The House that Joe Taxpayer Built: Preserving the Role of Baseball Stadiums Without Providing Distorted Public Subsidies
dc.contributor.author | Gregory, Christopher | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-05-25T22:32:12Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-05-25T22:32:12Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
dc.description.abstract | (1 Willamette Sports L.J., no. 1, 2004). This article discusses stadium projects in Denver, Seattle, and San Francisco, analyzing the bargaining power of cities and baseball teams. The article then considers legal issues relating to public subsidies for stadiums, including whether the costs of a related labor dispute (i.e., a baseball strike) can be shifted from local government to a team. The author concludes that the power difference between local governments and baseball teams is the root problem behind stadium negotiations. To correct that problem, the author advocates a more stringent application of antitrust law, and an erosion of the “baseball exception” in antitrust. | |
dc.identifier.citation | 1 Willamette Sports L.J., no. 1, 2004. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10177/5562 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.title | The House that Joe Taxpayer Built: Preserving the Role of Baseball Stadiums Without Providing Distorted Public Subsidies | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |