessary for order, but one must first have life. This can be provided by the passionate, Prolific anima.

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Grendel: de Man, da Myth

(A Very Ad Hoc Study)

by Chris J. Carden

If you hear him howling around your kitchen door
Better not let him in
Little old lady got mutilated late last night
Werewolves of London again . . .

I saw a werewolf drinking a pina colada at Trader Vic's
His hair was perfect
Werewolves of London
Draw blood

"*Werewolves of London*"
—Warren Zevon

No matter how strong it's made, a pina colada is not a very monstrous drink. And going to Trader Vic's is not a very monstrous thing to do. In *Werewolves of London*, the language creates an opposition between a fiend mutilating little old ladies and a bar patron sporting a sharp hairdo and a coconut cocktail. However, connecting a wolfman to a bar creates a second interpretation in which the once oppositional elements actually attract. The Trader Vic's references produce a non-literal werewolf, a wolf-man (not a wolfman), a single's bar wolf. However, the little old lady references still seem to support the more literal view. The available textual information affirms and denies both interpretations.

Grendel balances on a similar state of oppositions. On one hand he is a monster that separates people from their limbs while driving them together as a society; on the other hand he is a singer, dancer, and

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mime suffering from occasional depression who spouts nut-shell existentialism—all rather human activities. The textual devices support both monster-like action and man-like consciousness. An examination of some of these devices demonstrates how binary oppositions influence the interpretation of the language and how the oppositions are in turn warped by other textual factors.

The opening paragraph of the second chapter throws out a pair of paradoxical metaphors with scant context to aid in the unravelling. Grendel first dubs his talking "a pale skin of words that closes me in like a coffin;" then he refers to it as a "degenerate mutter of noises I send before me wherever I creep, like a dragon burning his way through vines and fog." (15) The metaphors tell the reader the effects of the words, but not what the words are; the thought is not referenced to the previous chapter, the next paragraph or anywhere else in the text. The text says only that the missing words are "not in a language anyone any longer understands" (15) (perhaps not even Grendel) and that he mutters them wherever he creeps. This creates somewhat of a quandry of meaning because an antinomy exists between Grendel's speech constricting him and simultaneously clearing his pathway. The paragraph seems to support two opposing figures, but without the words there is no referent to resolve the conflict.

However, spells, coffins and dragons are not trifling images; whatever Grendel may be muttering, the metaphors clue the reader that it is important—powerful in two seemingly contradictory ways. As a rhetorical device, this paragraph says, "When Grendel talks, *listen*, for his speech has the power to bind him to death and to scorch what lies in his path." It is a figurative signpost signaling that Grendel's speech is an incantation of magic. The opposition of the metaphors amplifies the power of Grendel's words regardless of their meanings.

Although they are inside the text, these figures become, in a sense, an extra-textual influence on what follows. They aren't part of the literal meaning of Grendel's speech, but they color the reader's literal and non-literal interpretations. When Grendel later tells his mother, "The world is all pointless accident," (28) he isn't just making an existentialist observation; he is spewing metaphorical dragon's fire which seals him in a grave. The meaning may be unclear, but the emphasis is obvious.

In terms of the constricting/clearing opposition, his "words"

metonymically represent his meaning. "The world is all pointless accident" does not close Grendel in. The thought —THE WORLD IS ALL POINTLESS ACCIDENT— does. His words, his parole, are mere metonyms for his ideas, his knowledge, his beliefs. The pale skin that closes him in his thought—the speech act only has magic power because it represents thought, because he means what he says. (Dumbo's magic feather only worked because he believed in it.) Therefore, the oppositional metaphors operate on the very substance of the meaning of the text.

Yet, to make things complicated, the text says what Grendel says, not what he means, has the power. This stresses the terms rather than the implications. The metaphors push language into greater conflict with its own meaning and cause words to revolt against their purpose. The metaphor eclipses the very metonymy (words = meanings) that gives it function. The flame takes the place of the fire.

Still, to the reader, Grendel's thoughts and convictions only have power through his words—the mirrors of his thoughts. The reader sees not the object, but the image, including distortions of surface and of viewing angle. Grendel may say what he means, but what he means by what he says is subject to the rhetorical variance of extra-textual factors (the text in this case being what he says, not the novel). The skin/fire metaphors therefore subvert everything they support because the metaphors enhance the words and the words undermine the meanings. For example, the paragraph of Grendelian existentialism (22) connects with the opening figures, but the figures act on the reader's interpretation of the words which represent Grendel's thoughts. The referent might be the reader's view of existentialism rather than Grendel's view of the world. The opposition subverts its original intent by amplifying the distortion along with the signal.

Meaning is tainted or blinded by other far-reaching extra-textual elements as well, most importantly the foreknowledge that Grendel is a monster. The dominant pre-text for the novel is revealed in the subtitle, "The Beowulf legend retold from the monster's point of view." At the barest minimum, even if the reader has never even heard of *Beowulf*, he or she now knows Grendel is a "Monster." He is the evil, the grotesque, the scary, the dangerous. (Perhaps he's also a member of the Addams family, but that's probably not dominant.) No matter how "nice" he seems, the reader knows better. He is not to be

trusted. The more the reader knows about the pre-text of *Beowulf*, the more well-defined the battle lines are. If the reader knows the barest substance of the legend, he or she knows that Grendel kills his or her fellow human beings. This tilts the reader's judgements from the start. The pre-text has set the jury's mind even before the crime has been committed. This is not to say that anyone who reads the novel will go in or come out with Grendel-hating opinions; it simply means that the text is loaded in an anti-Grendel fashion prior to its interpretation. If the text were to say that Grendel and his actions were necessary and good because he unites human society in opposition, very few readers would say thank-you.

The text is tainted in still another way for those who know the outcome of the Beowulf legend. Not only do they know the Grendel of *Beowulf* fame as an evil demon, but they also know, even before opening the text, that Beowulf will emerge and slay the monster. Like the dragon later in the story, the reader can see the future as well as the past and present. Any mention by Grendel of his own death (or even his own life) becomes a metonymic reference to that final battle. Grendel's observations about "puny" human beings are warped by the pre-knowledge that the puny will in the end triumph over the great. The text can never be free of its position as a metonym for *Beowulf* (and maybe even monster stories in general). This subverts any attempt on the part of the text to break new ground. Swaying from the expected breaks some of the pre-rules of the text. This doesn't make divergences impossible, but it does alter the meaning and interpretation because of the awareness of the digression. Grendel grows up in his big brother's shadow. It is "the Beowulf legend retold," a post-text, as well as a text. Grendel says that he has settled his soul on destroying Hrothgar slowly and cruelly (30), but Beowulf has already cut the fear from this threat because the reader knows that the monster gets his and the humans win out.

The same influence greatly affects the tale of Grendel's youth. Had the account of his pre-upper world days been placed at the beginning of the text, without any indication of who the famous child was, the interpretation would likely be more sympathetic. Paul Harvey's "The Rest of the Story" approach might remove the loading from the phrase "quick whispered plottings with invisible friends, wild cackles when vengeance was mine" (15) and dramatically alter its meaning. In the

given context, these references tend to show savage violence. In an anonymous setting they might be taken as normal, boyhood play. In that context, the cave and the lake of the fire snakes could be the origins of a superhero (16). Instead, any textual attempt to present an image is twisted by pre-judgements based on extra-textual knowledge. When Grendel passes through the pool and surfaces in the world, the reader probably sees a savage fiend loosed on the world. Were the reader not to know who he or she were dealing with, it might seem a birth, a liberation.

The perceived meaning of the text brought on by these oppositions and influences should not be misunderstood as a twisted form of the "correct" meaning. Certainly the figures and factors alter the literal meaning of the words that make up the text; they even alter their own non-literal alterations. But to assume that this is a negative effect is to reject any meaning above the word level. In a painting, the colors stand out because they coordinate and contrast with the background and with other colored elements. In Grendel (or any text), the connecting elements stand out because they coordinate and contrast with other elements. Meaning is created by opposition and support. Punch lines don't work without jokes, and contentions are meaningless without evidence. The text is elevated above the level of data by the elements intertwining, reinforcing, and subverting each other.

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The Employment Consequences of U.S. Defense Spending: An Overview

by Chris Duquette

"... Congress should fund the defense program we need for national security, ... not because of the needs of the economy."
—Murray Weidenbaum, 1981

"It is widely acknowledged, however, that the true foundation of national security is a strong and healthy economy."
—Inga Thorsson, 1983

The notion of U.S. defense expenditures raising employment, reversing recessions, and fostering economic growth is as old as the arms race itself. This should come as no surprise, since the purported economic benefits of military expenditures are frequently invoked as a justification for expanded defense spending. As early as 1953, the New York Times editorialized that an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations would be economically undesirable: "... as the experts here see it, one of (Moscow's) objectives seems to be to smile us into disarmament, deflation, unemployment, and depression" (New York Times). That "deflation, unemployment, and depression" were the inevitable consequences of disarmament was a proposition apparently requiring no further explanation. Nor has the conventional wisdom changed much in the ensuing quarter-century. More recently, the economic benefits of defense spending have become, in the absence of a direct military confrontation, a primary rationale for an expanding U.S. defense establishment.

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At the onset of the Reagan Presidency, Senator Paula Hawkins (R-Fla) described the President's much-heralded defense buildup as "an integral part of his overall economic revitalization strategy" (The Joint Economic Committee, p. 205). Since then, in the annual debate over military appropriations for the coming fiscal year, outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has consistently reminded the American people of the perceived economic benefits of defense expenditures.

Specifically, the nature of the debate over the "never say die" B-1 bomber and its subsequent funding provide a telling case in point. During the debate, Rockwell International (the B-1's prime contractor) pointedly informed Congress the B-1 components would be purchased in 48 states, generating 192,000 jobs nationwide. Of what possible military significance is the geographical distribution of B-1 contractors and subcontractors? To ask the question is to answer it. In raising the point, Rockwell's implicit suggestion was that 48 states stood to forego potential economic benefits in the event of project cancellation. With the vast majority of Senators' and Representatives' districts ostensibly standing to reap economic gains from B-1 manufacture, the B-1 passed Congress with bipartisan support, including that of such liberal Senators as Alan Cranston (D-Cal) and Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). Commented Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis), "At a time when we have a large number of people unemployed, the economic argument is probably the most effective argument of all. I think that we would have been able to kill the B-1 last year . . . if it hadn't been for the economic argument" (Center for Defense Information).

I. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE U.S. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

In assessing the implications of U.S. defense spending for nationwide employment totals, an understanding of the size of the Pentagon "gravy train" is crucial to understanding such expenditures' subsequent employment consequences. To begin with, FY 1987 DOD (Pentagonese for the U.S. Department of Defense) outlays totalled $274 billion, higher than at any other time in postwar, peacetime U.S. history (Budget, FY 1988, p. 56). This figure, however, understates the true magnitude of the U.S. defense effort. Not only does it overlook $8.2 billion earmarked for the U.S. DOE (specifically, the

Atomic Energy Commission) under the guise of "atomic energy defense activities" relating to the research, development, testing, and production of nuclear warheads (Budget, FY 1988), but it also ignores NASA's $7.9 billion in FY 1987 outlays, approximately half of which funded activities military in nature (Budget, FY 1988, p. 4-166). Total expenses incurred for national defense in FY 1987 were therefore at least $10-$15 billion greater than figures listed under DOD "outlays" in the FY 1988 Budget of the United States Government.

And President Reagan's FY 1988 budget request envisions DOD outlays expanding to $321 billion by FY 1990 (Budget, FY 1988, p. 5-6). Another measure of Pentagon purchasing power, "authority", stood at $293 billion in FY 1987, rising to a projected $353 billion by FY 1990 (Budget, FY 1988). The distinction between "authority" and "outlays" is more than academic. DOD authority defines that amount which Congress has authorized the Pentagon to spend, while outlays designate actual Defense Department expenditures over a given period. In periods of steadily increasing defense expenditures, authority traditionally exceeds outlays due to the lengthy lead times and multi-year nature of many DOD programs. For example, Congressional authorization of $2 billion for an additional aircraft carrier battle group would only be reflected in that year's DOD authority totals, while Defense Department outlay figures would reflect the per-year expenditure of money until project completion some years hence. As of FY 1986, the accumulated balance of unexpended DOD authority amounted to $279.7 billion (Kaufmann).

Since outlays, unlike DOD authority, designate the actual expenditure of funds over a given period, the use of outlay totals is therefore more appropriate in attemting to quantify the magnitude of U.S. "defense spending." Such outlays have doubled since FY 1980, when Congressionally enacted Pentagon outlays totalled $136 billion. Since then, annual Defense Department outlays have expanded from 5.2% of GNP and 23.4% of total federal expenditures to 6.3% and 27.8%, respectively, of a much larger economy and federal budgetary pie. Presently, annual defense expenditures consume one-sixteenth of America's $4.5 trillion GNP.

It can plainly be seen, therefore, that a substantial portion of U.S. employment and output is dependent upon defense expenditures. However, it is a time-honored economic axiom that "there ain't no

such thing as a free lunch." What of the opportunity costs? What of the consumption and investment expenditures foregone as taxes are raised or nondefense expenditures pruned to accomodate an expanding defense establishment? What of the employment and growth prospects sacrificed as a consequence of receding consumption and investment spending? In a May 1953 address, President Eisenhower perhaps best described the "opportunity costs" associated with defense spending: "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies — in the final sense — a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold and not clothed" (Eisenhower, p. 419). While it is undeniable that military outlays per se stimulate both employment and output, the relevant consideration becomes one of whether these oft-mentioned economic benefits are exceeded by the attendant opportunity costs of substituting military for nonmilitary expenditures. It is toward answering this question that this analysis will be directed.

II. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE DEFENSE-EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

A. U.S. Defense Spending as an Employment Stimulus

The proposition that defense expenditures generate fewer jobs than do equivalent civilian expenditures is established both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretical standpoint (the relevant studies will be discussed later in this analysis), two considerations highlight the relative inferiority of military spending as an employment tonic.

First, military spending is capital-intensive by nature. Unlike other "labor-intensive" components of federal spending, such as transfer payments and employee compensation, in which individuals are reimbursed for either meeting certain eligibility requirements or performing a service, the bulk of military expenditures purchase the defense-related products deemed essential to maintaining national security. Hence the label "capital-intensive." Statistically, 68.7% of FY 1977 U.S. defense outlays purchased goods, compared with 30.1% of nationwide personal consumption expenditures and 24.5% of nondefense public spending (Blank and Rothschild). These figures were compiled in the previously cited BEA study and are unfortunately the most recent available. If anything, the defense figure would have

risen over the subsequent decade, given recent trends in DOD procurement outlays.) In relative terms, the capital-intensity of U.S. military outlays therefore exceeds twice that of consumption expenditures and approaches triple that of federal nondefense expenditures. And military expenditures consume 6.3% of the U.S. GNP, while employing (in work-years equivalent) an estimated 3.5% of the U.S. labor force indirectly testifies to the capital- dependent orientation of U.S. military outlays (Royer, p. 280).

Considerations of capital-intensity aside, that the salaries of the engineering and scientific personnel upon which the defense sector depends so heavily substantially exceed the national median further inhibits defense sector job creation. According to data collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce, median annual earnings of "technical and related support" professions exceeded those of "all workers" by 16.0% (U.S. Department of Commerce). Even such non-technical personnel as blue-collar and clerical employees employed by the defense establishment enjoy higher salaries than their civilian counterparts, due to the high profit margins and relative absence of competition traditionally enjoyed by defense-oriented firms. Given the salary differential, it follows that defense outlays supporting relatively high-salaried employees necessarily generate fewer additional jobs than would an equivalent civilian expenditure. And when previously discussed considerations of defense sector capital-intensity are included, the defense/nondefense employment differential widens further still.

In discussing the relative inferiority of U.S. military spending as an employment tonic, it should also be noted that periods of declining defense expenditures have historically been accompanied by vigorous economic growth and declining unemployment. The 1955-56 period immediately following the Korean War, the 1962-64 period preceding the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the 1971-73 era coinciding with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam were all periods of reduced U.S. military expenditures, receding unemployment, and rapid economic expansion. Although not direct evidence of a causal relationship between military expenditures and economic contraction, the historical coexistence of declining U.S. military expenditures and reduced unemployment is noteworthy.

B. Defense Spending and the U.S. Occupational Spectrum

Regarding the employment ostensibly generated as a direct consequence of U.S. defense expenditures, it is often the case that additional jobs are not actually created, but are shifted from the civilian to the defense sectors. This phenomenon of "employment shift" is especially characteristic of the engineering and related technical professions as previously employed technicians and engineers are diverted from civilian occupations to fulfill military demand. As a consequence of the high degree of education and specialized training required, professional and technical workers have historically enjoyed the lowest unemployment rate of any occupational category. In December 1982, the height of the 1981-82 recession (dubbed "the worst in postwar history"), as overall U.S. unemployment mounted to 10.8%, only 3.7% of "professional and technical workers" were actively seeking jobs (DeGrasse, p. 14). Thus, although defense expenditures generate military-related job openings for engineers and scientific personnel, aggregate employment within this occupational category rises but only negligibly.

Moreover, a defense effort concentrated in the engineering-intensive aircraft, communications, and ordnance industries creates disproportionately few jobs for those most in need — the "hard-core," unskilled unemployed. And military force levels, the one aspect of military spending with the potential to create jobs for the unskilled, have risen but 6.2% in the decade since 1977 (Budget, FY 1979, p. 71 and Budget, FY 1988, p. 5-14). Taking the tenth root of 1.062 implies that military force levels rose but 6.03% annually over the 1977-87 decade. By comparison, the U.S. labor force expanded by 19.0% over the same period, for an average annual increase of 1.76% (Economic Report of the President, p. 280). Assuming the structural unemploy ment rate over the 1977-87 decade to be approximately constant (it is, after all, the rate of "structural" unemployment and is ostensibly unaffected by cyclical fluctuations in the unemployment rate), the annual increase in the absolute number of structurally unemployed individuals outpaced the annual increment in military force levels by a factor of three. And until the current decline in the relative priority accorded military force levels is dramatically reversed, defense spending will remain of limited effectiveness in addressing structural unemployment. Military expenditures are therefore ill-equipped to

address unemployment at either end of the occupational spectrum — from the "fully employed" to the hard-core unemployed.

C. Lagged Effects of U.S. Military Spending

Further diluting the effectiveness of military spending as an employment tonic or anti-recession tool are the lags which invariably accompany defense sector employment. The temporal lags characterizing military procurement in general are quantified in a recent analysis by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Concluded the CBO, "on average, $1 appropriated for defense procurement produces only about 12 cents of actual outlays in the first year. Outlays grow to 37 cents in the second year, 30 cents in third year, and then tail off" (ACDA). By comparison, the corresponding lags for federal transfer payments are virtually nonexistent. Upon Congressional passage of a benefit increase or modification of eligibility requirements, affected recipients begin receiving the revised benefits almost immediately. Likewise, better than 97% of Congressional appropriations earmarked for federal salaries enter the economic bloodstream within one year.

Within the defense sector, the example of military shipbuilding in particular (an increasingly important component of Pentagon spending, given the U.S. Navy's much-publicized commitment to a 600-ship fleet) is an instructive one. Historically, only 2% of Navy shipbuilding appropriations become outlays within the first year, rising to 14% the second year, 18% annually for the third through sixth years, with the remaining 12% disbursed over the seventh and future years (Kaufmann, p. 11). Similar percentages characterize expenditures on such military staples as tanks, aircraft, and military construction (Center for Defense Information). Military procurement expenditures are therefore suited for addressing only those recessions which can be definitively forecasted years in advance. And in the absence of macroeconomic crystal balls, military procurement spending will remain of limited effectiveness as an economic stabilizer.

D. The Volatility of U.S. Defense Spending

Not only are military expenditures of negligible effectiveness in taming periods of economic expansion and reversing recessions, but policymakers attempting to employ defense spending as an economic stabilizer may unwittingly aggravate that which they intended to

stabilize, with potentially disasterous consequences. This conclusion is a direct and unavoidable consequence of the inherent volatility of U.S. defense outlays.

Defining volatility as the "sum of the absolute value of year-to-year changes in the percentage of spending going to each of the . . . expenditure categories." Blank and Rothschild (Blank and Rothschild, p. 682) estimated the volatility of 1972-83 U.S. defense outlays at nearly triple that of personal consumption expenditures. In annual terms, Blank and Rothschild estimated the volatility of U.S. defense expenditures at 4.3%. The corresponding volatility of personal consumption expenditures was estimated at 1.5%. Moreover, between FY 1980 and FY 1985, annual DOD authorization (recognizing again the distinction between authority and outlays) appreciated 65% faster than did the entire U.S. economy. Since FY 1985, however, as Congressional enthusiasm for further defense increases gave way to considerations of deficit-cutting, defense authority declined 2.5% in real terms (Budget, FY 1987, p. 5-5 and Budget, FY 1988, p. 5-6), while the recovering economy continues along its expansionary path.

Recalling that U.S. defense outlays constitute 6.3% of annual GNP, efforts to achieve stable, sustained economic growth are therefore thwarted as a consequence of the wide swings in Congressionally enacted defense appropriations. When coupled with the lags that invariably characterize the authorization and disbursement of defense appropriations, any countercyclical contribution of U.S. defense spending towards taming economic expansion or reversing recessions is purely coincidental. In fact, it is equally probable that such expenditures will contribute toward a potentially disastrous anti-countercyclical overheating of economic expansions or exacerbating of recessionary periods. The use of U.S. military expenditures as an economic stabilizer therefore represents a contradiction in terms.

E. U.S. Military Spending and Economic Growth—The Short Run

A great deal of present-day economic analysis is predicated upon the theory of resource diversion or opportunity cost. As applied to the U.S. defense establishment, resource diversion theory holds that every dollar appropriated for military purposes represents one dollar diverted from the U.S. civilian sector. Extrapolating, a $33 billion annual defense effort necessarily implies the diversion of substantial quantities of human and capital resources from the civilian to the

defense sectors. This resource diversion to the U.S. defense establishment has profound and serious consequences for U.S. economic growth, in the short and the long run. Over the short term, the diversion of resources to a relatively less productive defense sector has negative implications for present economic performance.

That the U.S. military sector is less productive than its civilian counterpart is an inevitable consequence of its unique structure. Unlike other markets where a multitude of sellers vigorously compete for the affections and loyalties of millions of prospective buyers, the defense sector is characterized by a single, monopsonistic Pentagon as buyer. After deciding which weapons systems are required to maintain U.S. national security and securing Congressional authorization of such systems, the Pentagon contracts with certain defense contractors for their research, development, testing, and eventual production. On the other side of the equation, the contract-winning firm closely resembles a monopolist in its relationship with the Pentagon — especially in the case of highly specialized, technologically complex weapons systems deemed militarily necessary by strategic planners. With a monopsonistic Pentagon on one side and a monopolistic contractor on the other, the defense establishment, in practice, scarcely resembles the utopian capitalistic world envisioned by Adam Smith. This arrangement has unavoidably negative implications for defense sector efficiency.

Numbering among these consequences is the Pentagon's legendary capacity for sheer wastefulness. Perhaps more than any other federal entity, the Defense Department is notorious for wasting prodigious sums of taxpayer dollars. Spare parts abuses, cost-overruns, and mismanagement in general are qualities seemingly inherent in the military acquisition process. In a 1985 New York Times editorial, James Reston listed some of the more egregious examples of procurement waste. Included were expenditures of $1118 for a plastic stool-leg cap, a $659 plastic ashtray, a $435 hammer, and a $400 socket wrench, among others (Kaufmann). Recent revelations of $640 toilet seats have inspired many an editorial cartoonist. Those companies notorious for spare parts price abuses, commented a DOD official in an October 1984 Wall Street Journal interview, merely "reaped the financial benefits of the military's glaring lack of cost controls" (Riddell, p. 455). And despite Secretary Weinberger's "personal resolve to

clear up the spare parts situation" (Riddell, p. 456), such abuses continue today, virtually unabated.

Ingrained defense sector wastefulness and mismanagement, while unfortunate and irritating in its own right, inevitably also has negative consequences for sectoral productivity growth. Empirically, using 1972 data compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Economic Analysis, Blank and Rothschild estimated productivity (measured in annual output per worker) for "personal consumption expenditures" to exceed that of "military final demand" by 7.8% (Blank and Rothschild, p. 690). The irony of this productivity differential is reflected in Blank and Rothschild's subsequent conclusion "workers employed to supply military demands are better paid on average than other workers, but are relatively less productive" (Blank and Rothschild, p. 690).

Exacerbating the defense/nondefense productivity differential is the lack of incentives within the defense sector to enhance productivity. Through its noncompetitive bidding practices, the DOD fails to reward those contractors who do invest to upgrade productivity. For FY 1986, 43% of DOD prime contracts were awarded noncompetitively (Budget, FY 1988, p. 5-13). Of the 57% that were "negotiated competitively", the majority involved the solicitation of bids from firms predetermined by the Pentagon. In all, fewer than 10% of all DOD prime contracts are awarded following formal price competition (Riddell, p. 454). Within the contract negotiation process, the DOD's emphasis upon high performance specifications and attendant willingness and ability to pay, necessarily minimizes the importance of cost, again removing a primary rationale for contractor investment, namely the expansion of profits through the reduction of per-unit cost. In fact, current DOD practices actively discourage capital investment by military contractors by directly reimbursing contractors for inflated production costs attributable to capital obsolescence.

The high degree of concentration and specialization characteristic of civilian defense contractors further reduces the incentive to undertake investment expenditures. Of the estimated 30,000 defense contractors, the ten largest firms accounted for 34.3% of FY 1983 DOD prime contracts, with 20.6% directed to the top five alone (Riddell, p. 453). Reinforcing the defense sector's tendency toward what one observer terms "oligopolistic rivalry" are such factors as

extensive barriers to entry (including size, expertise, and limited access to government-owned capital), frequent vertical and horizontal integration, and a tacit commitment by the Pentagon to maintain the profitability of its largest contractors. Consequently, the extent of defense sector concentration has worsened in recent years. For FY 1980, the comparable percentage of DOD prime contracts awarded the ten largest defense firms was 29.8%; the top five, 18.8% (Riddell, p. 453). Mounting defense sector concentration necessarily implies a corresponding reduction in competition, which induces complacent attitudes and tempers any incentive for a vigorous investment effort.

Moreover, studies confirm the historically inferior investment rates of defense contractors. A comprehensive 1976 DOD-commissioned evaluation of defense contracting firms and practices, Profit '76 (Ball and Leitenberg, p. 39), estimated that military contractors invest an average 35% of gross sales. The comparable figure for a Federal Trade Commission sample of some 5,000 nondefense durable goods firms was 63%. Of those industries comprising the U.S. military sector, DOD shipbuilding contractors invested the most per sales dollar, but still invested substantially less than commercial shipyards.

Having established the relative inefficiency of the U.S. defense sector vis-a-vis the civilian economy and the uninspiring prospects for any narrowing of the shortfall, it therefore follows that aggregate economic growth suffers as a consequence of the diversion of human and capital resources to the military establishment. In particular, the widespread diversion of scientists and engineers to less productive military endeavors exacerbates the civilian engineer shortfall.

As a consequence of their unique responsibility to "provide for the common defense", defense contractors characteristically employ a disproportionately high percentage of engineers and technically skilled personnel. It is a cornerstone of U.S. strategic planning that the U.S. must maintain technological supremacy to offset overwhelming Soviet quantitative advantages. While strategically necessary, the maintenance of U.S. technological superiority exacts a heavy toll on the collective pool of U.S. scientific and engineering talent.

Specifically, the defense-dependent aircraft and communications industries mentioned earlier cumulatively account for a modest 1.3% of civilian employment, but 8.9% of U.S. physicists, 11.6% of

mathematicians, 12.4% of U.S. engineers, and 16.5% of electrical engineers (Blank and Rothschild, p. 693). In the guided missile industry alone, engineers constitute 31.1% of the work force (DeGrasse, p. 13). Overall, it is estimated that upwards of one-third of U.S. scientific and engineering personnel are engaged in military-related activities (Dumas, 1982, p. 72).

This continuing military demand for technically skilled personnel occurs within the context of an economy already critically short of engineering talent. By 1990, predicts the American Engineering Association, the cumulative shortfall of electrical and computer engineers will total 35,000 (The Joint Economic Committee, p. 119).

Less affectionately referred to by some as "brain drain", such a sustained diversion of technically skilled personnel from the civilian sector stymies the development of improved U.S. industrial technologies. To quote Dumas, "The most fundamental prerequisite to the development of new technology is the availability of appropriately skilled engineering and scientific personnel." (Dumas, 1987, p. 32) To the extent that military demands constrain the availability of engineering and scientific talent for the development of increasingly advanced civilian technologies aimed at streamlining productive efficiency, civilian productivity growth suffers, with ensuing negative consequences for both future GNP expansion and aggregate employment.

To quantify the ongoing decline in annual U.S. productivity growth, for the ten years spanning 1955-1965, nonfarm U.S. productivity growth averaged 3.0%. Over the subsequent decade, annual nonfarm productivity gains contracted to 1.8%. For the most recent decade ending in 1985, the productivity deterioration worsened further still, with annual U.S. productivity growth averaging a meager 1.2% (Economic Report of the President, p. 195). (While other influences such as deteriorating rates of saving and investment have undoubtedly also contributed to the productivity falloff, the cumulative effects of continued high rates of "peacetime" defense spending inhibiting civilian technological progress should not be disregarded.) And not only has U.S. productivity growth declined in absolute terms, it has receded in relative terms as well. In recent years the U.S. has enjoyed the lowest rate of productivity growth of the industrialized

world (Melman, p. 87). Since the 1950's, the "productivity gap" or lag in U.S. productivity growth behind that of our Japanese and West German competitors has averaged 3-5% annually. Not coincidentally, Japan and West Germany devote 1.0% and 3.3%, respectively, of their GNP to national defense, while the comparable figure for the U.S. exceeds 6%. The notion of a military/productivity tradeoff is also established empirically. Specifically, an examination by the Council on Economic Priorities of 13 industrial nations' respective performances over the past two decades demonstrated a negative relationship between military expenditures and annual civilian productivity growth (Dellums, p. 197).

Recognizing the contribution of civilian technological progress toward improved productive efficiency, the National Science Foundation described such innovation as "perhaps the most important factor in the economic growth of the United States in this century" (Dumas, 1982, p. 75). By inhibiting the pace of civilian technological innovation and therefore productivity growth, U.S. military expenditures (especially those directed toward engineering-intensive military research and development) jeopardize prospects for continued improvement in the U.S. standard of living.

F. U.S. Military Spending and Economic Growth – The Long Run

The deleterious effect of military spending upon the economy, however, is not confined solely to the short run. Over the longer term, future economic growth is compromised as a consequence of the so-called "investment tradeoff" between military expenditures and investment outlays.

The notion of a defense-investment tradeoff is empirically established, with several studies (Cappelen, 1984; Smith, 1980; Smith and Georgiou, 1983) demonstrating a tradeoff between military expenditures and domestic investment. According to these analyses, a nation's propensity to save and invest is retarded by an amount roughly proportional to the appreciation of its military burden (measured as a percentage of annual GNP). Hence the "investment tradeoff." In what is termed a "classic study" on the relationship between defense spending and economic performance. Russet (1970) quantified the magnitude of this inverse relationship. Specifically, Russet estimated that for the 1939-68 period, every dollar of U.S. military spending inhibited capital formation by 29 cents, eleven of

which would have gone directly toward the purchase of new industrial equipment. Thus, between one-fourth and one-third of U.S. defense outlays represent foregone investment expenditures. And given that federal budget deficits directly contract the pool of available capital, the magnitude of the defense-investment tradeoff worsens in the event of deficit-financed military spending. Whether or not exacerbated by deficit financing, the implications of the investment tradeoff are serious.

It is widely recognized that current investment levels are a crucial determinant of future economic performance. One estimate quantifies the contribution of each investment dollar at between 20 and 25 cents of additional production in each successive year (Russet, 1970). A $282 billion annual defense effort therefore implies between $16 and $20 billion of sacrificed productive capacity, annually. Coupling these figures with a Center for Defense Information finding that every billion dollars of 1978 civilian-oriented production generates 53,000 jobs (Center for Defense Information, p. 3) (suggesting a comparable figure of approximately 30,600 jobs corresponding to 1987 price levels), an estimate of between 500,000 and 600,000 jobs is obtained for the total employment foregone as a consequence of the "investment tradeoff" alone. To quote Arthur Burns, former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, "The real cost of the defense sector consists, therefore, not only of the civilian goods and services that are foregone on its account; it includes also an element of growth that could have been achieved through larger investment in human or business capital" (Russett, 1982, p. 767).

G. Military R & D and Civilian "Spinoffs"

In response, it is asserted that military research and development frequently yields unintended technological "spinoffs" and therefore does not retard civilian technological development and prospective economic growth. Frequently cited are the well-known contributions of the Apollo project to improved civilian technologies ranging from medical telemetry systems to Tang. Given the many technological spinoffs resulting from a $15 billion (in current dollars) Apollo project, the reasoning continues, imagine the technological side effects of, say, appropriating $2 trillion for a space-based missile defense system (a.k.a. "Star Wars"). However interesting and novel this proposition, though, the notion of military R&D expenditures

spawning a civilian technological revolution is a flawed one. The reasons for this are many.

Military R & D, to begin with, is, by its secretive nature, inherently unsuited to the civilian dissipation of discoveries. Unlike civilian industry, the U.S. defense establishment is also entrusted with the formidable responsibility of maintaining U.S. national security. Because of the U.S. defense sector's unique responsibilities, concern for avoiding compromise of technologically sensitive discoveries necessarily overrides any willingness to share such innovations with the U.S. private sector.

And even if the Pentagon were completely to abandon all pretense of secrecy and enthusiastically share all discoveries with the non-defense sector, the applicability of increasingly specialized military technologies to civilian uses has declined in recent years. Most military R & D funds, for example, are directed toward the engineering development phase of the weapons development cycle, work unlikely to possess direct civilian application. The inconvertibility of military technologies to civilian application is further demonstrated by a 1978 United Nations study concluding "military technology is moving further and further away from any conceivable civilian use, and is anyway focusing on fields which are mostly irrelevant for the solution of the more important present and future problems of the world" (Thorsson). Realistically, the civilian applicability of precision-guided missile tracking systems and neutral particle beam technologies currently under development within the Strategic Defense Initiative are few, if any.

Not only is the notion of military-oriented R & D spurring a civilian technological Renaissance theoretically untenable, it has not been borne out by historical experience. Concluded the National Academy of Engineering, "With few exceptions the vast technology developed by federally funded programs since World War II has not resulted in widespread "spinoffs" of secondary or additional applications of practical products, processes and services that have made an impact on the nation's economic growth, industrial productivity, employment gains and foreign trade" (Dumas, 1982, p. 74).

If proponents of the spinoffs rationale sincerely desired civilian technological innovation, they would advocate directing the resources toward civilian R&D, rather than awaiting unintended, unpredictable,

not to mention unlikely, technological "spinoffs" from highly specialized military projects. That they do not says more about their desire to promote additional "big-ticket" weapons systems than their interest in revitalizing the U.S. civilian technological base. Recognizing the folly of directing scarce resources toward defense-related R&D in anticipation of potential civilian applications of discoveries yet to be made, Dunne & Smith conclude "a greater return would be obtained by devoting the resources directly to basic research or civilian development" (Dunne and Smith, p. 301).

In all due fairness, the Pentagon is not the only federal agency to invoke the notion of unforseen technological spinoffs in requesting expanded funding. So has NASA, in many respects the Defense Department's civilian counterpart. Confronted with a NASA budget request containing projections of a technological windfall from expanded NASA activities, former Director of the Office of Budget and Management David Stockman likened NASA's position to "in effect claiming that the way to build a better mousetrap was to go to Jupiter" (Stockman, p. 151). Both historically and conceptually, the notion of unintended technological spinoffs is a feeble justification at best for the widespread diversion of human and capital resources to the military.

III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELEVANT EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

The conclusion that defense spending hampers economic performance is as established empirically as it is theoretically. Ever since Emile Benoit's pathbreaking (though subsequently refuted) analysis of the relationship between military expenditures and economic performance for 44 developing countries, researchers have attempted conclusively to determine the direction and magnitude of the influence of military spending on the domestic economy. A substantial body of research literature emerged, with the vast majority of analyses supporting the conclusion that defense spending represents a net burden on the economy. Of those few analyses reaching an opposite conclusion, most were either subsequently disproven or demonstrated to possess incapacitating methodological shortcomings.

To begin with, the proposition that military spending generates the fewest jobs per expenditure dollar enjoys widespread empirical

support. This should not be surprising, in light of the relative capital-intensivity and elevated wage rates characteristic of the U.S. defense establishment. Writing in the Journal of Peace Research, Nincic and Cusack (p. 111) cited an estimate by the Michigan Public Interest Group that military hiring (which is even less capital-intensive than military procurement and therefore creates more jobs) generates the fewest jobs per expenditure dollar of the six public employment categories surveyed. At 58,000 jobs per billion dollars, "defense" proved demonstrably inferior as an employment stimulus to the categories of "fire" (70,000), "teachers" (73,000), "police" (76,000), "nurses" (85,000), and "Job Corps" (145,000).

An earlier analysis conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics contrasted Defense Department spending with somewhat different occupational categories. Again "defense industries" (at 75,000 jobs/billion $) proved least effective as an employment stimulant, behind "construction" (100,000), "health" (138,000), and "education" (187,000). (The Boston Study Group, p. 293) Since the BLS study predated that of the Michigan Public Interest Research Group cited above, its corresponding employment figures are understandably larger, in light of the dollar's steadily declining purchasing power.

Not only does the U.S. defense establishment create fewer jobs than a few selected categories of civilian expenditure, but it generates less employment than even civilian expenditures in general. Analyzing the nationwide employment impact of FY 1977-78 U.S. defense expenditures, Anderson (Dellums, p. 187) discovered that spending for "military industry" yields 9,000 fewer jobs per unit billion dollar expenditure than "civilian industry". Regarding public nondefense expenditures, the differential was even greater – 35,000 more jobs than an equivalent billion dollar appropriation for defense.

Similar conclusions were reached in an analysis conducted by the Center for Defense Information (Center for Defense Information, p. 3). While FY 1977 military expenditures were estimated to generate 45,800 jobs per billion dollars, the comparable figure for "civilian production" was 53,000. Every billion dollars in defense outlays therefore represents a net sacrifice of 7,200 jobs in comparison with simply leaving the money in the hands of the American consumer. For the occupational categories of "anti-recession aid to state and local

governments" (71,000 jobs/billion $) and "public service employment" (98,000 jobs/billion $), the corresponding employment differentials totalled 25,200 and 42,200 jobs, respectively. Concluded the CDI, "military spending at any level is a burden on the economy, not a stimulant". (Center for Defense Information, p. 8)

Assuming defense expenditures to exert a dampening influence upon both GNP and aggregate employment, it follows, therefore, that aggregate employment increases as a consequence of reduced defense expenditures – whether accompanied by tax refunds or expanded nondefense governmental spending. Writing in the Journal of Regional Science, Bezdek analyzed the employment impact of a "compensated" 30% reduction in U.S. defense spending – that is, one accompanied by an offsetting increase in nondefense public expenditures. A similarly compensated 30% increase in military spending was also examined. While neither of these scenarios is particularly realistic given current political sentiment, the direction and magnitude of the hypothetical employment consequences is instructive. Concluded Bezdek, "Overall, the reallocation of defense expenditures to domestic programs increased total national employment by slightly more than two percent and reduction of expenditures in favor of arms procurement reduced total employment by approximately 1.3 percent." (p. 189)

In the case of a defense reduction accompanied by a direct tax refund, the Employment Research Associates (DeGrasse, p. 12) concluded likewise. Specifically, the Associates' scenario involved the reallocation of $62.9 billion in FY 1981 military outlays to personal consumption expenditures. Given the historically low U.S. propensity to save (a meager 4.3% in 1986 and approaching 2% in recent months (Stone, p. 1), such a reallocation would be analgous to a direct tax refund. As a consequence of the hypothetical expenditure shift, defense-related employment declined by an estimated 1.8 million, offset by the consumption-fueled addition of 3.3 million private sector jobs. The U.S. economy, therefore, registered a net employment gain of 1.5 million jobs due to the expenditure reallocation.

Not only is there ample empirical demonstration of a negative relationship between military expenditures and economic performance for the U.S. economy, but studies involving other nations also reach similar conclusions. Investigating the consequences of a 50%

reduction in worldwide 1970-75 armaments outlays, a U.N.-commissioned analysis calculated the resultant total GNP expansion at $200 billion annually. Over the five-year period surveyed, the aggregate GNP differential attributable to the hypothetical defense cutback amounted to approximately $1 trillion. (Thorsson, p. 402) This figure exceeds the annual GNP of all but three of the world's 144 nations.

Other analyses demonstrating either an inverse relationship or the absence of a positive relationship between defense expenditures and economic performance include Dessouki, Lim, Frederiksen & Looney, Smith & Smith, Cappelen, and Brzoska & Wulf. Nor are these simply a few, isolated studies representing the fringe of economic thought. While concluding that military expenditures have depressed the United Kingdom's rate of economic growth, Dunne and Smith cite a "near unanimity in the technical literature" in support of the proposition that "disarmament represents an economic opportunity rather than an economic problem." (Dunne and Smith, p. 297) Even a study commissioned by the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, in recent years a champion of steadily increasing U.S. defense outlays, concluded "there is nothing unique about the capacity of military spending to create jobs." (Ball and Leitenberg, p. 13)

Somewhat different conclusions regarding the relationship between military spending and economic performance were reached by Emile Benoit in the late 1960's. In one of the first empirical attempts at investigating the relationship between military expenditures and economic performance, Benoit analyzed the experiences of 44 developing countries during the periods 1950-1965 and 1960-1965. For both periods, Benoit deduced a statistically significant positive correlation between a developing nation's average military burden and the pace of civilian GNP expansion. The provocative nature of Benoit's conclusion inspired a series of reexaminations of the Benoit methodology. Numerous criticisms surfaced.

Specific criticisms include Benoit's alleged overstatement of the contribution of defense outlays toward mobilizing previously underutilized national economic resources and understatement of such expenditures' retardation of national savings and investment levels. Not only is the military's contribution to resource mobilization difficult to quantify, but it is almost certainly offset by such expen-

ditures' well-established corrosive influence upon capital investment. Consequently, Deger and Smith argue, military expenditures hamper, rather than stimulate, economic growth within developing nations. (Deger and Smith, pp. 335-353) Benoit's correlation of a static measure (average defense burden computed as a percentage of GNP) with a dynamic measure (the current rate of GNP expansion) is also methodologically questionable. Reviewing the Benoit methodology, Chan suggests "in the absence of a clear delineation of the temporal order between the introduction of the supposed cause and the subsequent observation of effect, it is difficult to infer a causal relationship from such analysis". (ACDA, p. 34)

Notwithstanding potential methodological questions, Benoit's conclusions themselves are far from certain. Although the study is frequently cited as conclusively refuting allegations of a dampening effect by military spending upon aggregate economic output, it meekly concludes "...we have been unable to establish whether the net growth effects of defence expenditures have been positive or not. On the basis of all the evidence we suspect that they have been positive, for the countries in our sample, and at past levels of defence burden, but we have not been able to prove this." (ACDA, p. 34) Empirically, Benoit's investigation failed to demonstrate a positive relationship between military expenditures and economic performance. Unsupported statistically, Benoit's suspicion of such a relationship is therefore dependent upon his personal assessment of such expenditures' nonquantifiable contributions to the civilian economy. It is, thus, not a conclusion but a hypothesis, and an unproven one at that.

In all due fairness to Benoit, other studies reaching similar conclusions are not without their own methodological shortcomings. For certain Mediterranean nations, Chan (ACDA, p. 30) reports the existence of a positive "correlation" between member nations' defense burdens and economic growth rates, but fails to specify the existence or direction of causation. In other words, Chan demonstrates the co-occurence of expanding defense outlays and rising economic output, while proceeding to infer a causal relationship between the two. Such is tantamount to inferring a causal relationship between, say, pickle consumption and mortality, reasoning that all who consume pickles have or will eventually die. Colorful analogies

aside, the point to be realized is that correlation and causation are not synonymous. In fact, precisely the opposite conclusion can be legitimately inferred from Chan's research data. Rather than defense expenditures spurring economic expansion, as Chan concluded, perhaps it is continued economic expansion which permits an increasing annual defense burden. Certainly a defense buildup is more affordable during periods of economic expansion than when the economy is mired in a recession. Both hypotheses are equally plausible given Chan's demonstration of the concurrence of both a rising defense burden and improved economic performance.

IV. CONCLUSION

The notion of U.S. defense spending taming recessions, diminishing unemployment, and fostering economic growth while simultaneously ensuring national security enjoys widespread public and Congressional support. It cuts across the political spectrum, uniting both right and left. On the right, former Texas Governor and Republican Presidential candidate John Connally once advocated a $250 million Lockheed defense contract "so they can provide employment for 31,000 people throughout the country at a time when we desperately need that type of employment". (Center for Defense Information, p. 2) On the left, liberal California Assemblyman Tom Hayden (perhaps better known as the husband of former Viet Cong sympathizer and antiwar activist Jane Fonda) was once quoted as saying "I don't believe that any defense contract ought to be cut in the face of mass unemployment". (Center for Defense Information, p. 2) Unfortunately, this notion is as mistaken as it is popular. Far from being the economic cure-all advertised by supporters, in reality military spending stifles consumption expenditures, reduces investment outlays, retards technological development, constrains productivity gains, weakens U.S. international competitiveness, and diminishes economic growth prospects over both the short- and long-term. Although often overlooked in the ongoing annual debate over military appropriations for the coming fiscal year, the employment consequences of U.S. military expenditures are many and real. Hundreds of thousands of unemployed Americans owe their unemployment directly to the U.S. military establishment. It seems strangely ironic that America's quest for military superiority through the accumulation of weaponry may

actually erode U.S. national security by undermining the very foundation of America's rise to international prominence – namely, her economic dynamism. As President Eisenhower pointedly stated three decades ago, "...there is no way in which a country can satisfy the craving for absolute security – but it can easily bankrupt itself, morally and economically, in attempting to reach that illusory goal through arms alone." (Center for Defense Information, p. 5)

Eisenhower was right.

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